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This thesis investigates Bulgarian sports policy in the 20th century, from 1878 until 1999. 
More specifically, it seeks to examine the making of sports policy as a field of state 
activity and as a process involving various projects, agents and transformations, by 
uncovering the underlying structures and relations in the national sports policy context. 
The research is informed by the premises of the Strategic Relations Approach as 
developed by Jessop (1990), while critical theory provides the link between the 
theoretical foundations and the interpretation of data. 
This task demands an analysis which can account for the political, social and economic 
environments in which sports policy is made, and also for the structures and actors 
involved. In doing so, the thesis challenges both the traditional Marxist approach to the 
state, and some of the Jessopian claims about interests, strategies and global influences on 
policy making. The history of the modem Bulgarian state is marked by three major 
transformations, and the advancement of three distinct projects - Capitalism, Communism 
and Europeanisation - each aiming to establish a new stateness. Subsequently, it is argued 
that sports policy is a strategic relation, the formation of which needs to be viewed within 
state-society relations at particular historical conjuncture. Furthermore, this relation 
constitutes a process of past and present struggles, the outcomes of which are uncertain. 
The study draws several conclusions regarding strategic relations in sport policy making 
by highlighting: 
" the relations between state projects and sports projects; 
" the forms of state intervention in sport in various socio-political environments; 
" the constitution of power in sports policy and state-society interactions; and 
" the role of transnational and local forces in shaping sports policy (e. g. 
international sports federations and the IOC). 
The conceptualising and operationalising of Strategic Relations allows for three 
overriding tendencies pertinent to Bulgaria's sport policy to be outlined - of continuity, 
statisation and incongruity. One aspect of this study of theoretical interest in that, so far 
as can be ascertained, it is the first time that the Strategic Relations approach has been 
applied to a Communist state. 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements i 
List of Figures ii 
List of Tables iii 
List of Abbreviations iv 
Chapter 1 The Bulgarian State in the 20th century - Projects 
and Transformations: An Introduction 1 
1.1. State projects and transformations: towards a Strategic 
Relations perspective 2 
1.2. Synopsis 6 
Chapter 2 The State, Strategic Relations, Transformations and Sport 8 
2.1. Introduction 9 
2.2. The Strategic Relations Approach 11 
2.3. The Implications of the Strategic Relations Approach 14 
2.3.1. On the nature of the state 14 
2.3.2. The state's constitution 16 
2.3.3. State-society relationships 19 
2.3.4. The state power 23 
2.4. What did the Strategic Relations Approach fail to attend to? 26 
2.4.1. Interpreting Strategic Relations in a totalitarian setting 27 
2.4.2. State-society relationship in totalitarianism 28 
2.4.3. Representations and interests in totalitarianism 30 
2.4.4. The totalitarian power 32 
2.4.5. Strategic Relations in a socialist (non-capitalist) setting 35 
2.4.6. Strategic Relations and the politics of transformations 37 
2.5. Globalization, the Nation-State and changing Strategic Relations: 
implications for sport policy 
2.5.1. Globalization - definitions and interpretations 
e 
43 
46 
2.5.2. Globalization and the nation-state: effects and 
responses 48 
2.5.3. Towards a global sports order? 53 
2.5.4. Globalization and state strategies 57 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 62 
3.1. Preceding remarks 63 
3.2. The study of sport policy through the lenses of the critical 
theory and the Strategic Relations approach 66 
3.3. Research methodology: Elements and Strategy 72 
3.3.1. Defining sport policy 78 
3.3.2. Sport policy deconstruction and reconstruction 84 
3.3.3. Data collection 85 
3.3.4 The Case study method 88 
3.3.5. Validation of Research Concepts 91 
3.3.6. Data analysis 92 
Chapter 4 State projects, Strategic Relations and Sport Policy Making: 
The Capitalist Period (1878-1944) 97 
4.1. The making of a state 
4.2. State projects and society 
4.3. Constructing the sports policy domain: state projects 
and interventions 
4.4. Strategic Relations in sport policy making 
4.5. Conclusion 
Chapter 5 The State, Strategic Relations and Sport Policy Making: 
The Communist Period (1944-1989) 
5.1. Building the socialist state and its projections for sport 
5.2. State projects and society 
5.3. Constructing the sports policy domain - state projects 
and interventions 
5.4. Strategies and strategic relations in sport policy making 
98 
103 
108 
114 
123 
126 
127 
131 
135 
142 
Chapter 8 Globalization, State Responses and Sport Policy Making 219 
8.1. The state and global interconnectedness 220 
8.2. Transnational linkages and state responses 225 
8.3. The global sport nexus and strategic relations in national sport 
policy making 229 
8.4. Conclusions 239 
Chapter 9 Strategic Relations in Bulgarian Sports Policy: Conclusions 241 
9.1. The state as a social relations 242 
9.2. Conceptualising state-social relations in sport policy making 246 
9.2.1. State projects and sport projects 246 
9.2.2. Forms of state intervention in sport and various 
socio-political environments 248 
9.2.3. The construction of power in sports policy 
and state-society interactions 248 
9.2.4. Transnational and local forces in shaping sports 
policy 250 
9.3. Operationalising strategic relations in sports policy making 251 
9.4. Lessons from the application of critical theory to sports 
policy analysis 262 
9.5. Strategic Relations applications outside capitalism 267 
9.6. Future research opportunities 269 
Bibliography 272 
Appendix A Sample Interview Transcript 291 
4 
Acknowledgements i 
In the course of completing this project I have incurred many intellectual and personal 
debts for which I would like to pay due credit now. First of all, I am greatly indebted 
to Mike Collins, my supervisor for his encyclopedical knowledge, drive, patience and 
friendship which he generously shared for many years stretching beyond the time span 
of this project. Also my sincere thanks go to Ian Henry who took me on a tour of the 
premises of the Department of Physical Education, Sports Sciences and Recreation 
Management in early 1990 and had been a source of support and intellectual stimulus 
ever since. This project would not have been completed without the trust and help of 
the Luton Business School and the Department of Tourism and Leisure to which I 
belong. I owe enormous gratitude to my Bulgarian friends and colleagues Peter 
Bankov and Ivan Sandanski and sports officials Ivan Slavkov, Jordanka Blagoeva and 
Radka Valkova for their insights and unique materials. I would like also to record my 
appreciation for the assistance of many colleagues with whom I have worked over the 
years in a number of national and international sports governing and professional 
bodies. 
Finally, I thank my wife Rossy and daughter Katerina for their understanding and 
support which helped to remove any sign of tension created by extended research 
endeavours like this. 
f 
List of Figures ii 
4.1. Shaping the sport policy domain - state policies and public movements 
(1878-1944) 109 
6.1. Key actors, their roles and relations in the sports policy domain - 1994-1996 183 
7.1. Organisational structure of the Aerobic Union Bulgaria 194 
7.2. National School Sports Federation - organisational structure 206 
9.1. Sport policy community during the Capitalist (1878-1944), Communist 
(1944-1989) and Democratic (1989-1999) periods 252 
9.2. State-social relations in sports policy (1878-1999) 253 
9.3. Strategic relations in sport policy making (1878-1999) 254 
e 
List of Tables iii 
3.1. Key theoretical propositions and their methodological implications 65 
3.2. Main research questions, theoretical premises, data required, sources of 
information and technique of data acquisition 68 
3.3. Sport policy-makers in Bulgaria interviewed regarding Communist and post- 
Communist periods 87 
4.1. Bulgaria's ruling political parties, their ideologies and sport visions 104 
4.2. Aspects of Bulgarian social structure, 1885 - 1944 107 
4.3. Ministry of Education budget as percentage of the total state budget 111 
4.4. Bulgarian participation in the Olympic Games in the capitalist period 121 
5.1. Sports classification in policy domain imposed by the Communist Party 139 
5.2. Sports domain members on local level 140 
5.3. State projects, sport projects and strategic responses (1958 - 1988) 144 
5.4. Budget of the central sport governing bodies VKFS (1945-1949) and 
BSFS (1959-1988) as percentage of state budget 155 
6.1. Incomes and expenditures of Bulgarian political parties (000Lv) 166 
6.2. Sports domain membership - (1989-1999) 177 
6.3. The status and strategic projects of BSFS and CYPES 181 
6.4. National Sports Federations' (NSFs) and sports clubs' sources of revenue 185 
6.5. Top ten state grant beneficiary NSFs and their club network (1998) 186 
8.1. Foreign direct investment by sector, 1992 - 1998 (US$ million) 226 
8.2. Participating municipalities and political patronage of the International 
Challenge Day and the World Walking Day 235 
8.3. International instruments for shaping Bulgarian sports policy 239 
9.1. Forms of state intervention in the sports policy domain (1878-1999) 249 
9 
List of Abbreviations 
AU - Aerobic Union Bulgaria 
BCP - Bulgarian Communist Party 
BFU - Bulgarian Football Union 
BOC - Bulgarian Olympic Committee 
BSFS - Bulgarian Sports Union 
CE - Council of Europe 
CM - Council of Ministers 
CYPES - Committee for Youth, Physical Education and Sport 
DFS - Sports Societies 
EU - European Union 
IFs - International Sports Federations 
IOC - International Olympic Committee 
ME - Ministry of Education 
MD - Ministry of Defence 
NFC - National Fitness Complex 
NSFs - National Sports Federations 
SC - Sports Clubs 
SCPES - Supreme Council for Physical Education and Sport 
SR - Strategic Relations 
SSF - School Sports Federation 
UDF - Union of Democratic Forces 
4 
iv 
Chapter 1 
The Bulgarian State in the 20th Century - Projects and 
Transformations: An Introduction 
Chapter 1. Bulgarian State in the 20th Century: An Introduction 
This thesis sets out to investigate Bulgarian sports policy in the 20" century, from 
1878 until 2000. The investigation, however, extends to the last two decades of the 
19"' century (1878 - 1900) because of their formative influence on the state and sport. 
More specifically, it seeks to examine the making of sports policy as a field of state 
activity and as a process involving various projects, agents and transformations. Taken 
from a strategic relations perspective, this task demands an analysis which can 
account for the political, social and economic environments in which sports policy is 
made, and also for the structures and actors involved. Given the scope of the study and 
the lack of similar investigations in domestic and foreign literature, this has proved to 
be a challenging undertaking. The topic was provoked particularly by current major 
changes in Bulgarian society, marking the transition from a totalitarian to a 
democratic settlement. Thus, what has been termed totalitarianism was taken as a 
point of departure for labelling the three periods under investigation as: capitalism 
(1878-1944), communism (1944-1989) and democracy (1989-1999). The project 
reflects the author's personal involvement in events since 1979, and many years of 
studying the topic. 
I. I. State projects and transformations: towards a Strategic 
Relations perspective 
The Bulgarian state has more than 1300 years of history, full of dramatic events. Over 
the last 121 years Bulgaria has undergone three massive transformations of the state, 
each causing enormous shake ups in public and individual lives. As a result, its history 
has been rewritten three times, every 40 to 60 years, and different interpretations were 
given to events, to actors' roles (both individual and corporate), and to outcomes, 
posing extra difficulties for researchers. 
The Bulgarian state was created in 681 and, after centuries of development and 
prosperity, in 1369 it lost its independence to the Ottoman Empire, to re-emerge only 
in 1878 as an independent state, though substantially different as a territory, 
population and constitution. The project set by the new state envisaged establishing a 
modem capitalist society based on democratic principles, but they (the constitution 
and administrative structure) were written in Russia, the least democratic country in 
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Europe. Despite its strong appeal, the project presented Bulgaria's society with a 
whole host of paradoxes. There was no political party representative of capital to take 
a lead, nor was there a capitalist class per se, nor markets for the industrial products 
which had been lost with the eclipse of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to what was 
intended, the capitalist period ended in 1944 with an overt monarcho-fascist 
dictatorship and a collapse of the national ideals. 
For the second time, the fate of Bulgaria's society was changed drastically in 1944, 
after World War 2, when it set out on the road to Communism and was subjugated 
totally to Soviet influence. This project presented a new host of paradoxes as the 
Communist Party, which was supposed to provide leadership of the project, was very 
weak and ill-organised. With over 70% of the population living in poverty in villages, 
there was no organised working class to assume a hegemonic role, nor was there a 
strong economy capable of delivering the promised general welfare. In a fashion 
similar to the previous period, the Communist project for equality and well-being 
produced a totalitarian society, with very limited individual freedoms, heavy foreign 
debts and mass disillusionment, which fell together with others in Eastern Europe in 
1989. 
The autumn of 1989 heralded the third state reshaping - the launching of the new 
democratic project. With it came the same paradoxes - there were no political parties 
to take the lead. Both the Communist Party and the new non-Communist formations 
had strong commitments to and sentiments about the past: the former to the 
Communist period when it reigned unchallenged, and the latter to the pre-totalitarian 
period and the privileges they had then enjoyed. Neither was there a distinct middle 
class capable of promoting and guaranteeing the key values of the project, nor was 
there a market economy in place capable of producing democratic institutions for the 
state. At present, the state's financial and social policy is being substantially dictated 
by other external agents, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World Bank. This period is far from over, but so far all indications suggest a 
discrepancy from rather than compliance with what was proclaimed. 
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Despite different ideological labels, the three state projects - Capitalism, Communism 
and Europeanisation - displayed a great deal of similarity in terms of: 
- total negation of previous values, practices and achievements 
- subjugation to foreign visions and interests 
- dominant political practices 
- the nature of state - civil society relations 
- forms of state intervention 
- forms of participation (or lack of it) of those in whose name the project 
was introduced in the policy process 
- project outcomes - failure to deliver what was promised. 
The approach undertaken to the analysis in this thesis is shaped to a degree by the 
very nature of this project. It appears that studies aiming to explain transformations 
should be in a position to provide a clear picture of what particular phenomena used to 
be, and what they are now as result of the transformations. Here the analysis confronts 
the issue of understanding. Our ability to understand the transformation is 
predetermined by the ability to understand what a capitalist or communist state had 
actually been. J. Baudrillard (1995: 81) in The Gulf war did not take place, 
successfully captured this dilemma by using Brecht's eloquent model of explanation: 
"This beer isn 't a beer, but that is compensated for by the fact that this cigar isn 't a 
cigar either. If this beer wasn 't a beer, and this cigar really was a cigar, then there 
would be a problem. " Somewhat analogous is the problem with understanding the 
transforming of sports policy and the form of state interventions in it. In other words, 
if we are justifiably critical about recent changes in national sport policy after the 
events of 1989, that is, if these were not real transformations, the adequacy of our 
understanding can be restored if we accept that what used to be labelled "socialist" 
sport has not been "socialist" sport, at least in the proper ideological sense of this 
definition. Conversely, if we agree that socialist sport was genuinely socialist, then it 
becomes difficult to understand why there were no changes during the transformation 
which would have persuasively characterised it as a process of dismantling socialist 
sport. The same model of logic is applied with regard to the capitalist and totalitarian 
periods of Bulgarian sport. 
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Having formed our understanding, we are still facing the issue: what went wrong in all 
three undertakings? Was it the project or its implementation? There could be very 
little disagreement with the timing and the aims of the three projects. They all were 
launched in a moment of crisis, when society was disillusioned, frustrated and 
humiliated, and clearly offered new perspectives for everyone. 
This thesis, however, will argue that what went wrong stemmed from the specific 
conjunctures created by transformations in each of the three periods. First, the very 
idea of building a new stateness (this is a common concept in Bulgarian political 
discourse) is controversial in itself. Inevitably, it involves the notion of discontinuity 
rather than continuity. As each of the three projected new states had to be built on a 
new rather than a current terrain, priority number one of each incoming state machine 
became dismantling the remnants of the past. By doing so, they cut traditional 
cultural, personal and economic links and created vacuums in relations and 
institutions, and made projects' and actors' places in any domain highly uncertain. 
Second, no project inherited a well-established political system and practices, nor a 
sound economy, nor an undivided society. Each sought to establish a new 
legitimisation, a new state and social unity. Third, various environments, outside 
forces and the nature of the projects turned the state into the supreme regulator of 
society and economy, and presupposed the kind of strategic relations to be 
established, ensuring its and its managers' leading roles, yet another paradox. Despite 
the compelling evidence for the supreme role of the state demonstrated by its history, 
Bulgarians remained highly sceptical about the state, traditionally detested it, and 
never had confidence in it, while from a perspective of individuals a state post has 
always been a highly attractive option and a source of privileges. 
Sports projects in the capitalist, communist and democratic periods clearly reflected 
the visions of various state projects, and sports policy making has always been 
considered as a state matter, rather than a private or a civil society issue. So, what then 
constitutes the relation between state and sport projects? Who are the sports policy 
makers? what motivates their choice? who determines what is to be placed on 
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society's agenda? or what is at stake? This thesis ventures to answer these and other 
relevant questions adopting the approach outlined in the next section. 
1.2. Synopsis 
The analysis of Bulgarian sports policy in the 20th century is developed in nine 
chapters. Chapter 1- Introduction - sets the scene by offering an account of the 
controversy and paradoxes involved in building a new stateness and points out that, 
this is a process which involves struggles, and outcomes which are contingent upon 
them. 
Chapter 2- the state, transformations and sport (a literature review) - sets the 
theoretical premises of the project by suggesting an analysis of the state as a strategic 
relation based on the Strategic Relations approach developed by Jessop (1990). It 
challenges both the traditional Marxist approach to the state and some of the Jessopian 
claims about interests, strategies and global influences on policy making. One aspect 
of this study of theoretical interest is that, so far as can be ascertained, it is the first 
time that the Strategic Relations approach has been applied to a Communist state. 
Chapter 3- Methodology - establishes the link between theoretical foundations of the 
project and the interpretation of data and events in the three periods. This is achieved 
by employing a Critical theory. The chapter provides the understanding that the sport 
policy process as a strategic relation in the pursuit of various projects can only be 
established and comprehended in examining the unfolding of that process. 
Chapter 4 analyses the constitution of the state in the capitalist period (1878-1944), 
and examines the role of various forces acting within and outside it, and their impact 
on shaping the sports policy domain and policies. It provides evidence for the role of 
public and voluntary agencies in the domain, and unveils their strategic relations. 
Chapter 5 follows the format of the previous chapter and investigates the constitution 
of the communist/totalitarian state (1944-1989) and its effects on forming sports 
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projects, the policy process and structures. It evidences the role of different agencies, 
and managers of state-voluntary associations, and identifies their strategic relations. 
Chapter 6 investigates the emergence of the democratic state (1989-1999), the 
forming of its institutions and relations with civil society, and their role in forging the 
sports policy domain and practices. 
Chapter 7 provides a more in-depth analysis on the workings of the sports policy 
process in the form of two case studies - of the Bulgarian Aerobic Union and the 
School Sports Federation. It scrutinises the forming of strategic relations and the role 
of agencies and managers in these two particular settings in 1999. 
Chapter 8 deals with the global forces influencing the behaviour of the nation-state 
and its responses to global circumstances. Examined are the transnational linkages 
between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Council of Europe (CE) and 
the European Union (EU) and the Trim and Fitness International Sport for All 
Association (TAFISA) in shaping Bulgarian sports policy, and these organisations' 
relations with state and voluntary agencies. 
Chapter 9- Conclusions - evaluates the theoretical discussion in the light of the 
empirical evidence. It substantiates and illustrates a number of Jessop's assumptions 
about the state as a social relation, though providing some valuable lessons from a 
non-capitalist setting. It concludes by offering a conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of state-social relations in the making of Bulgarian sports policy, 
outlining some opportunities for further research. 
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Chapter 2. The State, Strategic Relations, Transformations and Sport 
2.1. Introduction 
Very little seems to have changed since Richard Gruneau's observation made eighteen 
years ago, that despite the growing interest in studying sport and politics, "very little 
of the recent work... has attempted to situate sport in the context of any coherent 
theory of the state and there has been virtually no sensitivity among students of sport 
to the significant debates in social and political theory about the nature of the state 
and its role in social and cultural life" (1982: 2). Certainly, Gruneau was not the first 
to address the need for further studies in this area, but so far the ever increasing 
number of scholars who have ventured to investigate it is still far from producing a 
coherent account. Why is this? Is it because of their lack of sensitivity, or due to the 
complexity of such a task? 
In "state-ing the obvious", C. Hay (1996: 3) opens his analysis of the state with a quote 
by Schmitter (1985: 33) which favours the latter of the above propositions: "the 
modern state is... an amorphous complex of agencies with ill defined boundaries 
performing a great variety of not very distinctive functions. " Besides the clarity this 
definition brings to the debate, together with other definitions of the state offered by 
various theorists (see Carnoy, 1984 and Clarke, 1991), it informs us that any attempt 
to fix the notion of the state would face several important limitations which would 
lead subsequently to flaws in state-sport analyses. Based on the above propositions, 
and given the focus of this thesis, it appears that what is needed is not necessarily a 
coherent theory of the state in which to place the debate about sport. Instead, it will be 
more instructive to seek an approach which, while acknowledging these limitations, 
suggests adequate avenues to distinguish between the elusiveness and tangibility of 
the state as an object, and to highlight what is distinctive about the state which will 
allow us to better understand the transforming politics of sport in East European 
countries generally, and in Bulgaria in particular. 
Two further considerations are worth noting: 
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(a) variations of the kind of analysis suggested by Gruneau have been already applied 
in some depth by a number of commentators (Cantelon and Gruneau (1982), Hall et al 
(1991), Harvey et al (1995) in Canada, Allison (1993), Collins (1990), Henry (1993), 
Houlihan (1991,1997) in the UK, Nassis (1995) in Greece, Porro (1996) in Italy, and 
Riordan (1991,1991a, 1993) for Eastern European sport, and 
(b) as R. Maclver rightly noted as early as 1926, "it is easier to agree on the nature of 
a particular state than on the nature of the state " (quoted in Hay, 1996: 5). 
It is the aim of this chapter therefore, first to identify and evaluate the interpretations 
of the state as a dynamic set of power relations given in the literature, and second, to 
examine the implications of those explanations for evaluating national sport policies. 
Although these tasks are straightforward enough, it is imperative for this introductory 
section to define the approach that will be used to accomplish them. As the preceding 
overview of Bulgaria's modem history suggests, a distinguishing feature of all three 
major transformations (revolutions) was that they involved creating a new `stateness' 
and political order. Inevitably, the aspirations of the newly arrived political, moral and 
intellectual leaderships were driven by the idea of building this projected state. 
Clearly, state-building ("tracklayering" in Weberian terms) can be seen as a process of 
past and current struggles, the outcomes of which largely depend on specific 
conjunctures, timing, constraints and actors. Thus, the diffusion and organisation of 
sport throughout different periods would have to reflect similar patterns because 
changes in state order affect all basic areas of social and cultural life. 
The accomplishment of the tasks set in this chapter involves both a challenge to the 
established qualifications for a model of state intervention in sport, as well as a new 
reading of the past and recent state involvement in sport. Following the assumptions 
outlined above, the approach to the literature review will be informed by the premises 
of the Strategic Relations approach (SRA) developed by Bob Jessop (1990), to be 
discussed in the next section. 
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2.2. The Strategic Relations Approach 
A broad analysis of the literature on the state suggests that when reviewing the 
relationships between state and society (and sport in particular), it is as important to 
define as to demystify the state. This can be successfully achieved if the classical 
Marxist approach of seeing the state as something towards which one should have a 
strategy, that is, to maximise the advantages its form and practices provide, and to 
diminish its disadvantages, is substituted by an interpretation which, according to 
Jessop (1990: 270) is described as: 
a strategic terrain, as the crystallisation of political strategies, as a 
specific political form which offers structural privileges to some but not 
all kind of political strategies. 
Jessop's (1990) Strategic Relations Approach makes two major claims. First, that the 
state is a social (strategic) relation, and second, that an adequate analysis of it must 
proceed on three levels. The first claim that the state is a social (strategic) relation was 
substantiated by an analysis which saw it as the site, the generator and the product of 
strategies. According to him, the state system is the site of strategy because its 
structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of political strategy than 
others. This strategic selectivity implies that a given type of state or regime will be 
more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to 
gain state power (Jessop, 1990: 260). 
The state is seen as a generator of strategies, in the sense that it is where the state's 
formal unity (as a sovereign state) and substantive unity (as a social support) can be 
established. Thus, the state becomes the site of class struggles and the site of struggles 
and contests among its different branches. Finally, the structure and modus operandi 
of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past 
political strategies and struggles. These strategies and struggles could have been 
developed within that system and/or at a distance from that system; and they could 
have been concerned to maintain it and/or to transform it (Jessop, 1990: 261). 
. 
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Jessop's (1990: 343) second claim is, that regardless of how we have defined the state, 
an adequate analysis of it must proceed on three levels: 
the forms of its basic institutional separation from the rest of the society 
whose general interests it is supposed to represent; the nature of its 
internal organisation, modes of political calculation and operating 
procedures; and the political practices and discourses in and through 
which the common interests are articulated and promoted. 
Based on these premises, he suggested that the next step to make the analysis more 
specific is to consider the organisational form and socio-political bases of the state by 
identifying six dimensions. The first three dimensions are formal and institutional in 
nature: forms of representation, the internal organisation and the forms of 
intervention. 
As relevant forms of representation he instanced territorial and functional 
representation, pluralism, clientelism, raison d 'etat, and populism, but political 
parties, social movements and state managers are also relevant. Jessop did not clarify, 
however, whether a state may be successfully represented in more than one form, and 
what effects that would have on its organisation, mode of intervention, and 
substantive dimensions. For example, being well concealed or straightforwardly 
manifested, political clientelism can be found in states of virtually all compositions 
alongside pluralism, populism, or raison d 'etat. In the Bulgarian case it would be even 
more informative to consider the state's international political clientelism, as it is 
relevant to the three periods. This we do in Chapters 4,5,6, and 8. 
The state's internal organisation refers to the distribution of power among different 
parts of the state system. This process involves power relations between the 
administrative apparatus, levels of government and supra-national state forms such as 
culture, education and sport. Despite different socio-political environments in the 
three periods considered, sport remained largely a state controlled area subordinated to 
the government. The state's forms of intervention concern specific policies and 
practical measures applied through specific institutional mechanisms to society or 
_ 
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economy. They play a major role in shaping the changing boundaries between civil 
society and the state, and clearly exhibit a decisive role in forming national sports 
policy. 
The other three dimensions of the state reflect its behaviour and strategic orientation. 
The first is defined by Jessop (1990: 346) as the social base of state power, i. e., "the 
nature of the power bloc, supporting classes or other social forces and alliances 
whose unstable equilibrium of compromise is crystallised in the state system. " The 
argument here is that each state or regime can be related to a social base which 
provides its support and serves to identify its principal beneficiaries. But as the 
previous discussion revealed, this relation is not necessarily straightforward. If the 
main beneficiaries for whatever reasons do not exist, or resist the project, it is also 
possible for this support to be created retrospectively, that is, to rationalise past 
actions. 
The next two dimensions derive from what Jessop called a "part-whole paradox" of 
the state. This paradox as he put it (1990: 346) "is rooted in the fact that the state is 
but one institutional order among others in a given social formation; and yet it is 
peculiarly charged with responsibility for maintaining the integration and cohesion of 
the wider society ". The second dimension is the state's practices and projects and 
corresponds to the `part' moment of the `part-whole' paradox. In other words, the 
state unity (or order) is not a pre-given condition, rather it has to be established in the 
process of materialisation of the state's practices and projects, which define the 
boundaries of the system. 
The third dimension - historic bloc and hegemonic project - refers to the `whole' part 
of the paradox, which articulates the notion of common will and interests and serves 
to legitimise the above practices and form of the state. This dimension also provides 
political and moral guidelines for the conduct of state policy. For example, during the 
totalitarian period, the development of sport was measured mainly by quantitative 
. 
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criteria, such as number of participants, events, medals and points. These had to assert 
the state policy which in line with the socialist project aimed to ensure mass 
participation of all segments of society. 
What follows from Jessop's interpretation of the state is spelled out in several basic 
implications of the Strategic-theoretical approach despite the fact that, as he himself 
stated (1990: 267), these remain at "the level of assertions and guidelines. " The 
introductory account of the struggles, interests and transformations in Bulgaria's 
modem development substantiates most of the implications of the Strategic theoretical 
approach. We have seen in that, what emerged as a Bulgarian state in 1878 in terms of 
territory and nation had very little to do with what had existed five centuries prior to 
the Ottoman domination. The relation between the state's formal and substantive unity 
was epitomised in the pursuit of a national ideal - the unification of Bulgarian lands 
and people. For the purposes of sport policy analysis, however, it is important to 
examine more carefully four key implications (features) concerning the nature of the 
state (what is it), its constitution (the evolving of the state's form and institutions), 
state-society relations (representations and interests), and power (form-related balance 
of power) which will be discussed in turn. 
2.3. The Implications of the Strategic Relations Approach 
In line with Bulgaria's historical development, and to ensure consistency of analysis, 
the three implications of the Strategic Relations approach (SRA) just identified will be 
examined, both in a capitalist and a socialist (non-capitalist) setting. 
2.3.1. On the nature of the state 
The first implication of the SRA maintains that the state is a specific institutional 
ensemble with no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity. 
Thus, Jessop (1990: 341) suggested a broad definition of the state by making specific 
reference to state discourse and institutions: 
The core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of 
institutions and organisations whose socially accepted function is to 
. 
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define and enforce collectively binding decisions of the members of a 
society in the name of their common interest or general will. 
As he further clarified, this definition identifies the state as a specific form of macro- 
political organisation with a specific type of political structure, establishes clear links 
between the state and the political sphere, and the wider society. What is also 
interesting to note, is that Jessop puts the contradictions and dilemmas involved in 
political discourse, and more specifically the claims about general will or common 
interest (as opposed to straightforward political domination or violent oppression) at 
the heart of the analysis of the state. Such an approach, as Jessop himself argued, 
"could serve as a basis for describing specific states and political regimes as well as 
for exploring the condition in which states emerge, evolve, enter into crisis and are 
transformed" (1990: 341-2). It can be also particularly useful when examining a social 
phenomenon such as sport policy in specific historical contexts in a given country. 
Another strength of the above definition and approach to the state is its interpretation 
of the state as a dynamic and moving (and not as a fixed) object, thus overcoming the 
inherent limitations of other accounts by bringing to the fore several qualifications: 
(i) states are never fixed, rather contradictions and transformations are 
inherited in their nature, the state is a strategic terrain, and its 
constitution involves struggles; 
(ii) states never achieve full closure or complete separation from society 
and their precise boundaries are usually in doubt (Jessop 1990: 342), 
hence state and society are interdependent. The relation of various 
organisations and institutions found around the core of the state to the 
core is uncertain; 
(iii) the nature of these institutions and organisations, and their links with 
the wider society will depend on the nature of social formation and its 
past history; 
(iv) the common interest or general will in whose name the state claims to 
act is always illusory, asymmetrical and marginalizing of certain 
groups (cf. Hay 1996: 8). 
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Despite the clarity they bring to the analysis of state-sport relationships, when applied 
to a particular setting, however, these qualifications need further discussion, which is 
carried out in the remaining sections. 
2.3.2. The state's constitution 
The second implication asserts that political systems can be constituted out of the 
available institutional elements, and in this sense state-building is not a once-for-all 
process but is constantly reiterated. As the introductory chapter on state projects 
demonstrated, in each of the three transformations the basic institutional elements 
were imported or imposed, and reflected Bulgaria's gravitation in the European 
geopolitical balance of powers. During the first transformation, after the liberation 
from Ottoman domination, the key elements of the new political structure - the state 
form (the Prince and the Constitution), the structure of the government (including a 
temporary Russian government for 9 months), and the constitution of the army 
(including its command cadres and training) were imposed by Russia. Russian 
military personnel were also responsible for introducing several modem sports to 
Bulgaria. The specific manifestations of this influence will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Four. 
A similar pattern can be observed during the second and the third transformation 
periods. For the former, the Communist model of development was imposed again 
from Russia (now the USSR). The form of the state was decided in a referendum in 
the presence of the Red Army and the newly adopted constitution of the country 
contained articles (3,12 and 13) surrendering its national sovereignty. Furthermore, 
the ways of the Bulgarian state's economic and cultural integration in the world were 
predetermined by political, economic and social treaties imposed by the Soviet 
doctrine (key Soviet advisers to the party, the army, the security forces and the 
economy were also appointed). With regard to the latter period, the form of economic 
development (conceptually and structurally) was imposed by the European Union, 
IMF and the World Bank, to the point that, as the former Bulgarian Prime Minister Z. 
Videnov (1995-1997) stated, the country was on the brink of losing its economic 
sovereignty" (1998: 195). This process was, and still is accompanied by intense overt 
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and covert external political pressure aiming to set up a national balance of political 
forces which would guarantee the necessary legislative grounds for its success 
What followed for the political systems to be established was a high degree of 
dependency on external interests which did not take into account the true aspirations 
of the people. The main conflict produced by these developments was an 
incongruency between the demand for national prosperity and the capacity for its 
materialisation. This conflict can be captured by the notion of centrifugal and 
centripetal forces operating within a state territory, as suggested by Taylor (1985: 113- 
4). Centrifugal forces represented both the striving for unification of Bulgaria's 
territories and the intervention of the great powers in this process. Centripetal forces 
in turn reflected the binding drive of the state as an idea. The form of the state as well 
as its basic structural mechanisms were not constituted solely out of existing 
institutional elements, rather major elements were imposed by outside forces. With 
few notable exceptions, the projects put forward by a myriad of political, economic 
and intellectual groups and their leaders served to justify what had already been 
imposed, and in essence they represented a "catching-up" strategy. These politics 
demanded little improvisation on behalf of domestic leadership elites, and in essence 
reinforced the ideological function of the state. As political historiography evidences, 
seeking approval for any major decision in the Russian, German or recently, the 
American embassy has always been an essential attribute of the repertoire of 
Bulgaria's political leaders. 
Bulgaria's specificity provides some substance to Jessop's notion of state constitution, 
but as he himself pointed out, is still in its infancy and needs to go beyond the stage of 
abstract propositions and to be applied to particular states and problems. Such an 
attempt has been made by one of Jessop's associates - Colin Hay, in his (1996) 
analysis of the state and socio-political change in Britain. 
Following the process of constituting a state and defining and maintaining its various 
boundaries, Hay differentiated between three interrelated generic moments of 
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stateness (1996: 9): the state as a nation (an imagined national community); the state 
as territory (a bounded sovereign terrain); and the state as institution (a set of 
apparatuses and practices). Borrowing from Schlesinger (1987), Hay viewed the state 
as a nation in terms of a communal sense of belonging to a national collectivity 
pursued through national identity, nationalism and loyalty to a sovereign territory. A 
similar stance clearly denotes an emphasis on the sociocultural conception of the 
nation (as opposed to the ethnic) defined by the early French Enlightenment 
philosophers as a community of citizens united by the idea of common stateness. 
The second moment of stateness is the territorial. Although related closely to the state 
as nation, it appears to be a more clear-cut concept perceiving the state as a territory, 
or a geo-politically bounded sovereign terrain. This meaning of territory is tied up 
with the legal concept of sovereignty. In the words of Hinsley (1966: 26, quoted in 
Johson et al, 1995: 96) "sovereignty implies that there is one final and absolute 
authority in a political community ", and that "it is the bringing together of territory 
and sovereignty which provides the basis of the modern inter-state system. " As will 
be demonstrated, the negation of this absolute authority has had serious effects on the 
form and functions of the Bulgarian state in the past. Both Jessop and Hay, however, 
failed to recognise two important functions of state territoriality - as a source of 
meaning and as an opportunity. The former serves to evoke aspirations, attachments, 
and moral and physical exploits among the people. The latter sets limits to essential 
economic activities concerning raw material production and the state's role in world 
markets. As the following chapters show, this moment of stateness was of particular 
importance for the unification and assertion of Bulgaria in the late 19th century, and 
shaped to a great extent its national ideal. Also, the opportunity function of the 
territorial state entails the need to consider the global aspect of its strategic relations. 
A last moment of stateness is that of the state as institution which incorporates its 
administrative and organisational dimensions. Hay (1996: 11) categorised the state as 
an institution in terms of: 
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(a) its distinctive modes of intervention (emphasis in original) within 
such spheres; 
(b) the extent of state regulation; and 
(c) the degree of administrative centralisation and decentralisation. 
He further developed the relationships between the three senses of `stateness' with the 
practices and processes of a specific state form. Hay's moments and levels of stateness 
will inform the analysis of sport policy in Bulgaria in the three periods because they 
offer a clear framework for seeing the state in its wholeness and examine its strategic 
relations. 
2.3.3. State-society relationships 
The third implication of the SRA, pertinent to state-society relationship, concern the 
notions of representation and interest. These are viewed in the light of Jessop's 
assertion that it seems to make no difference whether the state will achieve full 
closure or will be separate from society as long as their boundaries remain uncertain, 
which is problematic. To aspire to a full closure or to separation presents distinct 
strategies, political agendas and practices with different implications for various 
institutions and agents within the state. 
Jessop's third implication referred to the problem of representation, state neutrality 
among different political forces, and its interests. He went on to reconsider the 
problem of representation by suggesting that (1990: 268): 
interests can only be established in relation to specific strategies and the 
selectivity of the state systems must be established in terms of the 
differential opportunities they offer to different political forces to realise 
their interests in pursuing specific strategies. 
This strategic-theoretical model however, poses the need for clarification of two 
essential aspects which Jessop did not address. First, representation has a dual nature. 
As Dean (1994: 150) stated: 
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collective representations are both forms of description of social identities 
and relations and in this sense constitute them, and also prescriptions of 
the legitimate forms of existence possible. The state becomes a focus of 
such representation. 
If different social identities can be defined in relation to their manifest interests as 
Jessop suggests, for the analysis of interests and strategies it is equally important to 
consider representation as a structural relation. This relation is seen in terms of 
recurrent patterns of relationships that link strategic actors to each other and to the 
larger social system. Secondly, the pursuit of specific strategies clearly implies that 
attention has to be given not only to the strategic relations between different actors but 
to the process of their utilisation for achieving short and long term interests, that is, 
the analysis has to proceed further and examine the policy process itself. The case of 
School Sports Federation (see Chapter 7) illustrates the workings of representation in 
a sport-specific context. Using school sport's manifested interests (as promoted by 
sport officials) as a sole determinant of their identity would not produce an accurate 
picture unless we examine strategic relations in the domain, which revealed that 
ordinary pupils' interests were largely ignored. 
This notion of representation is informative for the analysis of sport policy as it helps 
to identify the key preconditions for the instigation of the policy process (the pursuit 
of specific strategies) - establishing the two domains - membership (social identities) 
and structure (social relations). The policy process as a form of policy analysis will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
So far there could be very little disagreement that the notion of common interest, 
general will, the national (policy for the nation) and the territory (affected by this 
policy) constitutes the core of an analysis of the state and sport policy. Jessop's 
critical reference to common interests merely as illusory (in the sense that truly 
common interests never exist), or that they can only be established in relation to 
specific strategies fell short on three accounts as it does not tell a great deal about: 
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(i) the interest peculiar nature - why specific strategies identified in terms 
of actors' real interests are not pursued (as opposed to those which are 
acted upon). The Bulgarian Sports Union's (BSFS) strategy to promote 
sports services at grass roots level in the early 1980s (an actor's real 
interests) was not follow up by practical actions, and further measures 
for centralised planing and provision were implemented instead, 
(ii) the nature of those groups who share it (e. g. professional bureaucrats, 
practitioners and participants), and 
(iii) how these two are articulated as the state's form changes, that is, 
whether the real interests (as identified) were acted upon and by which 
group. 
The notion of general will and common interest implies the existence of a community 
of people to whom these are pertinent and how interests relate to power. Defining 
society in this sense as the biggest of these social groups and as a key element of the 
state-society dichotomy is both informative and problematic. Ahrne (1990: 24-5) 
argued that although a particular design of a society has some importance, the 
integrity demonstrated by its common characteristics is illusory. He preferred to use 
the metaphor of social landscape instead which, in his words is "a mingling of diverse 
social processes and phenomena that happened to coincide in a certain place at a 
certain time ". What is a common and a non-abstract component of a social landscape 
for Ahme is the nation-state which can be made material as an organisation, including 
a sporting one. The central assumption made here, borrowing from Foucault, is that 
the material form is of great importance for understanding social processes. The way 
voluntary sport sector in the three periods was organised and structured was indicative 
of its ability to influence policy making. Ahrne (1990: 26) also placed significant 
importance on the concepts of terrain, territoriality and people as essential elements of 
a social landscape, predetermining the nature of social interactions. Voluntary sport 
sector as a community of members representing different sports do not share the same 
interests (Olympic - non-Olympic sports) but all are equally concerned with 
international success (which implies a sense of territory and a nation) as a 
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precondition for gaining privileges. The notion of a natural coincidence in the above 
definition seems, however, to rule out the existence of consciously developed 
strategies, guiding actors' actions, and leading to predictable outcomes. 
Interests also are thought of as pertinent to outcomes because they are supposed to be 
essential (actual or potential) for mobilising agents in struggles. Hindess (1989: 36) 
referred to the actual-potential basis of interests in the case of the actual as to a 
`capacity-outcome' conception of power, and in this case reference to 
interests provides an explanation for why agents act as they do. In the 
second case, interests are regarded as potential means of mobilization of 
agents whose ineffectiveness in a given situation has to be explained away 
Hindess' (1989) analysis is informative as it provided a clear account about several 
key concepts central for a Jessopian approach to the state as well as challenging their 
uncritical acceptance for explaining power. Building on Weber (1978) and Giddens 
(1976), he defined the conception of `capacity-outcomes' in terms of the "capacity of 
an agent to secure something" and: 
Outcomes are produced in the course of the agent's practices which are 
always subject to definite conditions and obstacles and which often 
include the practices of other agents. We are concerned with 
conceptualising the sites of practices (their conditions and obstacles), 
particularly those in which the obstacles include the opposition of other 
agents. These are arenas of struggles (Hindess, 1989: 28). 
In his later works, Giddens developed further the idea of capacity-power-outcome by 
adding an important qualification concerning the contingent relation between power 
and conflict. He claimed that : "It is the concept of `interest', rather than that of 
power as such, which relates directly to conflict and solidarity" (1993: 118). This 
classification complies with Jessop's notion of the state as the outcome of past 
struggles between social groups, which forms the context of, and resources for 
contemporary struggles. Both the notion of capacity-outcome and interests-conflict- 
solidarity require attention to be given to the policy process, and with regards to the 
transformations they inform analysis that an explanation is to be sought in terms of 
policy's (strategies') stated purposes and what this policy is actually achieving. This 
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relation is exerpted by the behaviour of the totalitarian sport-policy elite during recent 
transformations. After a few years of struggle and tension with state agencies 
eventually, the leadership of many sports federations accepted the autocratic style of 
the state (thus, choosing short-term benefits) and abandoned the idea of independence 
(thus, sacrificing long-term interests). 
Further reference to the concept of general will, interests and society suggests that the 
analysis has to proceed beyond their definition and to link them to how they are 
articulated by the state. Here interpretations vary as the basic concept of interest for 
pluralists is individual interest, and for neo-Marxism is class consciousness. While 
both groups recognise the importance of groups and organisations, their approaches to 
collective action remain limited by their central assumptions. Offe's treatment of 
organisations as collective agents is viewed as a contribution to neo-corporatism. He 
argued that there are three perspectives from which interest groups can be analysed: 
that of the individual, that of the organisation and that of the social system (quoted in 
Cawson, 1985: 3). The issue of common interest in a totalitarian society presents a 
particular case as it negates the distinction between the three forms of interests, and 
deserves more detailed examination here. As this project argues, it is a central issue 
which holds the key for understanding the nature of post-Communist transformations 
in sport. 
2.3.4. The state's power 
The fourth implication of the Strategic Relations approach suggests that the state's 
power is a form-related condensation of the prevailing balance of power; hence the 
state as such has no power, and it can only be assessed relationally. The idea of the 
sources of organised power in society is intertwined, and corresponds closely with the 
idea of human interactions and interests in different settings, and how it is articulated 
by the state in enhancing its capacity. As Giddens (1993: 117) put it simply "in most 
general sense, power' refers to the transformative capacity of human action". It 
would be beyond the scope of this chapter, however, to offer an exhaustive discussion 
on power. Hall's (1985) analysis emphasised three types of power - political, 
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ideological and economic - where military power is regarded as part of the political. 
He (quoted in Rush, 1992: 46) saw political power as: 
the capacity of some individuals in society to organise and dominate their 
fellows, economic power as the capacity to organise and develop 
resources, and ideological power as the capacity to rationalise the 
organisation of society through belief or value systems. 
Thus, political power draws largely on economic and ideological resources which are 
used primarily, but not exclusively, for political purposes. This view allowed Hall to 
place power in a broad societal context. The important point argued by Hall concerns 
the potential for achieving synergy between three powers capable of changing society. 
As he asserted: "[w]here ideological, political and economic power move in the same 
direction, it is extremely likely that great social energy will be created... " resulting in 
societal change, or what he calls "enabling power" (1985: 47). Failure to secure 
synergy results in what Hall called `blocking power', in which different types of 
power - political, economic and ideological, conflict with each other and mitigate 
against a major societal change. Jessop (1990) termed the process of channelling the 
three powers in one direction as "a state hegemonic project". The effect of `blocking 
power' is elaborated in the making of post-totalitarian sports policy (Chapter 6), 
despite attempts by various state administrations to promote the Europeanisation 
(hegemonic) project. 
Another illuminating account of society from the point of view of power relations is 
offered by Mann in his comprehensive analysis of The Sources of Social Power. He 
argues (1986: 1) that "societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and 
intersecting sociospacial networks of power. " His point is that societies are not 
unitary and they are not totalities, or social systems. Rather, they can be regarded as 
an asymmetrical alliance or a loose confederation of stratified allies. What follows 
from this argument is that any analysis of strategic relations developed as result of 
social interaction ought to take into account particular sociospacial conjunctures and 
historical specificity as well as their material form. This is what distinguishes elitist or 
Marxist unitary views of society from a goal attainment-oriented human society. 
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We use again Mann's (1986) influential analysis of social power where, in a similar 
way to Hall, four types of power were identified - ideological, economic, political and 
military. In discussing the sources from which each of these types of power draws, 
Mann (1986: 22-8) argued that ideological power derives from three interrelated 
arguments -meaning, norms and aesthetic/ritual practices. Economic power derives 
from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the 
extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of objects of nature. Political 
power derives from the usefulness of centralised, institutionalised, territorialized 
regulation of various aspects of social relations. And military power derives from the 
necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression. Related to 
the four powers are their ideological, economic, political and military organisations. 
From Hall's and Mann's accounts it can be concluded that regardless of the type of 
society and historical specificity, the process of ruling society's affairs involves 
conscious decisions taken at different levels of formal human organisations, which are 
grounded on diverse individual and group interests. Those power sources based on the 
four greatest networks -ideological, economic, political and military - give collective 
organisation and unity to the infinite variety of social existence because they are 
capable of generating collective action. Because of its potential to carrying symbolic 
meaning, and contribution to political (a means for mobilising social support), 
economic (generating business activity and increasing work productivity) and military 
(enhancing fitness) aspects, sport lends itself perfectly to the realm of power and 
becomes a domain of public concern and relations. 
To conclude so far: it has been argued that the state can be better understood if several 
important implications are acknowledged: 
" Firstly, state-building always occurs at specific historical conjunctures and 
involves individual and group actors; 
" Secondly, the accepted definition of the state implies that its emergence, 
development and separation from society should be viewed as a process of past 
and present struggles, that is, the state seen in motion; 
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" Thirdly, the approach to the state is based on Jessop's assertion that states never 
achieve full separationlclosure from society and their boundaries are usually in 
doubt; it will nevertheless challenge this assumption by outlining the difference 
between closure (totalitarianism) and separation, with several important 
implications for strategic relations; 
" Fourthly, the state becomes a focus of representation which involves 
establishing social identities (domain membership), and social relations (domain 
structures), as two essential preconditions for initiating the policy process; 
" Fifthly, human interests (the common will in societal terms) and sources of 
power are interrelated, and the outcomes produced in the course of agent 
interactions are predetermined historically by specific conjunctures; 
" Sixthly, conceived as a resource, power becomes a means to an end. The 
important question - To what ends or purposes is power put? - can be answered 
if, as suggested by the Strategic Relations Approach, we examine how projects 
emerge to promote the general interest which represent a balance of forces 
within and beyond the state. 
The principal benefits of the Strategic Relations approach for the analysis of 
Bulgarian sport policy include: 
" providing a framework for examining different aspects of the state in the three 
stages of its historical development, and helping to explain strategic selectivity 
of each towards a particular sports policy model; 
" facilitating the identification of the state and its unity in relation to a particular 
political system and wider social formation and the key sports beneficiaries; 
" helping to explore different parameters of the state's crisis with regard to its 
representation, institutions, rationality, hegemony and legitimacy, and their 
impact on shaping relations in sport. 
2.4. What did the Strategic Relations Approach fail to attend to? 
Despite its comprehensiveness, the Strategic Relations approach did not adequately 
attend to several important aspects of the state. In his critique of Jessop's Strategical- 
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Relational view of the state, Kelly (1999) identified four problematic issues 
concerning its methodological (questioning the extent to which it is possible to 
theorise contingency), theoretical (in that a limited view of capitalism as a strictly 
economic system is given), political (lack of concern about possibility of political or 
systemic transformation) and social (failure to recognise the role of agency `free will') 
premises. His criticism, however, also remained at an abstract level, and did not offer 
a greater concreteness. In taking into accounting the aims of this project, the rest of 
the section seeks to overcome this flow of the analysis by addressing the application 
of the SRA in a non-capitalist (socialist/totalitarian) setting, and in periods of 
transformation. 
2.4.1. Interpreting Strategic Relations in a totalitarian setting 
Three main explanations for the origin of totalitarianism have been put forward by 
commentators studying this phenomenon. The first, whose main advocate is Hannah 
Arendt (1973), traced the origins of totalitarianism in socio-historical conjunctures in 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. She identified four key factors for the 
development of totalitarianism: the breakdown of traditional community, the 
enfranchisement of the masses, the creation of a mass movement as a form of 
identification, and establishing the image of the common enemy. 
The second explanation of totalitarianism is ideological and goes back to eighteenth- 
century messianic beliefs, Rousseau's concept of the general will, and Jacobin ideas in 
revolutionary France, all of which were based on the belief that there is `a sole 
exclusive truth in politics' (cf. in Rush, 1992: 73). It was believed that the creation of 
an altogether new society, of a new man was possible and necessary to be built on a 
tabula rasa. A third explanation sought the origin of totalitarianism in psychological 
tendencies, such as aggression, intolerance and defence of authority exhibited by 
certain individuals. Notwithstanding that the socio-historical and ideological 
explanations enjoy greater popularity in the literature, when combined together, these 
three sources of explanation have an essential bearing on the analysis of the 
totalitarian state. 
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At the level of definition, two types have been advanced - the phenomenological 
(Zhelev, Bulgaria's president 1990-1997,1990, Friedrich, 1969 cited in Rush, 1992) 
and the essentialist (Lefort, 1986). Both types of definition emphasise the supremacy 
of the political dimension in the society-politics relationship. Accounting for the two 
approaches, Rush (1992: 72) suggested a short definition of totalitarianism which 
helps to grasp its nature: "a social system involving the political control of and 
intervention in all aspects of public and private life ". However, as he argued 
(1992: 77-78), 
the term `totalitarian' clearly implies an absolute rather than a relative 
state of affairs, but for analytical purposes this is a disadvantage, since 
not only can it be argued that no society has ever been totalitarian in the 
absolute sense, but it means that a given society must be classified as 
totalitarian or not ".... "applied therefore as a tendency rather than an 
absolute, totalitarianism is more useful analytical tool. 
The analysis of the historical development of the Bulgarian state complies with this 
conclusion, despite totalitarianism's almost unchallenged success between the 1960s 
and the 1980s. To understand fully the issue of Strategic Relations in a totalitarian 
setting an analysis needs to elaborate on the nature of the three key interrelated 
implications - state-society relationships, forms of representation and interests, and 
power, which are constitutive of totalitarianism and the Strategic Relations Approach. 
They will be discussed in turn below. 
2.4.2. State-society relationships under totalitarianism 
A distinguishing feature of the constitution of totalitarianism is the achievement of a 
full closure between the state and civil society which is based on the denial of the very 
principle which distinguishes between them. As Lefort (1986: 280) put it " it is the 
very principle of a distinction between what belongs to the order of power, to the 
order of law and to the order of knowledge which is negated. " Furthermore, the 
denial of the signs of division between state and society is linked intrinsically to the 
abolition of the signs of internal social division. What is rejected is the social 
heterogeneity of society, the existence of a variety of modes of life, behaviour and 
opinion, in so far as they contradict the image of a society in harmony with itself. 
. 
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These two moments of the totalitarian project, according to Lefort (1986: 286), "imply 
a de-differentiation of the agencies that govern the constitution of a political society ". 
The outcome of their imposition is the creation of a society with increased 
homogeneity and concern with the problems of its organisation. In such a society, to 
quote Lefort (1986: 280) again, 
the state alone appears to all and represents itself to itself as the sole 
instituting principle, as the great actor that possesses the means of social 
transformation and the knowledge of all things. It is the emergence of this 
point of view of the state'- of a state potentially at the centre of power 
and knowledge - that makes possible the formidable expansion of 
bureaucracies, whose members may cultivate their own interests and 
derive as much power and advantage as possible from it, on the alleged 
basis of their sovereign distance from those who are administrated. 
This image of the totalitarian type of society appears to be in contrast with the society 
described by Ahrne and Mann (pages 24-7) in its totality and harmony, but clearly 
complies with the notion advanced by these authors, that the material form is of great 
importance for understanding social processes. 
In a monumental work on The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt (1973: 311) argued 
that: 
Masses are not held together by a consciousness of common interest and 
they lack the specific class articulateness which is expressed in 
determined, limited and obtainable goals. 
The argument here is that these people cannot be integrated into any organisation 
based on common interest, such as political parties, professional bodies or trade 
unions. Conversely to the typical political party approach based on the promise of 
exchange - `vote us in power and we will serve you' - the totalitarian movement 
offered in a unique way to bring these people onto the political scene. Unlike 
democracy, or any other state form, a totalitarian regime creates a whole class of 
rulers. Offe's useful distinction (in Ost 1993: 459) between "class organisations" and 
"policy-takers" helps to better understand this process. The former include those 
organised groups that play a key role in shaping an economy through their role in the 
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market, and that seek to influence the state to help the market positions of their 
members. "Policy-takers" on the other hand, are those collectives shaped not by the 
market, but by the state, and are responsible for implementation within the framework 
given by the state. Thus, the totalitarian state assumes a decisive role in shaping 
interests. Although in a different political context, Jessop (1990: 269) also referred to 
this category in terms of collective consumers or a political community representing 
interests constructed around the policies pursued by the state. 
In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev himself said that this bureaucratic class numbered 18 
million (quoted in Bukovsky, 1990: 14). In Bulgaria, by 1989 this group in the field of 
sport was proportionally very substantial as well, having reached in excess of 4,000 
professional sport policy-takers (these were managers paid by the state, not allowing 
for technical and pedagogical staff). As this ruling class did not have a choice, its 
historical mission was to be in and to maintain power. When it seized power in 1944, 
the membership of the Bulgarian Communist Party amounted to only 15,000, but 
reached one million members (every fourth working person; plus a compulsory 
membership for all 9 to 19 year olds in the Youth Communist League) forty years 
later, recruited mostly from the industrial and agricultural masses. 
2.4.3 Representations and interests in totalitarianism 
To explain away the difference between a capitalist and a totalitarian state we have to 
examine the third implication of the SRA - that of representation and interests. We do 
that by identifying the key representations which make up the ideological matrix of 
the totalitarian state system. Lefort (1986: 286-9) discerned four such key forms of 
representation: the People-as-One image, the organisation, the social-historical 
creation, and that of society's transparency to itself. 
The People-as-One image is an ideological construct based on the belief that in a 
socialist society there can be no internal division, no other division than that between 
inside and outside. Consequently, combined with the image of the Power-as-One it 
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advances the image of the proletariat as identical to the people and the Party, and of 
the Party with leadership, of the leadership with an ultimate figure. There are two 
important strategic implications behind this notion, that - 
a) the power is concentrated in an individual who embodies the unity and 
the will of the people, and can be represented by a great Other - the 
ultimate figure of that power (the Egocrat in Solzhenitsyn's term); and 
b) the image can be affirmed if what is different from it is defined as alien 
or enemy. The totalitarian project can successfully accomplish the 
process of asserting people's identity only, if at the same time it points 
out the enemy. 
This process of double identification (with the people and the enemy) is best captured 
by the metaphor of the body. As the integrity of the body depends on the elimination 
of its parasites, so the pursuit of the enemy (in the form of regular ideological, 
organisational or ethnic purges) is seen as a form of necessary social prevention of 
`infection'. The People-as-One image is informative in that it reveals the social basis 
of support for a totalitarian (or other) project. It can be viewed as similar to Jessop's 
One Nation hegemonic project (1990: 211-2) where the support of the entire 
population is mobilised through material concessions and symbolic rewards. The two 
images differ, however, in the use of moral and physical coercion on the part of the 
totalitarian state. The strategic outcome of the first ideological representation is a 
justification for the introduction of the Body Politics - the establishment by a supreme 
body (the Party) of a uniform conception for every sphere of public life including 
sport, and performance criteria corresponding to it. 
This leads analysis to the second form of ideological representation - the organisation. 
The novelty of the totalitarian project is in its attitude to the entire society as a vast 
organisation comprising a network of micro-organisations. This new society is 
simultaneously organised and organizable. It is organised in the sense that every 
individual or collective member's position and function is well predetermined, and 
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imprinted in this organisation. It is organizable - because it is perceived as an 
amorphous matter which lends itself to the intervention of the constantly working 
organiser, the builder of Communism. Effective organisation also becomes the 
supreme criterion for gauging the action and knowledge of the leader. 
The next form of representation which complements the above image of the 
organisation is a social-historical creation. It derives from the myth of a social raw 
material offered to the power of the organiser, the creator of an already known future. 
The last representation - society's transparency to itself - rests on an irrational 
viewpoint of power possessing total knowledge of reality which aspires to be society's 
knowledge of itself. It developed as result of the merger between state and society, 
and bears clear implications for the practices of the organiser. Since he possesses the 
knowledge and the skills to organise society's affairs, and his performance is assessed 
by the results of the organisation, the most adequate framework for exhibiting this 
power appears to be the omnipresent state Plan. The plan represented the capacity of 
society to exhibit itself to itself, and following Marx's prophecy for the inevitable 
victory of Communism world-wide, involved an ever-increasing spiral of 
organisational outcomes aiming to demonstrate society's progression. The 
effectiveness of socialist organisation in sport is evidenced by the reports of sports 
organisations, which had always claimed an ever-increasing trend of more 
participants, medals and events. 
2.4.4. The Totalitarian power 
What follows for the policy and sport policy process from this analysis of the 
totalitarian state and its forms of representation is a new and unprecedented approach 
to power, based as Arendt (1973: 417) argued, on 
supreme disregard for immediate consequences rather than ruthlessness; 
rootlessness and neglect of national interests rather than nationalism; 
contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered pursuit of self- 
interest; "idealism, " i. e., their unwavering faith in a ideological fictitious 
world, rather than lust for power... 
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Subsequently, this led into the introduction of Body Politics comprising a uniform 
state strategy (based on the general interest as defined by the state, and the image of 
the strong male body) for the whole sports movement, practical approaches for its 
implementation (the means and degrees of freedom of the actors involved) and the 
ultimate criterion for its assessment (plan quotas). The manifestation of the above 
aspects in Bulgarian sports policy has been detailed elsewhere (Girginov, 1999,2000). 
Clearly, this configuration of interests, actors and strategies does not fit into Jessop's 
Strategic Relations Approach as it contradicts its very premises, which assume a free 
movement of various actors on the political scene trying to put forward different 
strategies to satisfy their interests. 
A totalitarian state does not fit into interpretations of the SRA's fourth implication 
regarding power and asserts a different vision of it. Arendt's (1973: 418) analysis 
described it as: "power, as conceived by totalitarianism, lies exclusively in the force 
produced through organisation ". Most of all, it was social power representing society 
itself qua conscious. As the dividing line between state and society disappeared, so 
did the dividing line between political power and administrative power, resulting in 
the state apparatus losing its independence from the Communist party and its 
leadership. Another important implication of this process is that it blurs the 
boundaries of different state bureaucracies by not fixing their prerogatives. The 
multiplication and duplication of administrative with Party offices destroys all sense 
of responsibilities and competence. Thus, the basis of bureaucratic power is not found 
in private property, it is not of a material kind. Instead, it is generated collectively and 
derived from the state-Party power which possessed all the means of production. 
This is what makes totalitarianism politically possible - destroying any guarantee of 
competence in every sphere of the bureaucracy, including sport. All strategic 
decisions in the totalitarian (and the capitalist and democratic) period concerning the 
conceptual and practical policy orientations of sport were formulated by the State (i. e. 
the Bulgarian Communist party) and given to sport organisations nation-wide for 
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implementation. Political intervention pervaded even the technical sphere of sport - at 
the level of event organisation and coaching. 
In totalitarianism the merging of the state and society, the identification of power and 
society, party and the state, and power and the position of the leader stemmed from 
the same necessity. By contrast with a democratic capitalist society where power 
appears as an empty contented place, is not fixed by law or linked to a body, and is 
impossible to wholly appropriate even by those who exercise public authority, in a 
socialist Totalitarian state this logic is reversed, and power is materialised in an organ 
-a body capable of concentrating in itself all the forces of society. The strength that 
such state power emanates, however, is ostensible despite its conformity with the 
notion established above (Hall, 1985) of the `enabling' power based on the synergy 
between ideological, political and economic forces in harmony. 
Although Jessop (1990: 269-70) argued that the state as such has no power, and 
brought into the analysis the importance of all actors, including state managers and 
forces resistant to state intervention, he did not account for some dimensions of state 
power. Weiss and Hobson's (1995: 6-8) study on States and Economic Development 
helps us to understand the significance of this concept, particularly with regard to 
states undergoing drastic transformations. This study advanced the notion of despotic 
and infrastructural power of the state based on the difference between its penetrative 
and extracting capacity. They identified three key dimensions of state power - 
`penetrative' which entails the ability of a state to reach into and directly interact with 
the population; `extractive', referring to the ability of the state to extract resources 
from society; and `negotiated', which in today's societies is manifested in the 
capacity for co-ordinating the economy, and involves strategic institutionalised forms 
of collaboration between political and industrial actors. 
According to this classification, totalitarian regimes fall into the category of despotic 
(weak) states as they can only generate low to moderate penetrative and extractive 
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power. Perhaps to explain this seeming contradiction of the omnipotent totalitarian 
state it is worth recalling a popular folklore from totalitarian times - "they (the state) 
lie to us for they are paying, and we lie to them for we are working". Weiss and 
Hobson concluded that: 
state strength increases with the effective embedding of autonomy, 
whereas state weakness ensues from despotic abrasion against society. 
This is the irony of state strength: the more autonomous a state is, the 
more isolated it is from social groups, with a low amount of economic and 
social energy created. Conversely, the more embedded a state's autonomy 
through supportive social linkages, the more economic and social energy 
can be generated (1995: 7-8). 
In short, similarly to Jessop's Strategic Relations approach, the argument here is that 
modern states are more likely to pursue their projects by engaging in a complex 
network of competition and collaboration. As the last transformation of Bulgarian 
society has proved, the enhancement of state capacity for negotiation internally and 
externally is crucial for successfully achieving its strategic goals. The merit of Weiss 
and Hobson's neo-statist account for the analysis of strategic relations, however, 
seems to lie in the integration of the international variables for explaining the state's 
autonomy, strategy and capacity, an aspect which remains largely ignored by Jessop. 
2.4.5. Strategic relations in a socialist (non-capitalist) setting 
Having suggested the incongruency between capitalist and socialist reality, though, 
we have to consider the validity of some of the SRA's claims for socialist societies. 
As the analysis demonstrated, the totalitarian notion of general interests and the 
ultimate power of a socialist organiser makes the position of individuals and agencies 
in the state system highly uncertain. Although in a very controlled manner, this 
reinforces the struggle between agents to secure their place in or near the core of the 
state apparatus. Different states also tend to use similar approaches for mobilising 
support. These observations justify the position towards totalitarianism not as an 
absolute, but rather as a tendency and urge analysists to examine the reasons behind 
totalitarian forms of representation and intervention. This will be partly achieved by 
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bringing in a global dimension which Jessop's Strategic Relations approach did not 
acknowledge. 
Lefort's arguments and the preceding discussion are very instructive as they identified 
the totalitarian state as the possessor of ultimate knowledge about everything, the last 
instance of the truth, and the only agent capable of carrying out radical social 
transformations. These three essential characteristics of the omnipotent totalitarian 
state - as (a) identified with, and (b) whose power stems from society, and (c) which is 
represented by the metaphor of the body - entail reconsideration of the key premises 
of the Strategic Relations approach. As stated above, Jessop's account is pluralistic in 
the sense, that it sees the state as a strategic terrain, an `empty space' where different 
interests are competing. In this scenario, society's agenda formulation can be viewed 
as a `bottom-to-top approach' resulting from the struggle of various actors to 
maximise the benefits of their strategic position in particular historic conjunctures. 
The totalitarian project reverses this process and makes it `top-to-bottom'. The 
affirmation of totality requires the denial of difference between the norms which 
define different modes of activities and institutions, and the materialisation of power 
into one organ - the body. Individuals and collective agents appear subordinated to the 
aims of the omnipotent socialist organisation and are subject to political authority. 
One crucial difference in establishing strategic relations in a capitalist and a 
totalitarian society with great implications for sport seems to be the relationship 
between actors' positions in the state system and their ability to advocate 
transformation. Totalitarianism is a reality that in principle is already mastered - no 
innovation that might transgress the boundaries of an already known future is 
tolerated. In comparison in a typical capitalist society individuals and institutions try 
to promote strategies in order to change their position in the system, the same actors in 
totalitarianism find themselves confined by the principle of general organisation, with 
their only option to assert the fantasised general interest. 
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2.4.6. Strategic Relations and the Politics of Transformations 
As outlined before, the Strategic Relations approach informed analysis about the 
significance of specific historical settings within which state-society relations evolved, 
identifying four basic implications of such an approach. Thus, the question of how a 
particular state and society (Bulgaria) is defined in the above terms becomes of equal 
importance for understanding the process of transformations subject to analysis. We 
refer again to Brecht's model of explanation that implied our ability to understand a 
transformation is determined by our ability to understand the nature of the capitalist or 
the communist state. In the Bulgarian case, social and historical facts about recent and 
past transformations so far have conformed very little to the a priori notions of equal 
opportunities and social justice, and market economy and democracy proclaimed 
respectively by socialism and the modem democratic society. Is this a unique feature 
of Bulgaria's development, or is it a typical scenario for any revolutionary or 
evolutionary process? 
In her analysis of the state and major social catalysts (situations in which societal 
crises have culminated in the emergence of new socio-political arrangements) using 
the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions as examples of transformation, Skocpol 
(1979: 171) argued that "epicycles were always added to the basic model whenever 
necessary to justify detours on the road to national power ". The point made here in 
examining the role of revolutionary leaderships, ideologies and practices, is that the 
outcomes produced by the three revolutions corresponded very little with their 
aspirations and proclaimed mechanisms. This conclusion complies with the 
observations made in the opening chapter concerning the projects and transformations 
in Bulgarian history. These observations, along with the premises of SRA, therefore, 
pose two interrelated issues which need clarification: 
(i) about the logic of transformation as a perceptual and three-way socio- 
economic-political process, and 
(ii) the level of transformation in terms of nationhood, constitutional order 
and `normal politics' (state intervention in the process of distributing 
resources and rights). 
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The term `transformation' (to change the condition, character or function) is closely 
associated with the term `crisis' which derives from the Greek `krizis' (literally `to 
decide') and implies a moment of transformation. Although this analysis does not use 
the two terms interchangeably, it will consider the crisis as an essential precondition 
for transformation, and so the two can be viewed as inseparable. Habermas' (1975, 
quoted in Hay, 1996: 87) definition of crisis that it "cannot be separated from the 
viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it" and the etymology of the term, imply that 
crucial to understanding transformation is the fusion between subjective perceptions 
and objective conditions. In his critical theory of crisis, borrowing from Habermas 
(1975), Hay (1996: 87) argues that: 
crisis is a lived (and hence subjective) experience and a moment of action 
and intervention in the shaping of institutions and the reshaping of the 
state. For a crisis to provide the opportunity for decisive intervention it 
must be perceived as so doing - it must be seen as a moment in which a 
decisive intervention can (and perhaps must) be made. 
This intervention and the moment of transition from one condition (of the state or 
sport) to another is what constitutes the transformation. 
Clearly, the emphasis of an analysis of transformations will be placed on the actual 
process, and not, as the transition between different conditions implies, on the 
destination. A consideration for not defining the transformation in terms of a 
particular outcome (destination), rests in the fact that the criteria for what constitutes a 
transformation and what does not, in the three periods concerned particularly with 
reference to the post-communist experience, were not clear, either for the key actors or 
for ordinary participants (see Ellen, 1990). Stark's (1992: 22, quoted in Bryant and 
Mokrzycki, 1994: 4) explanation of the process of transformation as one "in which the 
introduction of new elements take place most typically in combination with 
adaptations, rearrangements, permutations, and reconfigurations of already existing 
institutional forms " illustrates the point. This understanding also suggests conformity 
with the two previously established premises - 
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a) Jessop's notion of the contingency and uncertainty of the outcomes of 
struggles (seen here as equivalent of destination), and 
b) with Williams' (1977) thesis about the residual and emergent, in that 
the legacy of the previous form of the state and society cannot be 
discounted, which in turn confirms Jessop's idea that previous contests 
form the conditions for recent/current struggles. 
Three points deserve attention. First, the definition of crisis and transformation means 
considering their temporal characteristics. Hay stated that in so doing we distinguish 
two aspects of crisis: synchronic and diachronic. "A synchronic analysis focuses upon 
the contradictions and crisis tendencies existing within a particular system at a 
particular moment" (1996: 87). It is a snapshot of the state-society structural relations 
(including sport) at a specific point in time. "A diachronic analysis... focuses upon the 
historical development of a system with time "... and ... 
"looks at the actual way in 
which a crisis develops and unfolds historically within a system or set of structures. " 
Thus, in this sense, the process of crisis development can be seen as the actual process 
of transformations, and more specifically, as a simultaneous conceptual and structural 
transformation of the sport system. 
Secondly, from a Strategic Relations perspective the very process of transformation 
inevitably invites analysis to account for actors (individual and group) and events in 
which actors get involved. As the interaction unfolds, it evokes as defined by 
Habermas's (1975) two different crises (transformations) - that of the system and of 
the identity. The former refers to the breakdown of the integrity of the system, which 
in our case involves state-society relations (including sport), and also the relations 
between the state apparatus and various actors. The latter refers to the erosion of 
social integration resulting in the loss of identity. To illustrate this claim with a 
specific example, during Bulgaria's last transformation, for three years (1989-1992), 
from being a clearly defined area of state policy, sport became a "no-man's land". 
Simultaneously, institutions and individuals lost their identification with projects 
previously promoted by the state which guaranteed their position in the system. 
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As the above discussion based on Habermas' and Hay's propositions suggested, 
system transformation (crisis) is associated with the objective conditions and 
unresolved problems, while system identification is tied to subjective perceptions of 
the transformation. From a Strategic Relations standpoint, it is informative to link 
actors and events to these two aspects of transformation. The notion of living 
experience constitutes the objective conditions of the transformation and has 
particular bearing on the establishing strategic relations between actors at various 
levels of the system as they engage in events. Actors' interpretations of these events 
and the informal communication network in which they are part refer to the subjective 
perception of transformations and form the ground for their assessment and the nature 
of future strategic alliances. 
Thirdly, the consideration given to the two facets of reality - objective conditions and 
subjective perceptions which, correspond to actors'-events' relationship - brings to the 
fore another important aspect of the process of forming strategic relations and their 
political consequences. The point here is that we are confronted with a situation where 
the real problem (the crisis of the capitalist or totalitarian economic system) is 
substituted by an ideological interpretation (the advance of socialism or democracy). 
It is ideological because, as we have seen, it reflects only a partial view of the 
problem, distorts reality into a false and limited picture, and does not tackle the 
problem over the long term. Habermas' (1975,1979) contribution of `logic of crisis 
displacement' captured in an original way the intervention of the state in the economy. 
He described it as a process in which the fundamental crisis originating in the 
economy became the responsibility of the political system (the state) as supreme 
regulator of the economy. Thus, the crisis is displaced from the economy to the 
political system, where it becomes manifested as a rationality crisis. 
Offe's insightful account of the complex process of transformation of totalitarian 
regimes supports the point. He (1996: 41) argued that: 
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the introduction of a market economy in the post-socialist societies is a 
political' project, which has prospects of success only if it rests on a 
strong and explicit democratic legitimation. 
Such a situation, according to Offe, presents a number of crucial paradoxes (the 
Pandora's box of paradoxes in his words), in the face of which "every 'theory'- or, 
for that matter, rational strategy of transition must fail. " Offe, in a way similar to 
Habermas, asserted that only a developed market economy produces the social 
structural conditions necessary for stable democracy and makes it possible to form 
compromises within the framework of what is perceived as a positive-sum game. 
These conclusions are being confirmed by empirical studies (see Walder, 1995 and 
Dostal, 1998 in particular), and take Habermas' argument for understanding 
transformations further, by bringing in two useful dimensions-about the logical order 
or simultaneity of transformations, and the degree of what Jessop (1990: 267) called 
institutional fixity. 
In fact, the latter dimension presupposes the former. At this point, a plausible 
conclusion would be - the more contingent `givings' a transforming society carries 
over, the less the correlation between its economic and political reform. Offe also 
stressed attention on the three levels of transformation including nationhood, 
constitutional order and normal political practices. Although Hay (1996) made 
specific reference to the notions of territoriality and the nation, neither he nor Jessop 
developed the idea of transforming the state territory and the nation, or examined its 
effect on actors' strategies, rather they seemed to have taken the spirit of the 
constitution and political culture of the capitalist society for granted. It must be 
stressed here that most state boundaries were drawn between 1870 and 1925. In the 
Bulgarian case, several previous (1878-1941), and the 1945 fixings of national 
boundaries (politically reconfirmed in 1990) represented rather an arbitrary process 
controlled by Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Each was accompanied by a 
massive movement of people and debates over their national identity. The blueprint of 
the territorial-nationhood issue could be seen in the state projects of all regimes 
dominating the national political stage since 1878. 
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A similar logic can be applied to the sport system or sport policy making and the 
state's intervention in it. The crisis of socialism which, indeed originated in the failure 
of the command economy, and its model of sport (which simply meant the state's 
financial withdrawal) is being replaced by an interpretation offered by the state for a 
more democratic system of sport (meaning in practice less overt compliance by sport 
to a particular ideology). This becomes possible because sport does not have the 
internal capacity to resolve the crisis, and naturally looks for a political solution 
suggested by the state as its supreme regulator, in order to allow the process of 
accumulation (the provision of better resources and greater national-international 
achievements) to be sustained. But at the same time the new policy is clearly 
ideological, because it represents only a partial and short term solution of the financial 
problems of sport and does not address the world trend of an ever-increasing 
economic and political significance of sport, and the state's involvement in its 
financial and conceptual facilitation, but not its appropriation. 
This logic of crisis displacement in the economy or in sport at national level is 
reinforced by the way they depend on global economic and sport systems. 
Developments in both systems nationally are influenced by changes in supply and 
demand for particular products and by more competitive and commercialised sport 
respectively. Taylor's (1985) approach to power and politics in the world economy 
makes a useful distinction between the scale of experience and the scale of reality and 
helps to trace the origins of political processes of transformations. Thinking of 
transformations in terms of a policy and more specifically about the role of the state, 
we need to examine the articulation of what was termed `lived experience' and the 
`scale of reality'. For Taylor, the scale of experience is, for example, the closure of a 
dominant industry and the repercussions for the local community. A sport example 
would be the closure of a specialist sport boarding school and its consequences for 
local, regional and national strategies for talent identification, and developing and 
nurturing the national sport system. The nationalisation of this industry, or leaving the 
future of the sporting school to the discretion of local authorities would represent a 
partial and short term solution to the problem. This is because, as Taylor (1985: 31) 
argued for the economy, these problems derive from the scale of reality - both supply 
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and demand for our hypothetical industry, but also because the genuine striving for 
sporting excellence and international success are global in scope. This dispatches 
them to a level "where nobody can reach it" despite individual or group actors' 
concerns. Thus, it is at the scale of ideology that the policy emerges in offering partial 
and short term solutions. 
The unfolding of the state policy of transformation as process follows the format - the 
needs of accumulation are experienced locally (the closure of a sport boarding 
school), and justified nationally (to improve the efficiency of the national sport 
system) for benefits organised globally (to help the world expansion of competitive- 
elite sport, the multi-national companies and the mass media associated with this 
process, and the international sport governing bodies). Within this framework, various 
actors pursue different strategies and form alliances. It could be argued, then, that it is 
the ideology that separates experience from reality. This conclusion adds another 
dimension to the discourse of the state suggested by Jessop (1990: 260), and his notion 
of the state as the site, the generator and the product of strategies. What emerges from 
the above discussion, is that the state can also be viewed as a mediator of global 
strategies, engaging national actors and shaping the projects they put forward and their 
outcomes. Globalization of the economic, political and cultural sphere poses a much 
debated recently issue for the role of the state, and the consequences for the policies 
pursued nationally. The next section will take further the discussion about 
globalization and its consequences for the state-society relations and sport policy. 
2.5. Globalization, the Nation-State and changing Strategic 
Relations: implications for sport policy 
Finally, the Strategic Relations approach did not attend to the external influences 
responsible for shaping state-society relations and the making of sports policy. 
Following the primary focus of this study, this section has three interrelated aims to: 
(i) outline the nature of contemporary globalization in sport and adopt a 
framework for its interpretation; 
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(ii) examine the effects of globalization on the nation-state, and to 
(iii) consider various responses of the state to the process of globalization 
with regard to the strategies pursued in the sport domain 
Since McLuhan launched his influential idea of the `global village' (in Explorations in 
Communications, 1960), most of the last forty years have seen a proliferation of 
literature on globalization. The very idea, as most theorists would agree, is not new, 
but the novelty of the current debates was brought by the post-World War II 
settlements, and particularly by the demise of Communism in Europe and elsewhere 
at the end of 1980s. Recently Robertson (1992: 58-9), using a temporal-historical 
approach, offered a useful outline for comprehending the global circumstance. He 
identified five successive phases: Germinal (from the early fifteenth until the mid- 
eighteenth century), Incipient (from the mid-eighteenth century until the 1870s), Take- 
off (from the 1870s until the mid 1920s), Struggle-for-Hegemony (from the mid- 
1920s until the late 1960s), and Uncertainty (from the late 1960s and displaying crisis 
tendencies in the early 1990s). In the light of these five phases, it appears that 
contemporary globalization is to be perceived broadly as a process of changing 
patterns of hegemony and establishing a new world order. 
As stated above, the aims of this section can be accomplished by employing different 
perspectives. Robertson and Khondker (1998: 33) identified four overlapping types of 
globalization discourse: 
" regional (civilization) - such as in Western or Eastern Europe, 
" disciplinary - in business, political or cultural studies, 
" ideological - Left or Right, and 
" female-male. 
These ideas are taken up in chapter eight. The approach to this analysis will be 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional, and informed by political, economic and 
sociological premises. Political studies provide the concept of statehood and its 
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dimensions; economic studies the idea of the `economy of ideas', based on increasing 
intangible returns rather than "things"; sociology as the understanding of society with 
its multiple interests and relations. Hence, globalization will be seen both 
synchronically, in terms of its one-shot specific manifestation, and diachronically, 
that is, to account for the changes in the relations between the nation-state and the 
global system over the past century. 
The analysis also assumes that, contrary to the age of Empires at present, globalization 
unfolds in a world of nation-states established in the nineteenth century, whose 
European part was lastly reshuffled by the breakdown of the Soviet Union into fifteen 
independent countries, the reunification of Germany, and the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia. This world order, or as has been called, the Westphalian world order, 
evolved over the period of three centuries, and according to McGrew (1997: 5), is 
based on four key principles: 
1. Territoriality - states have fixed territorial boundaries which define the 
limits to their legal jurisdiction and the scope of their political 
authority. 
2. Sovereignty - within these fixed territorial spaces the state, or 
government, claims effective supremacy; it claims the undisputed and 
exclusive right to rule and to represents the ultimate source of legal 
and political authority over the people within a delimited territory; 
3. Autonomy - states are entitled to conduct their own internal and 
external affairs in a manner which only they are competent to decide 
and free from external intervention and control; 
4. Legality - relations between sovereign states may be subject to 
international law but only in so far as each state consents to being so 
bound. 
These four principles clearly underpin Jessop's Strategic Relations approach and 
Hay's moments and levels of stateness, as the latter assume and define the state within 
the former. But as it is discussed further in this section, it is the globalization project 
which challenges this notion of the immutable sovereign statehood, and entails re- 
examining its key aspects, such as common interests, representation and political 
authority. It does not undermine, however, the premises of Strategic Relations, rather 
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it brings to the fore new dimensions which have bearing on the policy making 
process, and the sport policy making process in particular. 
2.5.1. Globalization-definitions and interpretations 
Globalization is defined in many different ways. A broad overview of the debate 
suggests that there are three overlapping perspectives - cultural, political and 
economic. For Robertson, who put stress on the cultural dimension (1998: 29-30), in 
its most basic sense 
globalization involves the compression of the entire world, on the one 
hand, and a rapid increase in consciousness of the world, on the other. 
Contemporary globalization has produced a global circumstance in which 
civilization, regions, nation-states, nations within or cutting across states, 
and indigenous people, are increasingly constrained to construct their 
own histories and identities. 
Amongst the prominent advocates of political dimensions, Giddens (1990) maintained 
that globalization is a consequence of modernity, which he saw as a Western product. 
The reductionist thesis of globalization sees it as at root economic, and "contends that 
we now live in a world economy dominated by transnational corporations (TNCs), 
that invest wherever they like in a footloose manner" (Kiely, 1998: 96). 
A different view of globalization accounting for cultural and political dimensions was 
advanced by Beyer (1998: 80) as "the emergence of a global society whose central 
dynamic can be understood in terms of mutual conditioning of systemic structures and 
cultural resources ". Although McGrew can be classified as a representative of the 
world polity perspective, his basic interpretation of globalization "simply as growing 
global interconnectedness " (1997: 7) was not politically bound and helps us to grasp 
the idea of transcendency of traditional state-society boundaries, and the mutual 
dependency of structures and agencies at global as well as local and national level. 
This interconnectedness, according to McGrew, has four attributes, implying: 
a) expanded social, political and economic activities across national 
frontiers in such a way that events and decisions in one part of the 
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world have immediate effect for individuals and communities in distant 
parts of the globe; 
b) intensification in the flows of patterns of interaction which make states 
part of a global trade or world sport order; 
c) blurring the distinction between local and global as result of growing 
extensity of global interactions, so a "'domestic' decision by the 
German Bundesbank to raise interest rates in Germany can lead to 
houseowners in the UK paying more for their mortgages" (1997: 7); 
and 
d) growing interconnectedness generating a host of transnational 
problems, for instance, the spread of drug taking in sport, or the need 
for uniform regulations and practices in administering the International 
Olympic Committee global TOP marketing programme. These 
problems cannot be resolved by the efforts of individual governments 
or national sport governing bodies alone, and demand multilateral co- 
operation. 
From the discussion so far, it is evident that globalization implies a constant polarity 
between global and local, which consequently brings into play the consideration of 
two different realities - the global and the local, which often seem to be at odds with 
each other. In fact the global cannot be defined without the local, an argument 
captured in the coining of a new term- `glocalization'. But as Johnson et al (1995: 378) 
warned "in conceptualizing our world we must not fall into the trap of thinking that 
geographical scales exist separately from the social practices that create and 
continue to modify them. " The image of the `local' nation-state was shaped as 
outlined above, by the Westphalian institution of sovereign statehood. Globalization, 
as we have seen, is associated with the transformation of Westphalian order, and has 
significant implications for state-society relationships and state shared sovereignty 
and control over national territory by international agencies. Such an account, of 
course, is not unproblematic, as the problem of contingency arising from state 
sovereignty and the setting of rules for relations with other sovereign units (global) is 
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not the same as the issue of building national statehood (local). Bearing this in mind, 
analysis will proceed further by examining how globalization affects stateness. 
2.5.2. Globalization and the nation-state: effects and responses 
Generally, it is argued that globalization has challenged four aspects of the state: its 
competence, its form, its authority; and its legitimacy (McGrew, 1997). Drawing from 
twenty contributions examining geoeconomic, geopolitical, geosocial, geocultural and 
geoenvironmental changes, Johnson, Taylor and Watts (1995: 381-3) have identified 
six fundamental remappings for a basic understanding of the current trajectory of our 
world. They will be used as a framework for examining the effect on the stateness, 
and discussed in turn. 
First, it is the trend to economic globalization which, involves a new division of 
labour, an enhanced role of finance, increased capital mobility, and a flow of more 
intangible products - ideas (from software to media images) than things. The latter is 
of particular significance for sport and is perfectly illustrated by Olympic sport, and 
will be elaborated in more detail. This type of economic growth become possible 
because the cost of reproducing an idea is essentially zero and returns increase 
indefinitely with the scope of the market. As Evans (1997: 77) argued: 
the magnitude of returns of an idea does not flow from a logic of marginal 
production cost in a meaningful sense of the term, but it does depend on 
authoritative decisions, like the determination of the duration of the 
copyright and patent protection and the intellectual property regime more 
generally. 
It is not accidental that struggles over the issue of appropriation, and specifically the 
question of intellectual property rights, is a top priority of the United States' 
international economic policy. American senior officials and experts had to put a lot 
of effort including various incentives and threats to align Bulgaria's legislation and 
enforcement policy with international standards, to ensure that the intellectual rights 
will be observed because allegedly the country was placed amongst the leaders on the 
US list for software piracy of musical CDs in particular (estimated for 1997 to amount 
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$125 millions in lost profit for US companies). The case of the global information 
economy, and especially of intangible assets, provides an example of how powerful 
transnational economic actors, while wanting to limit the state's ability to constrain 
their own activities, also have an interest in stronger states to guarantee the increased 
scope of the market, and ultimately their profit. 
By stepping into a new area of legislation and economic policy as a response to global 
pressures, the state takes away from public and private institutions a lucrative source 
of revenue, but at the same time, gives to an independent sports actor a significant 
source of income. Until 1995, for forty years the Bulgarian National Bank amongst 
others was a main exploiter of the five Olympic rings (a registered intellectual 
property of the IOC) in using the symbol for commemorative coins and not paying 
any royalties. Eventually after five years of struggle, the Bulgarian Olympic 
Committee (the only authorised guardian of the symbol in the national territory) had 
to threaten to take the case to the international court in the Hague, and thus to use 
another supra-national institution's authority to make the BNB comply in future. This 
incident may not be of crucial significance for global sport, but if the BNB has to pay 
for what has been unlawfully appropriated, the amount due would have taken the 
whole budget of Bulgarian sport for at least five years. 
The second remapping involves the promotion of markets as resource allocators in an 
increasingly deregulated world. As Johnson et al (1995: 382) pointed out "all social 
activity is premised on the existence of rules: deregulation presupposes an alternative 
regulation. " This observation is valid, particularly for the transforming economies of 
Eastern European countries as the striving to `join the West' on many occasions led 
states to confuse market principles with market practices. After the demise of socialist 
economic integration within the framework of CMEA, a new institutional economics 
emerged stressing the importance of institutional regimes to any kind of economic 
transaction. This served, as Evans (1997: 78) said, to `further generalize the argument 
that efficient markets can exist only in the context of effective and robust nonmarket 
institutions. " So far, in most of the post-Communist countries, the state has failed 
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generally to ensure a tax discipline and policy adequate to the liberalisation of the 
market, and this has resulted in cutbacks of social programmes, including the health 
service, education and sport. The lack of clear vision by Bulgaria's post-Communist 
governments about privatisation has also led to the loss of many sporting properties- 
facilities, services and assets - which were transferred to private actors and served 
different purposes, with no compensations to the sports community. 
The third remapping represents a challenge to state sovereignty. There is no doubt that 
global flows have changed the functions of the state, and led to arguments that the 
power of nation states as administrative and policy-making agencies and their role as 
economic managers have declined. However, this does not mean the eclipse of the 
state. States generally remain the supreme authority in their national territories and 
appear to be a key source of legitimacy to markets and social activities, and 
deregulator of authority to powers above and below the national level, which makes 
them essential agents for adjusting to the changing environment. 
In responding to the previous challenge a fourth remapping - the construction of new 
civil societies in which people can engage in social change through their states - is 
required. The central part of the argument here suggests that following the global 
changes discussed above, for state strategies to sustain themselves, adequate policies 
are needed to set a framework for state-civil society relationships. In the case of post- 
totalitarian societies, this may prove extremely difficult, because for several decades 
traditional community ties were abandoned and distorted. In the aftermath of the 
Eastern European revolutions from the end of the 1980s, accompanied by massive 
reforms (see the second re-mapping in particular), many social institutions have been 
eliminated on ideological or ill-interpreted `market' grounds. As yet, they have not 
been replaced by new democratic institutions, and this gap is acutely felt in, amongst 
other places, Bulgarian sport. Clearly ideologically driven, state intervention in sport 
since 1992 has managed, in a systematic manner, to weaken and eventually to 
dismantle completely the principal voluntary umbrella sport governing body - the 
Bulgarian Sports Union, so that the State Committee for Physical Education and 
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Sport's authority over national sport is now absolutely uncontested. Putman's 
perspective (1993, quoted in Evans, 1997: 80) - `strong society, strong state'-is 
informative here as it suggested that: 
just as modern markets depend on economic decision being nested in a 
predictable institutional framework, likewise civic engagement flourishes 
more easily among private citizens and organised groups when they have 
a competent public sector as an interlocutor. 
With regard to sport, it is easy to agree on the interlocutor's role of the state, but 
certainly not on its self-proclaimed supreme supervisor's role. 
The fifth remapping, as Johnson et al (1995: 383) pointed out, "genuinely transcends 
the state in the form of environmental change". It may transcend but in no way by- 
passes the state. The concern for global environment becomes dominant in the 
international and domestic political agenda. It was manifested in the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment in Rio de Janeiro. The outcome of this summit - 
the Rio Declaration promoted the concept of `sustainable development' to which over 
one hundred countries subscribed. One of its key principles - No. 8 - proposed 
"reduction and elimination of non-sustainable production and consumption 
patterns ". Sport was assumed to be one of those patterns "on account of its 
increasing expansion in ways that are often neither healthful to society nor in 
harmony with nature " (Da Costa, 1997: 15). 
Subsequently, sport alongside several other areas underwent ecology-related 
assessments and under the leading role of the International Olympic Committee, 
general principles for international and national sport governing bodies were drawn 
up. This global development entails the introduction of a new concept of sustainable 
management which, presents a challenge to all sport organisations with regards to 
conformity to standards of `production and consumption'. Future polices and practices 
should account for ecological demands on sports activities, which concern not only 
the typical outdoor sports practised on water, snow, beaches or forest, but include also 
the impact of mega sporting events like the Olympic Games, or by setting large-scale 
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facilities. Clearly, for sports authorities to comply with ecological standards would be 
impossible without the mediating role of the state as proponent, legislator and 
enforcer of environmental strategies incorporating sporting practices as well. 
The sixth remapping calls for re-evaluating the central claim of modernity that there is 
an inexorable social progress. Different flows of globalization do not benefit all local 
and transnational actors equally. What they imply is that the modern world and its 
constitutive elements, nation-states, are undergoing a profound social change. This 
change, because of historic or current circumstances surrounding a particular state 
may take two basic forms, as continuity (more of the same), or discontinuity (a 
turning point to a new path of development). Bulgaria's history contains examples of 
both forms but despite the two great turning points - in 1944 and 1989 -a close 
examination reveals the domination of continuity of processes, structures, strategies 
and actors. 
In addition to the six remappings, another emerging implication from globalization, 
which seems to have been played down by the Strategic Relations approach, points to 
the significance of `world images' created by global interconnectedness. These world 
images as an aspect of contemporary consciousness play a critical role in framing the 
directions in which different state and non-state actors' interests (both ideal and 
material) have to be pursued within a given world order. In an original attempt to 
address this issue, Robertson (1992: 78-79) identified four types of such images of 
world order based on societies, individuals, the system of societies and mankind. As 
yet, these images remain on the level of fairly abstract constructs, but nonetheless, 
they point to an interesting notion of global ideologies or doctrines promoting one or a 
mixture of world orders. This explicitly `globe-oriented' perspective is defined as 
"one which espouses as a central aspect of its message or policy a concern with the 
patterning of the entire world" (Robertson, 1992: 79). With necessary allowances, it 
could be assumed that, modern Olympism with its concern for universal 
understanding, peace, equality, education and participation, represents such an 
ideology. There could be also very little disagreement on the appeal of this ideology 
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to nation-states as sport is justifiably seen as a significant contributor to the national 
health, cohesion, self-assertion, and economy. Subscription to this ideology on the 
part of a state (albeit not necessarily in the form of formal agreement, rather through a 
non-governmental agency - the National Olympic Committee) brings distinct 
advantages and obligations. It is in the interests of the state, therefore, through its 
public, voluntary and private bodies to put forward strategies to maximise the benefits 
promoted by the global Olympic ideology. 
2.5.3. Towards a global sport order? 
Two issues need prior clarification here. First, it is important to answer the question of 
whether modem international, and Olympic sport in particular, is truly global. Second, 
what constitutes its authority, and how this can be imposed on the nation-states? In 
answering these questions, one has to employ certain criteria against which to assess 
the globalization of modern Olympic sport. In a study of the limits of globalization, 
Weiss (1997: 6-7) offered such three criteria: 
i) novelty - is it unusual or without parallel, thus suggesting secular 
growth rather than oscillation? 
ii) magnitude - how substantial is it in size? and 
iii) distribution - to what extent is it world-wide in scope? 
Her findings, though, provided no compelling evidence indicating that the changes 
produced by the cross-border flow of people, products, capital and money had 
resulted in a clearly global tendency. This analysis does not intend to evidence and 
counter-evidence in detail the globalization of sport. Instead, it tries to satisfy the 
above criteria, and in line with their logic will provide a single key argument. 
Institutionalised modern Olympic sport emerged only some hundred years ago but can 
be said to satisfy the above criteria. Its novelty lies in the principal difference between 
the national-religious character of the ancient festivals, celebrating the superiority of 
the Greeks, and the global-secular format of the modern Games promoting human 
excellence. In terms of magnitude - the International Olympic Movement (IOM), 
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encompasses some thirty six International Sport Federations (administering the sports 
on the Olympic programme, but virtually all other International Sport Governing 
bodies being affiliated by the IOC) and all National Olympic Committees representing 
several hundred million athletes from all over the world. An third criteria - the 
distribution of the Olympic Movement - it seems to be the only governmental and 
non-governmental movement supported by its all potential members - the existing 200 
National Olympic Committees and national sport governing bodies (with more 
member-countries than the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund). 
Having ascertained the global character of the modem Olympic sport, let us now turn 
to the question of its authority. One way of understanding this issue is by placing it 
within the concept of international regimes which, Young (1980, quoted in Ruggie, 
1982: 380) defined "as social institutions around which actor expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations. " Inevitably, however, international regimes 
limit the discretion of their constituent units (social institutions) to decide and act on 
issues that fall within the regime's domain, because the former are thought as 
comprising principles, norms, rules and procedures which the latter subscribe to (see 
also Puchala and Raymond, 1982). Ruggie (1982: 380) further argued that: 
insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact, causation, 
and rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded 
as legitimate, they fall closer to the consumatory end of the spectrum, into 
the realm of political authority. Thus, the formation and transformation of 
international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of 
the internationalization of political authority. 
Essential for the evolving institutionalisation of sport order and its authority, as 
Gruneau (1988) suggested, are three central subprocesses: codification, organisation 
and legitimation. With the establishment of the first international sport federations at 
the end of 1880s and the IOC in 1894, the new international sport order which will be 
termed "Olympic" was given an institutional framework, and thus, it sought to 
establish formal authority. The authority relations within this order are constructed in 
an open, but clearly West European way, giving much scope to competitive-market 
forces, and allowing very little or no deviation, so that, even the Communist bloc 
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countries had to abandon their proclaimed holistic approach to physical education and 
sport in order to join the Olympic order after World War II. 
Specific regimes that serve such an order in the areas of codification and organisation 
are the written rules and regulations (in the case of Olympic Movement, the Olympic 
Charter), and recently the Olympic marketing contract within the TOP programme 
(TOP III-IV-1992-1996-2000). This is the first ever global sponsorship programme 
providing substantial cash and services in return for promotion of selected 
transnational companies' (called "Olympic partners"), mostly providing intangible 
goods or services. All National Olympic Committees around the world were sent a 
clear message by the IOC to join the regime if they wanted to be part of the Olympic 
order. This marketing regime which epitomises the `economy of ideas' discussed 
above 
in the case of the newly emerged National Olympic Committees of Europe 
(as result of the breakdown of USSR, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia)... was used by the IOC as a condition for recognition, a 
position very similar to the IOC 's attitude towards Eastern European 
countries after the 2nd World War (Girginov, 1998: 142). 
The workings of the marketing regime as constituent of authority, along with the 
structure of the Olympic sport order, are instructive for constructing the argument in 
the last part of the analysis in this section. 
Finally, what is important from a Strategic Relations perspective, is how the state 
copes with all those remappings, world images and international regimes, and what 
strategic responses, if any it offers. Environmentalist' slogan -'think global, act local', 
is of little help here as, it tends to by-pass the state and fails to acknowledge its 
potential roles. As the preceding analysis demonstrated, globalization clearly 
constrains traditional state authority and sovereignty but in no way implies its eclipse. 
In a world of increasing interconnectedness, the thesis that globalization is confined to 
the political and economic obsolescence of the state is, at the least misleading. Similar 
thinking about globalization and the crisis of nation-states, as Wade (1996, quoted in 
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Arrighi, 1998: 66) noted, "simply recycles arguments that were fashionable a hundred 
years ago. " Instead, it is important that states are seen as subsystems of the global 
political system, and, as Thomas et al. (1987, quoted in Beyer, 1998: 88) argued, "the 
modern state is a globalized institution that implies a model to which all states are 
under pressure to conform, more or less. " Such a view of the state associates 
globalization with the emergence of new political forces and social energies, and an 
increased capacity for stimulating new kinds of political organisations and 
solidarities. The massive growth of international non-governmental organisations and 
transnational social movements; the environmental, women's, or the Olympic 
movements illustrate the point. 
Borrowing from Weiss (1997) and Evans (1997), and relating to the fourth 
implication of Jessop's (1990: 270) the Strategic Relations Approach asserts that 
i) state power can only be assessed relationally; 
ii) the state as such has no power; 
iii) it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which 
mediate that power; and 
iv) the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through 
the state. 
The argument for the mobilization of forces and stimulation of new capacities and 
alliances assumes four responses by the state to globalization: 
i) adaptation rather than decline of functions; 
ii) acting as facilitators not victims of globalization; 
iii) emerging `catalytic' states which consolidate domestic and 
international linkages; and 
iv) mutual empowerment of state and civil society. 
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2.5.4. Globalization and state strategies 
It must be emphasised however, that as a state's capacities differ, so does its ability to 
exploit opportunities of global political, cultural and economic exchange. Thus, the 
concept of state capacity does not apply in any uniform way to Eastern European 
countries, rather, it is to be seen within the particular circumstances of each state. Four 
state strategies are briefly outlined below, while Chapter 8 deals in greater detail with 
their adaptation in Bulgaria, and how they are specifically manifested in sport. 
The issue of state adaptiveness involves various aspects of state behaviour - 
economic, political, social and technological - and concerns three main factors of the 
adaptation - institutional arrangements, the use of political tools, and key decision- 
making actors. Self's (1985) comprehensive study on environmental change and 
government response noted the tendency for expansion of state activities and the 
relationship between social structure, public opinion and the policy process. He 
suggested the assumption that 
environmental changes have had a potent effect upon the growth and work 
of government. At the same time, the self-exciting tendencies within the 
political system, and their feedback effects upon public demands, must not 
be forgotten (1985: 28). 
This tendency was clearly reinforced during the totalitarian period as the Bulgarian 
state took more responsibilities than it could handle (virtually full responsibility for 
everything). The tension, which the preoccupation with virtually all aspects of state 
and society functioning produces, diminishes the state's capacity to tackle strategic 
issues, and hence its adaptability to the changing environment. Furthermore, in the 
case of transformation from a totalitarian to a democratic state, in economic, political 
and social terms Bulgaria together with other Eastern European countries, falls into 
the category of a `late developer', as she has to `catch up' and comply with certain 
standards for democratisation laid down by the West. Economically, these countries 
face the prospect of unequal competition with established producers, 
both 
domestically and globally, whereas, ironically, the reverse process is in operation 
in 
sport. From their appearance on the Olympic scene in 1952, the Communist countries 
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dominated Olympic sport by setting the standards for excellence and leading medal 
tables. Thus, the process of adaptability demands from the state adjustment of its 
political, economic and social tools and institutions, whether to catch up or to sustain 
a particular model. 
This leads to the second response of the state as to why it is assuming the role of 
facilitator rather than victim of globalization. Building on the arguments from the 
previous section, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the growth of 
transnational flows of capital, products, images and people demands strong states, 
capable of ensuring an adequate economic, political and legislative climate to 
accommodate these flows. But these transactions do not have a unilateral direction, 
that is, they also include the promotion of the local (local resistance) as a global 
phenomenon. The ideas concerning the local and the indigenous are reproduced in a 
variety of international and transnational organisations and movements. Particular 
examples in sport constitute the Association of National Olympic Committees 
(ANOC), The Committee of Sports Ministers of the Council of Europe countries, 
European Non-Governmental Sport Organisations (ENGSO), or the World Festivals 
of Traditional Sports and Games run by TAFISA. 
Furthermore, the facilitating role of the state is encouraged by the key global actors 
advocating for abandoning the constraints on the transnational economy and 
communications. Deacon's (1995) and Deacon and Hules' (1997) studies on the 
making of post-Communist social policy and of international agencies provided a 
clear insight into the role, among others, of the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, OECD countries, and the European Union in setting social policy to 
meet the market changes. Deacon and Hules (1997: 60) even advanced the conclusion 
that: "the policy making in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the 
former Soviet Union is being used as a testing ground for ideas about the future of 
social policy elsewhere. " These developments clearly imply a double facilitating role 
of the state - both 'upwards' and 'downwards', as encouraging local business or sport 
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actors to go internationally, and by creating conditions for accommodating global 
practices. 
Thirdly, states can also respond to globalization by changing their powers through 
reconstructing the power around the consolidation of domestic and international 
networks. This process, closely associated with the facilitating role of the state, 
involves building power alliances - via inter-state coalitions ('upwards'), and via state 
-business alliances ('downwards'). Catalytic states, according to Weiss (1997: 24), 
seek to achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources than by 
assuming a dominant role in coalition of states, transnational institutions, 
and private-sector groups, and that 
it is a way of highlighting the tendency of states to seek adaptation to new 
challenges by forging or strengthening partnerships with other states 
(state and non-state) power actors, rather than going it alone. 
Accounting for the `late developers' position of the East European countries in the 
global economy and democratisation, Weiss' argument apparently does not fit fully 
their circumstances, although, some regional developments, such as the reawakening 
of the Balkan political, economic and sport co-operation, or the bi/multilateral 
commercial links between Bulgaria and former Soviet Republics provide substance to 
it. But as Weiss (1997: 25) asserted: "regionalism (inter-state coalitions) without 
domestic capacity (public private coalitions) is only half the story, akin to conducting 
a war of movement without having established a war of position. " Putting it slightly 
differently, the most important of these coalitions will be a partnership of government 
and business in new power sharing arrangements, with the state remaining as an active 
centre for mediating and managing domestic and international linkages. 
One essential emerging link accounting for the fourth response of the state is the 
mutual empowerment of state and society. As we have seen, the state's adaptation and 
enhanced capability entails new functions, mediating roles and shared power 
arrangements. These can be successfully achieved by establishing productive state- 
civil society relations. This response is at odds with the globalising assumption that 
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revitalising civil society implies accelerating the reduction, if not the demise of the 
state. The point here is not that the civil society could provide a substitute for the 
organised public institutions of the state, but rather that state agencies and local 
community groups can work together to produce a needed service or collective good. 
Evans (1997) referred to this prospect as `state-society synergy' achieved at the macro 
level through effective development projects, and illustrated it with Taiwan's 
Irrigation Association. In this light, the hostile attitude of Bulgaria's State Committee 
for Youth, Physical Education and Sport towards the voluntary sports sector appears 
in sharp contrast, and reinforces the country's inherited tendency for centralised and 
unchallenged state governance. 
In conclusion, several important implications of globalization on state strategic 
relations have been identified: 
- globalization is not a truly universal concept entailing the eclipse of the 
state; it does however, suggest a re-evaluation of the Westphalian order 
by challenging its basic premises, requiring states to share their 
sovereignty and authority with other levels of government or 
transnational actors (see also Henry, 2000); 
- in addition, globalization challenges a state's economic, social, 
environmental and developmental policies as it promotes a world order 
increasingly dominated by the `economy of ideas'. Corresponding to 
this world order is a global Olympic order which has been identified, 
based on the uniform regimes of rules, regulation and marketing 
contracts; 
- globalization prompts at least four key state responses- i) adaptability 
instead of diminishing functions; ii) facilitating `upwards' (global) and 
`downwards' (local) roles involving transnational flows of products, 
services, people and images; iii) consolidating domestic and 
international linkages via intra-state (downwards) and inter-state 
(upwards) mediating arrangements; iv) emerging state-civil society 
relations, presupposing mutual empowerment. 
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From a Strategic Relations perspective, what emerges from the effects of globalization 
and the responses of the state, is the creation of a whole new strategic environment, 
where state projects, and the political system devised to promote them, are often 
shaped by actors and arrangements distant from national territories. In the same way, 
state and non-state agencies get involved in struggles for resources and their 
distribution, located beyond national reach. It could be argued then that, virtually all 
relations established by the state in this global environment carry the sign of 
`strategic', whereas, far fewer intra-state links may have such an essential bearing on 
the constitution of the state and society. The likely implications for the sport system 
on the national level include a greater dependence of the National Olympic 
Committee on the new strategic environment (the Olympic order), hence increasing its 
authority over the national sports federations on Olympic matters from a strengthened 
financial position. The growing links between the state Committee for Physical 
Education and Sport with the Council of Europe, because of the leading role of the 
former, will impose certain models in the sports policy-making process promoted by 
the latter. As far as the local level of the sports system (clubs, societies and individual 
athletes) is concerned, the striving for international success, emphasising 
marketability of the sport product, may result in failure to comply with the norms set 
by national sports governing bodies, thus causing conflicts in the system, and 
prompting new strategic relations. 
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3.1. Preliminary remarks 
The starting point of this study was the recent transformations in society and in sport 
in Eastern European countries. More specifically, of particular interest was to observe 
the way Bulgaria's sport system, and its principal aspects - value orientation, 
ideology, policies, structures and actors - would be transformed in a changing 
environment. This seemed a challenging project, since there is no such analysis so far 
in the domestic or foreign lay or professional literature. The author's early studies 
(Girginov 1989,1991, & Slavkov, 1994,1995), as well as studies from other authors 
(Tzonev & Bankov, 1988, Stoichev & Tzonev, 1995, CYPES, 1996) provided 
interesting data concerning these aspects of the sports system. 
These data provoked and helped to formulate the research problem and theoretical 
framework for the study. However, there are two critical methodological 
considerations, concerning the congruency between (i) how capitalist, communist and 
democratic reality was viewed at the time, and (ii) how this reality is being studied at 
present, which need to be addressed beforehand. This poses the issue of constructing 
and testing the research questions. Academic studies elaborating on the role of the 
state in sport in the capitalist period are few, and most of the literature is descriptive 
and "administrative" in nature, being mainly supportive of the contemporary 
practices. The methods used include observations and ethnography. In addition, the 
literature on sport under Fascist rule, published subsequently during the Communist 
years, is clearly marked by its current ideological commitment. The totalitarian period 
has been and is being studied through a variety of methods - observations, interviews, 
ethnography, questionnaires, and hermeneutics, but the majority of the reports 
inevitably bear the sign of ideological rather than academic interpretation. Despite the 
historical specificity of the two epochs, it can be argued that empirical studies have 
been theoretically informed by a positivist perspective, seeking to discover a pre- 
existing pattern in order to predict and control events in sport. 
Accounting for different socio-economic conjunctures in the three periods and 
methodological concerns, the preliminary findings could only be considered as a set of 
regularities and empirical generalisations, and not as universal laws. The analysis of 
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empirical observations suggested that they were not only theoretically informed but 
can also be theoretically informative, in the sense that they can yield new theoretical 
claims and concepts. For these findings to become theoretically significant, they had 
to be related to a set of propositions. Studying the three periods from a contemporary 
perspective requires the application of a theoretical perspective and research strategy 
different from those used in each period. It was decided that a critical social science 
perspective would provide the framework of analysis needed to question the social 
situation during the three periods. As a theory on the topic, the strategic relations 
approach as developed by Jessop (1990) was chosen. The principal benefits of this 
approach for the analysis of Bulgarian sport policy as identified in chapter 2 included: 
" providing a framework for examining different aspects of the state in the 
three stages of its historical development, and helping to explain strategic 
selectivity of each towards a particular sports policy model; 
" facilitating the identification of the state and its unity in relation to 
particular political systems and wider social formations and the key sports 
beneficiaries and/or losers; 
" helping to explore different parameters of the state's crisis with regard to 
its representation, institutions, rationality, hegemony and legitimacy, and 
their impact on shaping relations in sport. 
More specifically, the introduction (Chapter 1) and the literature review (Chapter 2) 
suggested that the 121 years of Bulgaria's modem history can be viewed as a 
continuum, including three major reshapings (periods) of the state. Each period was 
marked by a distinct project seeking to build a new stateness, and which involved past 
and present struggles and produced outcomes which corresponded very little with 
what was intended. The theoretical propositions and the empirical observations 
brought to the fore some implications, and informed the research methodology about 
several important aspects as summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Key theoretical propositions and their methodological implications 
Theoretical propositions Methodological implications 
The state is a social relation which has no pre-given power or Attend to situations of crisis and transformations in which 
structure. Rather, it represents a strategic terrain where these struggles occur and outcomes are produced. These to be seen 
have to be established in struggles the outcomes of which are in historical perspective as a process (diachronically). 
always uncertain, and allowed the state to be seen 
simultaneously as site, generator, product and mediator of 
strategies; 
The nature of these struggles is the pursuit of the state's Look at changes in actors' positions in the sports domain as 
formal unity (as an institution) and substantive unity (as a result of enhancing their knowledge and access to resources; 
social base), whereby different projects (including for sport) in-depth evaluation of sports policy process (synchronically 
are put forward by individual or group actors trying to assert and as a series of snap-shots) in order to explain how and 
their interests and knowledge while competing for core why particular sports policies arise at certain times. 
positions in the domain and greater privileges; 
Past and present struggles and their outcomes create various Reassesses knowledge about events and the role of various 
socio-political environments which presuppose the forms of actors; look at whose interests have been promoted by the 
state intervention in sport; state's activity. 
The small correlation between the state's projects and their Account for individuals' beliefs and perceptions, and the role 
outcomes urges an analysis to account for two important of structures and specific settings. 
aspects: (i) it is a result of the contest over implementation of 
particular strategies pursued by various agents, and (ii) that 
there is a difference between the scale of reality (which 
involves global interests beyond the reach of anybody) and 
the lived experience (individual actors' perceptions), which 
are separated by ideologically obscured formulations; 
The global interconnectedness - the relations between Examine the effects on actors' knowledge and abilities to 
transnational and local forces in shaping state and sports promote local interests and strategies. 
projects; 
It was suggested also that sports policy is a strategic relation the formation of which 
needs to be viewed in a broader context of state-society relations at particular 
historical conjunctures. Furthermore, similar to the state project, this relation 
constitutes a process of past and present struggles the outcomes of which were 
uncertain. The testing of theoretical propositions involved in the Strategic Relations 
approach entailed examining the process of sports policy making, accounting for the 
role and interests of the state and non-state actors (local and global), and the projects 
pursued by them. These were studied both diachronically, that is, as a historical 
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process throughout the three periods, and synchronically, as a snap-shot (case studies), 
in a particular moment in time. 
This chapter aims to address the key elements of the research methodology by: 
a) formulating the research questions; 
b) considering the project's ontological and epistemological 
suppositions; 
c) examining the basic conditions for critical research; and 
d) setting the methodological building blocks. 
3.2. The study of sport policy through the lenses of the critical theory 
and the Strategic Relations approach 
As was argued in the previous chapter, the concept of the state as a set of strategic 
relations provided an adequate framework for addressing its role in the area of sport. 
In the preliminary comments of this chapter, it was noted that some data and research 
findings suggested a great deal of similarity at different times in sport's principal 
aspects such as its conceptualisation, state intervention, patterns of people's 
participation, and key actors. Therefore, this study was initiated with a well-defined 
vision, addressing a number of interrelated research questions formulated with the 
objective of elaborating on each significant aspect of the state-sport relationship. 
Allowing that virtually no work has been undertaken on the analysis of sports policy 
in Bulgaria, the investigation that forms the focus of this thesis can be defined as 
explanatory in nature, aiming to uncover the underlying structures and relations in 
Bulgaria's sport policy context. 
The research questions that will be pursued are: 
1. What constitutes the relationship between the Bulgarian state project 
and state project in sport in the three different periods? 
2. How does state intervention and the articulation of sport change as the 
political and economic environment is transformed? 
3. How is the social base of state power in sport constructed with 
reference to various state-civil society relationships? 
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4. What is the role of transnational and national organisations and actors 
for formulating national sport policy and values? 
Table 3.2. illustrates the relation between the main research questions, theoretical 
premises, data required, the sources sought and the techniques used for its acquisition 
pertinent throughout the project. 
The justification for emphasising the totalitarian form of the state is both historical 
and conceptual. From a historic perspective, as already pointed out, the political and 
socio-economic development of the Bulgarian state has been dominated by totalitarian 
forces, agencies and relations. Conceptually, totalitarianism can be seen as opposition 
to liberal-democratic ideas, but its representations in Communist and democratic 
societies is somewhat paradoxical. The example of totalitarian Communist states, or 
the failure of Communism to develop a critique of totalitarianism illustrates the point. 
The contribution of a strategic relations approach to the analysis is its capacity to offer 
a middle way between state-centred and society-centred approaches, thus recognising 
the significance of structures and individual agents for creating and implementing the 
state's sport policy. The former mode of inquiry focuses upon the actual behaviour of 
the state as an institution. As Clarke and Dear (1984: 10) argued: 
Questions of bureaucratic organisation, relationships between contending 
centres of power, and the maintenance of the state's legitimacy through its 
own actions indicate the scope and definition of this type of analysis. 
The society-centred mode of inquiry is the principal alternative to the state-centred. 
Clarke and Dear (1984: 10) added: 
Here the analytical method focuses upon the social obligations between 
society's members, and hence derives the necessity of the state, and its 
apparatus, from social relationships. 
Moreover, the "state neutral" nature of the strategic relations approach, makes its 
application to the three different socio-political settings unproblematic. As Jessop 
himself (1990: 353) asserted: 
Nothing in my proposed definition of the state implied that it necessarily 
has a particular class (or gender, ethnic, national or order) content. Nor 
has my account of the state as idea and the role of the state projects in 
shaping the state led to the conclusion that the state must be capitalist. 
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In a similar study, Nassis (1994) used the strategic relations approach, based on 
Jessop's (1990) assumption that various agents, whether political parties, local 
interests, or transnational organisations attempt to put forward specific projects by 
adopting certain strategies for realising their aspirations, and then explored different 
level of relationships. On the contrary, accounting for specific circumstances, this 
thesis took as a point of departure the existence of a Bulgarian state project and its 
related non-economic (hegemonic) project in sport as predetermining factors of sport 
development strategies. Nassis (1994: 214) for example, argued that "developments in 
Greek sports policy since 1980 are reflections of the strategic relations within and 
around the specific context, and present the materialisation of specific strategies put 
forward by certain agents and favoured by the form of the Greek state and sport over 
that period. " Clearly, in the Greek case we have a certain number of actors, operating 
in a changing political and economic environment, and trying to maintain or change 
their status quo by pursuing their aspirations. By contrast, in the Bulgarian case, in the 
three periods concerned, despite different state projects, there was more or less an 
environment shaped by the state hegemonic project, and imposed on all actors in the 
sporting scene with little resistance. What the two empirical researches have brought 
to light, however, is the contextual substance needed to conceptualise the strategic 
relations' principles in a particular setting. Jessop (1990: 267) acknowledged the lack 
of empirical research: 
... we can now 
deal with some basic implications of a strategic theoretical 
approach. For the moment these must remain at the level of assertions 
and guidelines but they nonetheless challenge many received wisdoms 
within Marxist state theorising. 
and: 
In advocating a strategic-relations approach I have only been able to 
provide some abstract and formal indications about new directions for 
research and enquiry (p. 270). 
It is the aim of this study to identify and conceptualise the strategic relations in 
empirical terms at three different historical conjunctures, that have led to the process 
of statisation of Bulgarian sport. 
As demonstrated by the historical overview of Bulgaria's sport policy development in 
chapter 1, the study of recent transformations could not be based on the face value of 
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empirical observations alone. The theoretical lessons brought by empirical analysis 
suggested that data are important in order to ground the enquiry, but data are 
meaningful only and must be treated as dependent in terms of their theoretical and 
socio-historic context. Empirical analysis together with theoretical conjecture is 
essential for a dialectical analysis of inner connections. These underlying assumptions 
inform our understanding about the significance of two crucial components 
concerning the practices under investigation - the knowledge (in the form of 
hegemonic projects and related sport policies) and its articulation by dominant social 
structures. As Harvey (1990: 2) claimed: 
at the heart of critical social research is the idea that knowledge is 
structured by existing sets of social relations. The aim of a critical 
methodology is to provide knowledge which engages the prevailing social 
structures. These social structures are seen by critical researches, in one 
way or another, as oppressive structures. 
and (1990: 6): 
in its engagements with oppressive structures it (the critical process) 
questions the nature of prevailing knowledge and directs attention to the 
processes and institutions which legitimate knowledge. 
The notion of oppression occurs in sociological literature in different forms - class, 
race, gender or religion - but there is a limited body of work addressing the existence 
of oppressive practices imposed by state-society strategic relations. It is the aim of this 
project, therefore, to examine the national sport policy in relation to state-society 
strategic relations. In order to accomplish this critical social research, an 
epistemological perspective was employed in which knowledge and critique are 
intertwined, assuming that a critical process informs knowledge. In the words of 
Harvey (1990: 4): 
critical social research aims at an analysis of social processes, delving 
beneath ostensive and dominant conceptual frames, in order to reveal the 
underlying practices, their historical specificity and structural 
manifestations. 
Critical theory, as first developed by the Frankfurt School, rests on the idea that 
reason is the highest potentiality of human beings and that, through its use, it is 
possible to criticise and challenge the nature of existing societies. One of the leading 
proponents of the critical perspective, Habermas (1972: 301-17), classified the process 
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of scientific enquiry into three categories according to their underlying interests 
("knowledge-constructive interests"), their anthropologically rooted strategies for 
interpreting life experiences, and their means of social organisation. Each of these 
categories produces its own form of knowledge - empirical-analytic (technically 
exploitable knowledge for prediction and control); human-hermeneutic (practical 
interests in communicative understanding between individuals or social groups); and 
critical (based on the emancipatory interest in achieving rational autonomy of action 
freed from domination). 
Blaikie (1993: 54), in his analysis of Habermas borrowed from Giddens (1977), and 
represented this classification as follows: 
Type ofscience Underlying interests Aspect of social existence 
Empirical-analytic 
Historical-hermeneutic 
Critical theory 
Prediction and control 
Understanding 
Emancipation 
Work (instrumental action) 
Interaction (language) 
Power 
Clearly, the underlying interest of critical knowledge is about emancipation and 
power. It is concerned with ways in which social, political, economic and cultural 
conditions produce a certain selectivity in the process of devising and implementing 
sport policy. It involves also a continual scepticism toward the commonplaces and 
socially accepted conventions of sport policy, acknowledging that social practices 
contain contradictions in which there are continually issues of power domination (see 
Morgan, 1983). This notion provides an important precondition for relating the basic 
assumptions of critical theory and Strategic Relations. 
Habermas argued that critical theory involves all three forms of knowledge. By using 
the methods of historical-hermeneutic science it studies the interpretative 
understanding of systems of belief and modes of communication and critically 
evaluates them, whereas it investigates their causes through the methods of empirical- 
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analytical science. More recently, other authors such as Antonio (1983), Sayer (1984), 
Fay (1987,1993), Harvey (1990), Popkewitz (1990), Agger (1991), Hoy and 
McCarthy (1994) and Bailey (1994), drawing from the same epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, have also argued that critical theory can use a combination 
of methods. In turn, this assumption had a particular bearing on the chosen research 
strategy and methods as it allowed for more adequate investigation of the three 
historical periods. 
3.3. Research Methodology: Elements and Strategy 
The sociological literature provides ample examples for varied critical research, but 
also asserts that a critical methodology is based on several building blocks. Antonio 
(1983: 344-5) and recently Harvey (1990: 19-32) argued that these blocks represent 
elements which are drawn together in various ways in the process of deconstruction 
and reconstruction and include abstraction, totality, essence, praxis, ideology, history 
and structure. The rest of this section discusses the setting of these blocks in relation 
to the project's objectives. 
As stated above, the starting point of this project was the abstract generalisation 
concerning the similarities in Bulgaria's sport policy at different historical 
conjunctures. This study sets out to investigate these generalisations by admitting that 
facts do not exist independently and so are not self-evident, and so concepts cannot be 
abstracted from them, an approach similar to what Sayer (1984: 42) referred to as 
concept-dependent and socially-produced objects of study. More specifically, it goes 
on to investigate their taken-for-granted underpinnings in the form of state projects, 
related practices and material structures. The analysis of sport policy as an abstract 
concept is made concrete in terms of its specific objectives, value orientation and 
underlying state-society strategic relations. Such a view replaces the superficial 
understanding of sport policy as a guideline document (a state affair) for public 
agencies and sport organisations with a dynamic conception of sport policy as a 
strategic relation and provides the basis for a total critique of the social process behind 
its creation. 
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Accounting for the totality of the critical approach, this study attempts to relate 
empirical data gathered for sport policy-making bodies to the structural and historical 
environment of each period. This involved an appreciation of the historical specificity 
of social relations, an understanding of structural relations, and a recognition of the 
mutual dependency of specific structures and specific forms of policy. That is, the 
state project entailed establishing specific sport policies and supportive structures, 
which in turn served to legitimise it. Throughout modem Bulgarian history all 
supreme sport governing bodies have been state creations. 
Essence in critical social research is seen as a key to unlocking the deconstructive 
process. The key used in this analysis of national sport policy is strategic relations. 
Sport policy is essentially a strategic relationship. It is a mode of social practice 
developed by different agents, over a contested terrain of scarce resources on behalf of 
those involved in them, and which often conflict with what those concerned actually 
need. This is not denying, however, that individuals and groups have no choice in 
what practice to take up. Most national sport conceptions, for example the National 
Fitness Complex (NFC), were introduced in the name of a wider population, but as 
seen by a governing group of political and sport administrators (the experts in the 
Bulgarian Sports Union and their supervisors from the CC of the BCP), and were 
never based on a public dialogue with those concerned. Habermas' comments (noted 
in Holub, 1991: 5) make a bridge to the next block of the methodology - praxis: "the 
public opinion of the private people assembled to form a public no longer retained a 
basis of unity and truth; it degenerated to the level of a subjective opinion of the 
many", and Holub (1991: 5) added "there is no necessary relationship between what 
the multitude thinks and what is true. " The process of deconstruction and 
reconstruction is spelled out in the next section. 
Praxis in critical research terms means practical reflective activity (Harvey, 1990: 
22), 
or what Habermas termed rational reconstruction (relating to human competency) and 
self-reflection (seen as a mode of reflection). The former provides a 
basis for 
historically relevant critique of social life and exploration of actual 
developmental 
possibilities, while the latter "brings to consciousness those determinants of a self- 
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formative process (Building) which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis 
and conception of the world" (quoted in Held, 1980: 327). This concept challenges 
Marxist view which reduces praxis to techne, by connecting social structures with 
human agency, and is seen as the intersection between them. Giddens (1993: 81) 
argued that the concept of Praxis is analytical to the concept of agency: 
(1) that a person `could have acted otherwise' and (2) that the world as 
constituted by a stream of events-in process independent of the agent does 
not hold out a predetermined future. 
As reflection is predominantly an individual activity, what counts for critical research 
are two things - that individual actions are indicative of social groups operating within 
an oppressive situation; and that changes in social formations are the result of praxis. 
For this study, the forming of sport policy and structures are seen as result of practices 
(situated doings of a subject) at local, national and international levels in each period. 
It is further argued that practices need to be understood in terms of power, and that 
sports policy is a transformative project. Policy research is ultimately concerned with 
knowledge for action which, eventually will change the world. 
Another fundamental element of practices which is constituting for actors' interaction 
and leads to the next block of methodology is that of language and discourse. Giddens 
(1993: 158) viewed the language as a practical activity, because it serves as a medium 
of the description of acts (justifying practical policies), and as a medium of 
communication between actors (describing intentions for action). In similar vein Held 
(1980: 319) argued that systematic distortion of interaction or language represents 
(institutionalised) domination and that "systematically distorted communication is 
seen as the condition of the emancipatory interest. " 
The concept of ideology constitutes an essential element of the project's critical 
methodology as it logically relates to other key concepts like group actions, and the 
hegemonic project. Geuss (1989: 4-26) suggested that critical theory can interpret 
ideology in three research programmes - descriptive, pejorative and positive. This 
project sees ideology as an overt attempt of various governments (state agencies) to 
put certain moral and political values on the agenda by acknowledging that 
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interpretations of ideology varied in different periods, and reflected by no means class 
interests. Ideology's relevance to sport policy rests in its ability to shape beliefs that 
incite people into action. For example, communitarianism (people's participation in 
sport in the totalitarian period predominantly as part of a collective) was used in 
justification of not investing in individualistic pursuits (including the production of 
sports equipment), of policies promoting mass participation (individual satisfaction 
was never recognised as a value), and of greater control over the voluntary sports 
sector. This in turn is indicative for a dialectic between ideas, social needs and 
ideology. 
Jessop (1991: 171) claimed that: 
hegemony involves the interpellation and organisation of different 'class- 
relevant' (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the political, 
intellectual and moral leadership' of ... its political, intellectual and moral 
spokesmen. The key to the exercise of such leadership is the development 
of a specific `hegemonic project'. 
Here, interpellation is described as the ideological mechanism through which subjects 
are endowed with specific identities, social positions and interests. This mechanism is 
grounded in the accumulation of cognitive and organisational learning capacities 
(developed through agents' interaction), and which are released during crises in the 
old social order. As will be demonstrated in this project, the ideological agenda of the 
three hegemonic projects, Capitalism (capitalist period), Communism (totalitarian 
period), and Europeanisation (democratic period) promoted as central the need to 
increase sports' dependency on the state, and to instil a culture of administrative 
supremacy in sports policy making, as opposed to public debate and consultation. 
Similar approach to Thatcherism as a hegemonic project in relation to leisure policy is 
argued by Henry (1993: 175-83). Butsch's (1990: 8) treatment of hegemony in a sense 
that it "directs our attention to practices rather than ideas - leisure rather than 
culture - as a medium of hegemony" sums up the link between 
ideology and praxis. A 
sport policy's ideology is expressed both through the promotion of certain values, and 
through gaps and omissions it makes in relation to various groups and interests. 
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The notion of structure is usually interpreted in two different ways: firstly, as 
something that can be reduced to its elements and examine them. The underlying 
assumption of this approach implies that individual elements are meaningful in their 
own right. Critical research is concerned with the second way of interpreting structure. 
It is viewed as "a complex set of interrelated elements which are interdependent and 
which can only be adequately conceived of in terms of the complete structure" 
(Harvey, 1990: 25). This interpretation involves the idea of wholeness, transformation 
and self-regulation. The case of National Sports Federations which make up the 
structure of sport on national level, conform with the legislative, normative and 
administrative regulations set up by the state and the international governing bodies 
(wholeness), transform itself according to changes in the environment 
(transformation) by using the mandate given by their members (self-regulation) 
illustrates the point. 
Giddens' (1993: 128-9) central theorem of Structuration theory - the duality of 
structures - is in some ways analogous to this understanding of the structure: 
By the duality of structure I mean that social structure is both constituted 
by human agency, and yet is at the same time the very medium of this 
constitution; 
Giddens' definition is informative for this research in two ways: 
(i) it complies with the basic assumptions of the Strategic Relations approach 
by asserting that individuals, interest groups and institutions are pursuing their 
aspirations by developing specific strategies (thus reproducing social structures) and 
strategic relations (thus creating a medium for constitution); 
(ii) the duality of structure suggests that if the analysis breaks the sports policy 
down into a system of individual actions (tasks), it would ignore the interrelationships 
and consequently would deny the structural relationship between conventions, 
resources and moral rules. 
The implication for the analysis of sports policy is that its nature as a strategic relation 
can only be seen when different policies are related to the broader context of the state 
and its hegemonic project. 
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As this project clearly involves examining the history of national sports policy, it is 
imperative to distinguish between traditional and critical historicism, and to outline 
how such an approach will inform the analysis. Critical research accepts that the 
reconstruction of history is an active interpretative process (historicist approach), 
rather than gathering of facts. More specifically, critical social research adopts the 
formulations of radical historicism which offers a critical analysis of the prevailing 
frameworks in which the historical facts are located. 
The point of view of the critical historicism adopted in this study concerns the 
generalisation about repeating patterns of state intervention in sport policy's 
formulation and implementation. Of practical interest are two interrelated issues: 
(i) to examine the genesis of the oppressive social relations and structures in 
relation to the prevailing social practices and to look at how far these structures are 
sustained through them; 
(ii) in each period to discover the residual patterns of relationships (practices 
that tie the present to the past) and emerging practices (patterns that tie the present to 
the future). 
For example, practices of state-controlled centralised planning of sport in pre-, 
totalitarian and post-totalitarian periods illustrate the residual, while the introduction 
of the first world-wide Olympic marketing programme in 1984 signalled an emerging 
pattern, setting the National Olympic Committee on the road to financial 
independence from the government. 
In this respect Harvey (1990: 28-9) argued that: 
the critical approach to history locates events in their social and political 
context, addresses the economic constraints and engages taken-for- 
granted ideological factors, 
and that 
within critical social research the reconstruction of history takes place 
alongside the structural analysis; it both informs and is informed by it. 
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Based on these building blocks, the next step of critical methodology is to offer an 
understanding of sport policy as a subsystem of public policy and to consider the 
processes of its deconstruction and reconstruction at different conjunctures. 
3.3.1. Defining sport policy 
Sports policy will be interpreted as a framework of principles, objectives and planned 
(unplanned) actions (inactions) developed by a credible local, national or international 
agency aiming to achieve common ends concerning specific communities within 
given range of resources, time and space. This definition implies four classifications 
which, together with Laumann and Knoke's (1987) approach to public policy, will 
inform the analysis and set its framework: 
(i) whether local or global, sports policy is a social construct designed to serve 
people's particular interests and involves making conscious decisions on the part of 
authorised institutions (appointed by the state or by members) about the distribution 
of always limited resources, and promoting relevant practices over given territories. It 
must be considered not only as a set of rationally pre-planned actions, but as ad hoc 
reactions and inactions as well. Allison's (1993: 4) introductory comment on the 
politics of sport is helpful here, as he described it as a typical phenomena both for 
Marxists and their ideological opponents by using Harold Lasswell's well-known 
observation that politics was about "Who gets What, When, How", while the real 
politics was about class, about "left" and "right"; 
(ii) Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 24) suggested that `for a policy to be regarded 
as a public policy' it must to some degree have been generated or at least processed 
within the framework of governmental procedures, influences and organisations. " As 
highlighted by the discussion so far, clearly sport policy represents a particular 
domain of public policy. It will be interpreted as a set of actors with major concerns 
about the sport area, whose visions and actions on policy scenarios and events must be 
taken into account by the other participants in the domain. Operationally, this study 
defines national sport policies as concerned with the planning, provision and 
distribution of sport services, facilities and equipment. Particular policies within 
sport's domain include the provision of physical activity programmes for different age 
groups, setting standards for training and performance, providing sporting 
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infrastructure and resource allocations, establishing codes of practice for athletes and 
officials, staff training and certification, and the regulation of sports structures. Given 
the scale of the sports domain and the range of policies, not all of the actors can be 
viewed as core, and so they will exercise differential influences over policy matters. It 
has to be stressed however, that the criterion for who is a core or a non-core actor 
may change and have an impact on the distribution of roles. An example from the 
early 1980s was the shift in the focus of sport policy from participation-oriented to 
health and fitness. This evoked the emergence of a new set of actors - health 
consultancy centres -a partnership between health and sport authorities. 
(iii) Membership in the sport policy domain is also a collective social construct 
representing the outcomes of continuous struggles and negotiations between core and 
peripheral corporate actors such as unions, federations, associations, committees and 
clubs who try to promote their strategies and have greater say in the policy-making 
process. A perfect example of defining the sport membership domain from the early 
1960s was the classification of all sports into three categories - major (group A) and 
minor (group B) Olympic and others (group C), for the purpose of granting aid 
according to their contribution to country's Olympic success. 
(iv) Structural relations in the sport policy domain concern the robust, 
recurrent patterns of interactions linking the core and non-core actors to each other 
and to the larger public policy domain. According to Laumann and Knoke (1987: 12-3) 
three generic relationships are especially significant in identifying political systems' 
social structures: information transmission, resource transactions, and boundary 
penetration. Information transmission refers to the ability of a sport actor to access 
information affecting his/her interests. Resource transaction is the potential of a sport 
organisation to participate in the exchange of resources in order to maximise its power 
and position. A gold medal from the Nagano 1998 Olympics won by a sport boarding 
school graduate caused the Ministry of Education and the State Sport Committee to 
reconsider their decision to close her local school, and to re-establish it as a major 
centre for winter sports. Boundary penetration is an actor-to-actor type of linkage and 
involves primarily the shared use of personnel. The appointment of a commission 
by 
the National Olympic Committee to advise on policy matters is an example of 
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partnership between a voluntary and an interest group. Other typical examples include 
common membership in boards or commissions, or research or staff training projects. 
The interpretation of sports policy given above, and particularly the notions of it as a 
social construct, membership and structural relation, relate clearly to the premises of a 
useful tool - the policy network model. According to Marsh (1995: 18), this model fits 
with Jessop's theoretical approach because: 
Policy networks are an important feature of the precise form the state 
takes and, in particular, of the way it relates to civil society. From 
Jessop 's perspective we would expect policy networks to be common and 
to be tight with a limited number of interests dominating a variety of 
networks; as such, certain interests would have much greater access to 
policy making and their strategies would be privileged. 
By utilising the policy network model, Marsh (1995) advances five hypotheses. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to test any of them, but it is believed that empirical 
evidence asserting some of the assumptions they make would bring extra substance to 
the research objectives. An approval or disapproval of Marsh' third and fifth 
hypotheses (1995: 20) that 
Networks will be based on structural rather than interpersonal 
relationships, but the strategic calculations of groups and individuals 
have a crucial influence on both the membership and the outcomes of 
networks. So the emphasis is upon strategic rather than structural 
selectivity and the relationship between structure and agency is viewed as 
dialectical, and that, 
Policy networks are a restriction of democracy because the tighter 
networks reflect a consistent pattern of structured political inequality and 
are characterised by the exclusion of most interests, 
will be sought in unravelling the making of sports policy in the post-totalitarian 
period. 
Building on the theoretical premises established in the previous chapter and 
methodological approach several important clarifications need to be made. As 
highlighted by the above interpretation, sport policy can be analysed in a variety of 
different ways. Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 13-41) suggest a useful categorisation of 
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the usages of the terms `policy' and `policy analysis'. According to this 
categorisation, sport policy will be seen as: first, a label for a field of activity for 
governmental and non-governmental actors; second, a specific proposal in terms of 
statements indicating an envisaged course of action to be undertaken by political or 
sport organisations. For example, the Socialist Party's Manifesto in 1992 stated that 
the party will promote the sponsorship of sport, so corresponding legislative and 
administrative activities can be expected; and third, an output, or what government or 
sport organisation delivers as opposed to what it has promised or has authorised 
through legislation. A typical form of output in the sport area is to describe such items 
as more facilities, more funds, or better regulations, but these should only be 
considered as important contributory factors to a desired output, as often in practice 
outputs do not conform to stated intentions; fourth, an outcome, that is, in terms of 
what is actually achieved. It is essential here to distinguish between outputs (the 
activities of institutions at the point of delivery) and outcomes (the impact of these 
activities). An example from the early 1980s was when the Bulgarian government 
committed resources to provide the necessary conditions for young people to learn to 
swim (output), but this still did not suffice to achieve its pledge - `every boy and girl - 
a swimmer' (outcome). In this sense, considering sport policy as outcomes allows the 
researcher to assess whether the stated purpose of a policy appears to be what the 
policy is actually achieving. The effect of what was labelled as a national policy for 
improving young people's health and fitness through the acquisition of life-time skills 
was limited to certain favourably located regions of the country with natural water 
areas and traditions. Thus helping improve these places infrastructure further at the 
expense of those which were lacking the resources was an example of unintended 
policy consequences. One may feel entitled then to argue that, this was a regional 
development policy as much as a national fitness policy. 
The term `sport policy analysis' presupposes different approaches to sport as a public 
domain, each highlighting a particular meaning. This study will use four specific 
approaches to sport policy analysis-as policy content, policy process, policy advocacy, 
and policy evaluation; The study of policy content focuses on the origins, intentions 
and operation of sport policies during the three periods, and is descriptive in nature; 
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studying the sport policy process involves the actions taken by the state (primarily the 
government) and non-public actors at each stage (see below); policy advocacy uses the 
analysis in making an argument in favour of a particular policy. It is important here to 
distinguish between the role of political actors and analysts (experts or interested 
groups) in policy advocacy. This is necessary as their interests and standards for 
performance differ significantly. Over the past eighty years the involvement of 
academics in key management positions in politics and sport (that is, as policy 
advocates) has been a common practice. Accounting for the conflicting demands of 
political (predominantly pragmatic) and academic (rigour of analysis) environments, 
the objectivity of their motivation and opinions would always be prone to challenge. 
As this will be an evaluative study, it will seek to assess how far sport policy's 
objectives have corresponded to their outcomes. This approach is also descriptive as it 
informs the project about the factors which shape national sport policy over time. 
Analysing sport policy in terms of process involves several stages but it is far from a 
uniformity or fixity (Ham and Hill, 1993). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) suggested a 
detailed model for public policy making including nine successive stages. For the 
purposes of this analysis however, Laumann and Knoke's (1987: 14-8) notion of the 
policy cycle has been adopted. It rests on the idea for time-dependent nature of the 
actors' searches for problems and solutions by acknowledging that policy processes 
do not occur in a vacuum, but involve a multitude of interests and other actors. 
The policy cycle begins with problem recognition. This usually occurs when an actor 
or group of actors identify some condition as an issue and invite other actors to take 
stance. The advance of the technological revolution in the late 1970s and 1980s has 
been pointed out by the Communist Party as a problem imposing a sedentary way of 
life on and threatening the physical development of young people. Subsequently, 
sports organisations have been urged to introduce policies to tackle the downside 
effects of technological progress. Of course, issue recognition is not always a 
straightforward process; rather it is often highly uncertain, and most importantly 
it can 
only become a domain issue if it is recognised by all key actors in the domain. 
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The second stage of the cycle is option generation. 
A policy option is the empirical unit act in the policy process. It consists of 
a statement made by a policy domain actor that advocates that a specific 
action be taken, either by an actor or by some other authoritative actor, 
with regard to a specially perceived issue (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 15- 
6). 
The important strategic implication here concerns the cases when the agencies which 
first identified and voiced an issue are not those who subsequently propose policy 
options aiming at solving it in their best interest. Once a problem has been recognised 
and policy options generated, the next step is to be placed on the agenda (agenda 
placement). A government or sport governing body agenda specifies the formal order, 
time limits, resources and actors needed for materialising particular policy option 
subject to decision. Typically, the number of issues calling for solution far exceeds 
those that can be placed on the agenda. Subsequently, organisations and actors take 
actions including committing resources and creating alliances with other actors to 
ensure that their issue reaches the agenda. The case of the 1996 Sport Law illustrates 
the point. It underwent more than fifteen editions and four years of rounds of 
extensive discussions at different levels, before the bill reached the agenda of the 
parliament where, without debate it eventually became law. 
The above example leads to the next stage of policy making process - events and 
scenarios. In fact the Sport Law can be seen as a wider scenario called "setting up 
post-socialist sport" as it envisaged a series of discrete events aiming to legitimise the 
sports scene, to prescribe obligations to public actors, or to urge the government to 
provide for minimum standards for physical education and sport. Finally, the process 
ends with authoritative decisions. The focus of the study is not on the procedures by 
which laws and regulations are authorised, but rather, on the socio-political 
construction of sport policy in terms of determining structures, relationships and 
outcomes. 
. 
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As stated earlier, the four approaches to sport policy-making, and the policy cycle 
model adopted here can serve analytical purposes well but by no means exhaust the 
richness of real life and its variety of scenarios. This is to suggest that different policy 
issues may require adjusting policy-making approaches to account for the 
circumstances and the issue in question. 
3.3.2. Sports policy deconstruction and reconstruction 
As the preceding discussion suggested, the key assumption of critical theory entails 
that human beings can appreciate one another's existence and shape the course of their 
affairs as a result of acting in a social manner, or what writers such as Habermas 
(1987) term `communicative competence'; or Fay (1987) label `human activity'. 
Thus the analysis of human interactions logically requires attention not only to 
individual agent' accounts, but also to the structural settings of power, structures and 
domination within which interactions take place and make sense to these actors. 
Critical theory can therefore be seen as a structural phenomenology. As Forester 
(1983: 235) put it: 
it is a phenomenology because it attends to the skilled and contingent 
social construction and negotiation of intersubjective meanings. It is 
structural because it attends to the historical stage on which social actors 
meet, speak, conflict, listen, or engage with one another. 
Various actors (including institutions) make sense of sport by getting involved in 
social interactions (communications), but the sense of sport (a sport policy or form of 
participation) depends on the objective historic setting. People take part in sport as 
result of a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic influences, but the actual form of participation 
is predetermined to a large extent by the policy of sport provision prescribed by some 
credible agency -a sport governing body, an expert, or an entrepreneur. 
As the above discussion suggests, the project research strategy required an approach 
that would account both for the phenomenology and the structure. In analysing 
relationships between the state project and state hegemonic project in sport and state 
intervention in developing Bulgarian sport policy, the research considered old and 
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new decision-makers' accounts, archive files, meeting records, social and political 
strategies, organisations and structures. This process involves a constant questioning 
of the perspective and analysis that the project is building up, and a constant 
deconstruction and reconstruction of concepts. Accounting for individual agents' 
interpretations, the research will build up a picture of how the state power in sport is 
constructed in terms of the significance of personal relations within the structure as 
well as analysing individual actions. The core concept of this project is sport policy as 
strategic relations. 
The deconstruction used in this project sees sport policy in terms of its strategic 
relation to the state project and state hegemonic project. This allows for the nature of 
sport policy to be reconstructed. The character of sport policy is revealed through the 
analysis of strategic relations between the state, society and individual agents. The 
process of deconstruction and reconstruction is continuous and gradually undermines 
the embedded ideology in prevailing conceptualisations. This is achieved by relating 
the core abstraction to the historical and structural totality in order to find out how it 
works, and by using empirical data to elaborate the relationships and suggest further 
deconstructive stages. In conclusion, the dialectic of deconstruction-reconstruction of 
this project is seen as a process focusing on the structural totality (as found in a 
particular historical conjuncture) and critically reflecting on its essential (strategic 
relational) nature. 
3.3.3. Data Collection 
The nature of the research topic required the use of both, qualitative and quantitative 
methods . Qualitative methods, according 
to Patton (1990) consist of three principal 
kinds of data collection: (a) in-depth open-ended interviews, (b) direct observation, 
and (c) written documentation. For the purposes of this study, focused interviews, 
direct observation in the form of case studies and ethnography, and document analysis 
were all employed. 
The focused interview was the most used form of semistructured interview, and goes 
a step beyond open-ended questions, as it provides more flexibility 
in terms of the 
85 
Chapter 3. Research Methodology 
questions asked. Merton, Fiske and Kendall (1956: 3-4), in a comprehensive 
discussion of this method, suggested that the focused interview uses topics and 
hypotheses selected in advance, while the actual questions are not specified in 
advance. The essence of the focused interview is the structure provided by the 
interviewer, which includes four elements. Firstly, the people interviewed must have 
been involved in particular events, that is, sport-policy making on a central or local 
level during all, or any of the periods under investigation. Secondly, the events subject 
to study must have been previously analysed by the researcher through content or 
situational analysis. This was accomplished for situational analysis of events during 
the totalitarian and the post-totalitarian period of Bulgarian sport, which allowed a set 
of hypotheses to be formulated concerning certain aspects of the belief and behaviour 
of those people to be investigated. Thirdly, based on the analysis in the previous step, 
an interview guide needed to be developed, setting for each major area of inquiry and 
hypotheses which provide criteria of relevance for the data to be obtained in the 
interview. Fourthly, the interview should focus on the subjective experiences of 
persons exposed to the pre-analysed situation in order to ascertain their definitions of 
the situation. The responses to the situation obtained in this way helped to test 
hypotheses, and as it is possible for unanticipated responses to be included, this might 
inform the researcher in undertaking more systematic investigation. 
Based on these assumptions several key actors, active during the communist and post- 
communist period were selected to be interviewed (see Table 3.3). They include Mr. 
Christo Meranzov, a former vice-chairman of the Bulgarian Sports Union, deputy 
director of the BCP Central Committee Organisational department and current 
consultant to the Bulgarian Sports Union; Prof. Peter Slanchev, former 
National 
Students Sports Union `Academic' chairman and National Sports Academy 
chancellor; Mr. Ivan Slavkov, an IOC and Bulgarian Olympic Committee member 
and Bulgarian Football Union president; Mr Plamen Krastev, recently 
deputy 
chairman of the Committee for Youth, Physical Education and 
Sport (CYPES); Mr. 
Svilen Ranev, Head of CYPES International Relations; Miss Radka 
Valkova, 
Secretary General of School Sports Federation; Mrs Jordanka Blavoeva, 
Bulgarian 
Aerobic Federation Executive Director and owner of a private fitness centre 
`Jova 
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Sport'; and Mr. Dimitar Haralampiev, former head of BSFS' International Relations, 
BOC Secretary General and currently project co-ordinator of Foundation Bulgarian 
Sport. No key figure from the pre-totalitarian period was alive and available for 
interview. 
Table 3.3. Sport policy-makers in Bulgaria interviewed regarding communist (c) and 
post-communist (pc) period 
Ell' 
/ ,ý ! 
ýL ji! g illi 
Mr. Christo Meranzov V-Chairman, D-Director (c) BSU, OD, BCP CC 
Mr. Peter Slanchev Chairman, Chancellor (c) NSSU `Academic', NSA 
Mr. Ivan Slavkov President (c, pc) BOC, BFU, IOC member 
Mr. Plamen Krastev Deputy Chairman (pc) CYPES 
Mr. Svilen Ranev Head (pc) Intern Relations, CYPES 
Miss Radka Valkova S. General (pc) official (c) School Sports Federation 
Mrs. Jordanka Blagoeva Exec. Director, Owner (pc) BAF, `Jova Sport' centre 
Mr. Dimitar Haralampiev Coordinator (pc) official (c) Foundatn Bulgarian Sport 
Critical ethnography attempts to link the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider 
social structures and systems of power relations (Schwandt, 1990, Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1993). In this project, it explored and situated the group of sports leaders 
(the BSFS, the BOC, National Federations) during the totalitarian and post-totalitarian 
periods, in social and political milieu. This was achieved by using detailed accounts 
collected by means of in-depth interviews and participant observation to examine 
structural relationships in terms of actual practices. Studied were the behaviour and 
practices of the BOC (Sofia 1992 and `94 Winter Olympic bids, 1985-88), the 
BSFS 
Executive Board (1989), leaders of the BSFS (Chairman and Executive Director, 
1993-94), Police Sports Association (Executive Director, 1993-94), Bulgarian Aerobic 
Union (Secretary General, 1998), and School Sports Federation (Secretary General, 
1998). 
For the purposes of this discussion a wide range of documents 
(written materials) have 
been studied. These can be classified into two major categories - primary 
and 
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secondary. Primary documents included policy papers, such as conceptions, plans, 
statements, analyses, speeches written, or eye-witnessed by the author. The secondary 
documents consisted of official reports, personal accounts, analyses, statistics, 
archives, and lay, academic and professional literature. According to their content all 
documents were further classified in five chief categories: policy (conceptions, 
reports, strategic plans, speeches), analyses (research papers, consultancy documents 
and surveys), accounts (personal, auto-and biographical books, polls), archives (state 
(e. g. Ministries of Finance & Education), public (e. g. BSFS) and private (e. g. Prof. N. 
Petrova) and statistics (official state, professional and public bodies). This was 
necessary in order to ensure a more comprehensive grasp of the subject under 
investigation, and to prevent analysis of overlying on certain categories of materials. 
3.3.4. The Case Study Method 
The case study method refers to non-experimental research in which the variables are 
neither controlled nor manipulated, where the phenomenon under study is analysed in 
its natural "ecological" setting, hence facilitating the study of context. While 
acknowledging the use in many case studies of quantitative research methods, the 
application of the case study method in this research should be considered as 
qualitative. Denny (1978: 2) defined the case study as "an intensive or complete 
examination of a facet, an issue, or perhaps the events of a geographical setting over 
time. " One of the most quoted case study methodologists, Yin (1989: 23) described the 
case study strategy as an empirical inquiry: 
" that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when 
" the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident, and in which 
" multiple sources of evidence are used. 
Clearly, the function of case studies in research is to identify and examine phenomena 
and meanings, in order to establish relationships and configurations. The argument of 
this methodology is that understanding strategic relations in Bulgaria's sport policy 
requires analysis of their development over time, and in the current environment. To 
meet the aspirations of the study, the analysis of post-totalitarian state 
intervention 
alone was not enough, as it would have provided information for only one 
level of 
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relations. The use of a case study allowed an embedded design to be employed that is, 
multiple levels of analysis within a single study (Yin, 1989), which included 
voluntary and private, provider-state, and client relationships, as well as the style of 
management. Moreover, the principal methodology of this study as offered by the 
critical science approach, aims to enlighten certain phenomena and relationships 
conforming with what Yin (1989: 25) saw as the most important application of case 
study method "to explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too 
complex for the survey or experimental strategies. " 
The main criticism faced by the case study method concerns the issue of 
generalizability, that is one-off cases are seen as opportunistic and unique, rather then 
representative for the phenomena under question. This application of the case study 
approach was testing the theoretical propositions established in Chapter One. Such a 
promising idea is argued by Pinfield (1986), whose assumptions were influenced by 
the writings of classical ethnographers. They asserted that a one-off case study can test 
a theory by a process of pattern matching, whereby several pieces of information from 
the case can be related to theoretical propositions. This can also be seen as one of a 
number of ways to link data to propositions. Thus, if multiple case observations 
cannot substantiate the pattern demanded by the theory, then the study has to conclude 
that the prior assumptions and theory are wrong. 
Another problematic issue with the application of the case-study method refers to the 
nature of sport policy-making and the focus of this project - transformations. As 
discussed above, sport policy is seen as a process of continuous struggles and 
negotiations between various actors, and transformations are examined in diachronic 
aspect, while the case study provides a snap-shot picture of the issue under study. 
Accounting for this potential flaw of the case-study method, the design of the 
particular cases used the four approaches of studying sport policy - 
its content, 
process, advocacy and evaluation, with emphasis on the unfolding of policy process 
(issue recognition, options generation, agenda placement, events-scenarios and 
authoritative decision) and the key actors and events involved in it. Thus, the chosen 
research strategy allowed analysis to locate the discussion 
in the context of the large 
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framework of the transforming post-totalitarian environment and to follow through the 
unfolding of particular sport policies, that is, seeing it not as a snap-shot but as a 
process. 
Eisenhardt (1989: 534) suggested that "case studies typically combine data collection 
methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations. The evidence 
may be qualitative (e. g., words), quantitative (e. g., numbers), or both. " Yin (1989: 95- 
102) gave more detailed argumentation on the validity of evidence in developing three 
main principles of data collection: 
" Using of multiple sources of evidence 
" Creating a case study data base 
" Maintaining a chain of evidence. 
Following these principles, the methods adopted in this study used data from all 
principal sources of evidence-documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, and participant-observation. At the same time, the use of the case study 
approach in the manner outlined above, worked in a form of triangulation (matching 
data from secondary sources and interviews) concerning reliability in relation to 
factual accuracy. The research design fits clearly the distinction made by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) between triangulation by data (the use of a variety of data sources), 
by method (the use of multiple methods of study), by researcher (the involvement of 
more than one investigator), and triangulation by theory (the use of multiple 
perspectives to interpret a single set of data, see Jones, 1993). 
The two cases selected for the study were Aerobic Union Bulgaria/Jova Sport Fitness 
Centre a voluntary - private partnership establishment and the 
Bulgarian School Sport 
Federation (SSF) -a voluntary governing body 
in Sofia. The former represents the 
most popular private fitness centre (which subsequently merged with a voluntary 
body) in the country, a novelty on the sport scene. The latter represents a typical 
voluntary organisation responsible for devising sports policy for the most 
dynamic 
group in society - the pupils - an area of public 
domain, which was firmly under the 
state control in the previous two periods. 
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3.3.5. Validation of Research Concepts 
As indicated in earlier remarks, the emergence of several trends in sport development, 
over three distinct periods, unveiled the presence of virtually unchanged phenomena 
(e. g. state intervention or sport organisations' behaviour). This suggested that certain 
structures, values and configurations in Bulgarian society must have been more 
durable than the ideological constructions derived from the current form of the state. 
Based on these assumptions, the construction of the main concepts of this study is 
grounded on the logic of the research strategy and strategic relations approach. 
Subsequently, the definition of this project's main concepts (or fixed phenomena) was 
followed by identifying the key variables (those parameters which vary in quantity, 
intensity, amount or degree) for each, followed by defining their attributes (variables' 
values). More specifically, this implies a match between the relationships within the 
research strategy (abstraction, phenomena, deconstruction and reconstruction), with 
different levels of the state project and hegemonic project relationships (accumulative 
strategies, agencies, intervention, transformations, policy, project, consequences). The 
research model and strategic relations approach complement each other in such a way 
that theoretical formulations derived from strategic relations guided the collection of 
data pertaining to the main concepts. In turn, this process was channelled by the 
research model denoting clear relationships between the phenomena under 
consideration, causal conditions, particular context, implemented action/interaction 
strategies and logical consequences. 
National sport policy in Bulgaria was chosen as a core concept of this study on the 
grounds that it is an umbrella term (although not necessarily explicitly and 
consistently holistic) concerning different groups of people and addressing wider 
social and economic relations. Bramham et al (1993: 1) argued 
in a similar, though 
broader context in relation to the existence of leisure policy: 
one should recognise both that leisure is invariably subject to 
intervention, and that intervention not only restricts leisure opportunities, 
but also creates new opportunities. 
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Clearly, formulating a national sport policy involves a set of agencies, actors, power 
relationships, resources, decision-making, regulations and deregulations, particular 
interests, and outcomes. All key concepts proved to be representative for the specific 
historical contexts and causal conditions, as they reflected primarily the durable 
elements in strategic relations. Their selection allowed the analysis to follow a clear 
path of development of its arguments. 
3.3.6. Data Analysis 
The analysis of data presented in this study is based on the assumptions laid out at the 
beginning of this chapter, concerning two starting positions: the existence of early 
researches and a defined point of view, in relation to the concepts under investigation. 
More specifically, research findings and observations suggesting a great deal of 
similarity in sport's principal aspects such as its strategies, forms of state intervention 
and key actors in three different phases, and deriving from that, a point of view in the 
form of four interrelated issues further spelled out in the research questions. 
Subsequently, the analysis of data was designed to search for patterns of state 
involvement and sport organisations' behaviour. Data collected were then interpreted 
in terms of the strategic relations theory which allowed the author to move beyond 
the historical-comparative analysis of a particular setting to a more generalised 
meaning of the events. 
In order to ensure the congruency of the research methodology and the development 
of the new body of knowledge, the analysis of data builds on the research paradigm 
in 
a distinct aspect. It was imperative to adopt methods of data analysis in line with 
both 
the research model and the critical perspective as this thesis' research paradigm. 
For 
the purposes of the study and based on the above assumptions, three 
interrelated 
methods of data analysis were selected: successive approximation, negative evidence 
and the use of diagrams and charts. 
According to Lawrence (1994: 412) in successive approximation the researcher 
begins 
with: 
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research questions and a framework of assumptions and concepts. He 
then probes into data, asking questions of the evidence to see how well the 
concepts fit the evidence and reveal features of the data. He also creates 
new concepts by abstracting from the evidence and adjust concepts to fit 
the evidence better. He then collects additional evidence to address 
unsolved issues that appeared in the first stage, and repeat the process. At 
each stage the evidence and the theory shape each other. 
As already pointed out, this study covers a great time span of Bulgaria's history, from 
the end of the 1870s to the present day. It is clear that the historical reality is not 
linear, and so to facilitate analysis and data collection there was a need to divide the 
history into periods. As a main criterion for theoretical definition of each period a 
crucial event was chosen. Subsequently, this resulted in distinguishing three periods 
termed capitalism, communism and democracy. The capitalist period is confined 
between the two World Wars, the communist from the end of World War 2 and the 
Eastern European revolutions from 1989, and the democratic begins after 1990, to the 
present day. 
The method of negative evidence emphasises the non-appearance of a feature or 
incident. Lewis and Lewis (1980) suggested seven kinds of negative evidence to 
consider. This study will apply two of them - events do not occur, and people are 
unaware of events. A prime example for the `events do not occur' evidence is the fact 
that no conception of the country's sport policy was ever based on an in-depth 
analysis of contemporary society. A possible explanation may be that agents and 
agencies implicitly recognised the power of the state over them. The state (in 
its three 
periods) exercised its power in a way that ruled out the idea of questioning the 
premises of a proposed sport policy. An extension of the first negative evidence 
is the 
`population unaware of events' : for many years sport development at all 
levels was 
subject to centralised planning. Until experts (and wider society) 
became aware of the 
incongruency of this method of policy making and the potential of the real nature of 
sport in a setting uncontrolled by the state grew, few saw this practice as 
limiting the 
opportunities of local and central agencies, and the population at 
large. 
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Presenting qualitative data analysis in the form of diagrams, charts and matrixes was 
employed as powerful means for organising ideas, and investigating of relations 
within the data. For example, a summary box of major events for each of the periods 
concerned was develop to provide the guidelines for their sequencing and analysis. In 
addition all significant trends in national sport policy are presented in graph or chart 
form, to allow visual comparisons. Several computer software packages, such as 
MediaGraphics were used. 
Finally, another influential idea in the form of so-called `outcroppings' was applied. 
This method of data analysis overlaps with the interpretative perspective of studying 
social reality but, used in conjunction with the strategic relations approach, provides 
valuable insights into the concepts under investigation. It is based on the idea that 
there are many things we cannot directly observe in the social world. As Lawrence 
(1994: 423) put it: 
a researcher's data from the observable, surface reality are only samples 
of what happens on the visible, surface level. The researcher uses the data 
to generate and evaluate theories and generalisations. At the same time, 
he assumes that beneath the outer surface of reality lie deeper social 
structures or relationships. 
When applied to the formation of sport policy, strategic relations theory looks for a 
range of relationships, including the role of individual agents whose behaviour is not 
always rational, and who exercise significant influence in shaping certain outcomes of 
this policy. The data collected from personal involvement, observations and 
interviews is organised in a way to point out the outcroppings of the make up of 
Bulgaria's sport policy. The next three chapters discuss in greater detail the patterns of 
strategic relations in the national sport movement in its pre-, totalitarian, and post- 
totalitarian periods. 
To conclude, from the discussions in the first two chapters, several 
important 
theoretical and methodological points emerged which have a bearing on 
the analysis 
to follow. The study of transformations in Bulgaria's sport policy through 
the 
capitalist, communist and democratic period was informed 
by the premises of the 
Strategic Relations approach developed by Jessop (1990). Its main claim asserted 
that 
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the state is a strategic terrain which offers structural privileges to some but not all 
kinds of political strategies. Therefore, the state will be viewed as a social relation and 
analysed as the site, the generator, the product and the mediator of strategies between 
local, national and global levels. 
More specifically, the subsequent chapters will examine the role of the Bulgarian state 
in shaping sport policy by using as guidelines its formal (forms of representation, 
internal organisation and forms of intervention) and substantive (the social base, state 
practices and projects, and historic bloc and hegemonic project) dimensions. The state 
will be interpreted as nation, territory and institution, and corresponding to it, 
category, form, regime and structure (see Hay, 1996). As this project sets out to 
investigate the transformations in sport policy in three different socio-economic 
environments, the analysis of the transformation will place the focus primarily on the 
actual process of transition from one setting (capitalism to communism) to another 
(communism to democracy) and to a lesser degree on its destination. 
Following the assumptions suggested by the literature review, the project employed 
the critical theory as a methodological tool in order to achieve its aims and objectives. 
Critical theory's epistemological and ontological premises inform the research in that 
knowledge is structured by existing social relations and that social reality is produced 
and reproduced by social actors. Subsequently, sport is seen as an institution whose 
policy and patterns of conduct are continually related to larger issue of social 
production and reproduction. In this context, practical policies are forms of social 
regulation in which particular social knowledge is selected and cast for people to 
guide their choice and participation. The project aims, therefore, to analyse social 
processes and reveal the underlying conceptions and practices. For a more concrete 
analysis, an attempt is made to examine their practical manifestation 
by further 
spelling out social processes, concepts and practices into several 
interrelated blocks, 
including - abstraction, totality, essence, praxis, 
ideology, history and structure. 
Accounting for both, the framework and its elements of analysis, the key concept of 
this project - sport policy is seen as strategic relations, 
that is, as a label of activity for 
governmental and non-governmental actors, as specific proposal put 
forward by them, 
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as an output and an outcome of their activities. Finally, the approaches to studying 
Bulgarian sport policy to be used include - its analysis as - policy content, policy 
process, policy advocacy, and policy evaluation. 
In the three historical chapters (4,5 and 6) which follow the reader is introduced to the 
content by a series of key events. These were selected as result of analysis which 
unveiled their critical impact on structuring and shaping sports domain and policies. 
Based on theoretical propositions, each of the three chapters follows certain logic 
(format) including: (i) the setting up of the new state as nation, territory and institution 
and its effects on state strategies; (ii) state projects and their impact on the 
conceptualisation of sport and its structuring, and (iii) key state strategies and strategic 
relations in sport policy making. The conclusions take the form of conceptualisation 
of strategic relations in sport policy which is spelled out in terms of content, process, 
advocacy and outcome. 
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Key state interventions in the capitalist sport policy (1878-1944) 
1897 Ministry of Education directive encouraging the setting up of gymnastics clubs 
1925 First state body set up - the Directorate for Physical Education within the 
Ministry of Education, with a separate budget 
1931 First Sports Act and state budget for sport 
1936 First state co-ordinated promotion of the Olympic Games in Berlin 
1938 Law on state control over public and voluntary organisations 
1938 First national military-fitness programme "Bulgarian Sport Badge" introduced 
1941 Setting up of state youth umbrella organisation - Branik (Defender) 
This chapter sets out to analyse the emergence and development of the third Bulgarian 
state (1878 to present), its key projects, and their implications for shaping an 
environment in which various interests, concepts, structures and relations in sport 
evolved. In order to achieve that the following objectives will be pursued: 
i) analysing the setting up of the new state as nation, territory and institution 
and its effects on state strategies; 
ii) discussing the state's projects and their impact on the conceptualisation of 
sport and its structuring; 
iii) establishing key state strategies and strategic relations in sport policy 
making. 
4.1. The making of a state 
As previously discussed, one of Jessop's central claims in Strategic Relations theory 
was that political systems can be constituted out of the available 
institutional 
elements. This provided only a limited viewpoint for understanding the emergence of 
the third Bulgarian state, which also marked the dismissal of 
Eastern feudal 
despotism. After a long delay, the Bulgarian nation appeared on the road 
to modern 
development, with the mission to build a new secular state out of 
the ruins of the 
theocratic Ottoman empire. This project presupposed no continuity, as 
Bulgaria 
aspired to regain its place as a European state. 
The backwardness of the Ottoman 
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empire provided no political, economic or social foundations to build on, and virtually 
all constitutional elements of the new state had to be developed anew, or imported. 
This task was assumed by Russia, but was largely facilitated by the uprising of April 
1876 - the most powerful manifestation of national striving for independence which 
received wide political support in Europe (see Todorov, 1975, Dimitrov, 1981, 
Crampton, 1997). As diplomatic efforts for a peaceful solution to Bulgaria's problem 
failed, in 1877 Russia eventually declared a war on Turkey as a last attempt to 
reshuffle the political balance in the Balkans, in accordance with its own strategic 
interests. 
The project for the constitutional settlement of the Bulgarian kingdom was prepared 
by the Russian military administration nine months before the end of the war. 
Bulgaria was declared by the Saint Stephan Peace Treaty of March 1878 an 
independent state incorporating 80% of its ethnic territory (including about 5 million 
Bulgarians) in the Balkans. The Treaty, though, was not sanctioned by Great Britain 
which saw it as a threat to its interests in the region, and after a secret deal with Russia 
the Berlin Treaty was imposed instead, in July of the same year (see in particular 
Penkov, 1969, Velev et al, 1997). Despite pledges of the local population, the country 
was divided into five parts ruled by Bulgaria, Serbia, Turkey and Rumania, a move 
which had a crucial impact on future developments. Besides the international 
dimensions, equally important for the territorial settlement of the new state was the 
issue of partitioning the land and its ownership, which shaped interests and strategies. 
Clearly, the geo-political orientation of the country and its constitutional order were 
decided by the Great Powers, and besides its basic mission the new state was assigned 
an additional role to play - that of a mediator of foreign 
interests and strategies. 
Russia laid down the foundations of the Kingdom's constitution, parliament, state 
administration, laws, judicial system, army and police, banking system, transport and 
communication network, and its cultural and sport institutions. It is 
interesting to note 
that ironically this modernisation was intended and accomplished 
in a far more 
advanced fashion than it was in Russia itself. As the then Russian War 
Minister, 
Milutin, acknowledged, "we could not have not admitted that our whole state 
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organisation demands a fundamental reconstruction from top to bottom. As for 
agricultural self - governance, local, regional and state administration - everything 
has outlived its time and would have to gain new forms" (quoted in Manolova, 
1994: 11). So apart from its strategic interests in the Balkans, Russia's critical 
intervention in building a new modern state in Bulgaria could be seen as a testing 
ground for similar reforms to be implemented later on its own soil. 
Bulgaria's political system was designed outside its boundaries, and no national 
representatives were allowed to take part in the preparation. Most commentators 
(Todorov, 1975, Dimitrov, 1981, Peshev, 1993, Velev et al, 1997) agree that the 
Turnovo constitution of 1879 settling the state-political construction was one of the 
most democratic constitutions in Europe. However, as a creature of the Russian 
Tsarist government, it naturally envisaged a leading role for the future monarch, and 
limited economic and civil freedoms. Following recommendation by the Russian Tsar 
Nikolai II, a 22 year-old officer in the Prussian army, a member of the Battenberg 
dynasty, and a nephew of the Russian Queen, was proclaimed the first Bulgarian 
Prince. He was entrusted with a great deal of power and the country declared a 
constitutional monarchy though it was ruled for nine months by a temporary Russian 
government. At the outset, the design of the political system was susceptible to an 
authoritarian style of ruling. 
As this first episode of Bulgaria's modern history illustrates, from the very beginning 
the building of a new `stateness' evoked various interests and struggles. The Great 
Powers' plans for the geo-politics of Bulgaria under the Berlin Treaty (1878) shaped 
to a great extent the nature of national ideals and sport visions in particular. The 
Treaty reshaped the territorial and ethnic base as well as the organisational and 
spiritual culture of Bulgarian society. The Bulgarian people refused to accept 
it, and 
openly resisted. As Velev et al (1997: 75) asserted: 
restoring the wholeness of the `Bulgaria of Saint Stephan' as part of the 
great Bulgarian national ideal - for a unified and inseparable 
Bulgaria' 
has turned into a national incantation. 
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In 1885 as the result of a mass uprising, Bulgaria gained territorial unification, 
endorsed by the Prince, and thus confronted the Great Powers with a fait accompli. 
Russia disliked this demonstration of independence, and withdrew its military 
personnel, leaving the Bulgarian army without commanders. According to many 
analysts (Penkov, 1969, Mitev, 1980, Velev et al, 1997), the realisation of unification 
was the single major independent act in Bulgaria's modem history which was not 
dictated or instigated by outside powers. Eventually, after 30 years of struggle, in 
1908 Bulgaria gained its full independence from the Ottoman empire, and appeared as 
an equal member of the international community. 
The country's further historical development was marked by continuous military 
conflicts and disasters. Most notably, there were three consecutive wars - two Balkan 
wars (1912-1913 and 1914), and World War I- and two coups, where the army 
appeared as a critical factor on the political scene. Bulgaria was defeated and suffered 
huge material and moral loses, as Gentchev (1968: 89) commented: 
the army - this reactionary institution - inevitably haunts over political 
life, plays a fatal role, and prepares a reactionary phalanx of political 
figures and military personnel, who look with disdain on the traditions of 
bourgeois democracy. 
As will be further demonstrated, this role of the army also had a serious bearing on 
sport. The core of the sport system comprised sports developed and practised in the 
army, and top military personnel were amongst the favourite appointments for key 
leadership positions in all sport governing bodies. 
Bulgaria's social and political reality after World War I (as a German ally and one of 
the defeated countries) was predetermined to a great extent by the `slavery' clauses of 
the 1919 Neville Treaty. The most fertile land of south Dobrudja, western Thrace, and 
the western outlying districts, was cut from the national territory, and 
huge 
reparations, equal to 20% of the national wealth, were imposed, on top of the existing 
foreign debts (Natan et al, 1969: 476). Bulgaria was deprived of having a regular army, 
and a particular reference was made in the Treaty (see Petrova, 
1978,1983, 
Bardareva, 1991) to the character of voluntary sport organisations, and even the way 
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gymnastics should be delivered in schools, in order to prevent the introduction of any 
military element in it. 
All these years of uncertainty, frustration, national humiliation, human and material 
suffering, coupled with the failure of bourgeois democracy to provide for these basic 
necessities, created anxiety, anger and a great demand for order, stability, and social 
and economic efficiency, which particularly appealed to the young and working 
people, and to military personnel. The call for a new social order capitalised on 
nationalistic fervour, and came in the form of the first military-fascist coup on 9 June 
1923, with the subsequent establishment of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes (for a 
detailed account on the authoritarian model in Bulgarian politics between the two 
World Wars see Tzvetkov, 1991 and Poppetrov, 1997). 
Gradually, the country's political and economic development began to follow an 
orientation towards nazi Germany, which by the terms of Versailles Treaty had been 
obliged to surrender its colonies, and subsequently was doomed to suffer from a 
chronic shortage of raw materials. Still driven by the powerful national ideal for a 
unified Bulgaria, in 1941 the state again joined Germany and entered World War II, 
which led for a short period of time to the country's re-unification. After a strategic U- 
turn in 1944, a day before the Red Army's invasion, Bulgaria declared war on 
Germany. Despite its army's critical contribution and 32,000 casualties against the 
Nazis, during the Paris post-war conference Bulgaria was not recognised (by the 
Allies including the USSR) as fighting on the side of the anti-German coalition, and 
as a result was deprived of its territories in Pomoravia, Macedonia and White Sea 
Trace. This was yet another catastrophe, and crushing for the national ideal (see 
Velev, et al, 1997). 
In summary, the constitutional settlement of the third Bulgarian state emerged as a 
result of a national struggle for independence, and the Great Powers' (Russia, 
Great 
Britain, and Germany) strategic interests in the Balkans. The state 
became a site, 
generator, product and mediator of competing conservative and liberal projects, which 
predetermined its relations with the rest of society. The clash of foreign and national 
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interests over the constitution of the Bulgarian state, and related struggles highlighted 
the importance of the relationships between the state as a nation, territory and 
institution. Furthermore, these arrangements had a serious impact on the role of the 
state and influenced the nature of state and sport projects. 
4.2. State projects and society 
As stated above, the Turnovo constitution of 1879 defined Bulgaria as a bourgeois 
state led by a monarch and put the building of a capitalist society at the top of its 
political-economic agenda. This project, however, had to be pursued by the only party 
- the Liberals, representing the poor and the petit bourgeoisie. The Conservative Party, 
which was supposed to represent the interests of the wealthiest group (a very small 
number of people), was linked closely with German and Austrian financial and 
economic capital elites, but did not constitute itself for four years after the liberation. 
Then, for some ten years, it demonstrated total disregard for the aspirations of the 
majority of the population, supported the Prince in suspending the constitution after a 
state coup in 1881, which for seven years brought about a regime of full powers 
(meaning that he assumed total responsibility for all domestic and international 
affairs, subjugating the parliament and the government). It eventually disintegrated 
and ceased to exist after 1885 (see Nikolova and Sazdov, 1992). 
The rest of the parties on the political stage emerged as `spin-offs' of the Liberal 
Party, triggered by either ideological or leadership differences. It is correct to talk 
about social and ideological streams rather than political parties per se. The lack of 
political tradition and the need to appeal to the majority of population urged various 
interest groups to generate support by identifying themselves with "the whole people" 
as opposed to a particular class or group. Despite attempts by social democrats and 
agriculturists to distance themselves from this common image, nonetheless the 
first 
30-40 years of developing the political environment nurtured a specific political 
culture dominated by several common conceptual, economic and social trends. 
Conceptually, all political formations were preoccupied with a concern to 
defend and 
implement the Constitution, and with unifying Bulgaria's lands and people. 
This was 
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a hegemonic project aiming to establish a modem capitalist society which called for 
mass support from all classes and groups. Subsequently, their programmes looked 
very similar, revolving around these key projects, but in which sport was not given 
formal recognition (Table 4.1). They had centralised structures and party discipline 
dominated by an omnipotent leader (see Hadjiski, 1943, Nikolova and Sazdov, 1992). 
Table 4.1 Bulgaria's ruling political parties, their ideologies and sport visions 
Political party Core ideology Sport visions 
1879-1919 
Various liberal, Statism supported by all Corporal education, 
conservative formations parties across the board military training and state 
and coalitions governance 
1920-1923 
Bulgarian People's Inconsistent bourgeois, No special policy, corporal 
Agrarian Union Professional criterion (physical) education 
1923-1931 
Popular Entente -Sgovor Radical right wing, Setting control over PE 
Dictatorship and sport 
1931-1934 
Popular block Bourgeois-parliamentary Military training and a 
democracy state budget 
1934-1935 
Zveno Monarcho-fascist Military training and state 
dictatorship (I) control 
1935-1944 
Tsar Boris III Monarcho-fascist Militarism, totalitarian 
dictatorship (II) government 
This was particularly true for the parties ruling the country as they were known 
by 
their leader's name, and not by their ideological platforms. For example the 
Radoslavists (after Dr Radoslavov for conservatives), the Tzankovists (after Dr 
Tzankov for liberals), or the Stambolovists (after A. Stambolij ski for agriculturalists) 
(see Radeva, 1993). 
In an attempt to compensate for the lack of comprehensive visions 
for the 
development of the country and having represented the blurred 
interests of large fluid 
groups, most parties adopted a convenient approach to practical policies, which 
Nikolova and Sizdov (1992: 12) characterised in the slogan 
`our programme is our 
acts'. This approach, coupled with a lack of adequate collective control over political 
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centres and regular changes of party memberships in favour of those in power, also set 
the practice of justifying post factum actions to serve particular interests. Given the 
lack of political culture and democratic traditions, it comes as no surprise that 
Bulgaria had four cabinets in three years including interim Russian Prime and War 
Ministers (1882), with the first cabinet being the shortest lived, surviving only for four 
months. 
During its first five decades Bulgaria could be characterised (according to present 
terminology) as `a developing economy', dominated by small to middle-sized craft 
production and agricultural small holdings. Until 1884, there were only 23 factories 
with more than 10 employees, increasing to 30 in 1904, and to 1,245 by 1930 
(Hadjiski, 1943: 194-5). In comparison, the Cadbury's chocolate factory near 
Birmingham had 3,000 employees in 1900. Despite this growth and the state's heavily 
economically protectionist policies in the form of special laws for encouraging 
domestic industry (in 1883,1895,1897,1905 and 1928), the economy remained 
underdeveloped and poorly structured, with industrial production contributing, equally 
with craft production, only 6% of GDP in 1926, and still only 10% in 1930. The 
nation's trade balance until 1930 was negative, as imports exceeded exports, thus 
placing an extra burden on small firms. Bulgaria's foreign debt in 1939 (12.6 billion 
Lev) equalled twice the value of its annual exports (6.07 billion Lev) (Tzvetkov, 
1994: 47). 
After 1930, the economy took a course to closer integration with Germany's military 
economy. Up to 1935 Germany's capital investment represented a modest 5.5% of the 
total foreign investments in the country, but rose to 16% in 1939, and reached 29.1 % 
in 1944, the highest of all investing countries. A similar trend dominated foreign 
trade. In 1933 Bulgaria's exports to Germany represented 38.2% and its imports 36% 
of its total trade. By 1939 these figures were 67.8% and 65.6% respectively. During 
the war Germany established a virtual monopoly comprising 95-100% of the exports 
of Bulgarian meat, fruit and vegetables, 85% of its wine and 65% of its tobacco, and 
maintained a negative trade balance, exceeding two billion DM (even if calculated at 
the very favourable and artificially maintained exchange rate of 32.5 Leva to the 
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German mark). This maintained level of exchange was in fact a way of crediting the 
Nazi military economy (Natan et al, 1969: 544,563,590, and Stojanov-Finance 
Minister in 1944 (quoted in Toshkova, 1994: 79). 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that as a result of an imposed model of 
economic development, territorial limitations and the lack of colonial profits, 
Bulgaria's capital accumulation had to be materialised at the expense of the domestic 
market, and more specifically from the state, in the form of state supplies, 
protectionist import duties, industrial privileges and other measures. Furthermore, 
wealth redistribution had to be achieved mainly within the country, which further 
reinforced the significance of state power as the most valuable strategic resource. In 
contrast to advanced capitalist countries where the bourgeoisie profited through the 
state, Bulgaria's capitalists generated their profits from the state. This was a critical 
consideration, highlighting the specific role of the state as site, generator, product and 
mediator of strategies which underpinned various actions promoted by different public 
and voluntary actors. 
Bulgarian society's social structure mirrored its economic reality, dominated in its 
income by a middle agricultural class, but in its social behaviour by a servant- 
intelligentsia class (consisting of well-educated in Western Europe people occupying 
influential public or private offices). Table 4.2 shows the changing structure of society 
from the liberation to the next great transformation in 1944. This structure presents 
Bulgaria's towns as the centres for modernising tendencies, as opposed to highly 
conservative villages. The towns' diverse social structure comprised a small wealthy 
capitalists class (of bankers and entrepreneurs), a mixed middle class, and a very 
powerful group of intelligentsia, who often became politically involved. Naturally, 
these groups were the bearers of modernisation manifested through industrialisation. 
In contrast, a traditionalist block was represented in the agricultural masses suffering 
the so-called "farming overpopulation" (an underdeveloped agricultural sector unable 
to employ large numbers, Totev, 1943, quoted in Minev, 1997). This was referred to 
by some commentators as the fundamental problem of the Bulgaria economy. 
This 
problem seemed to have no solution as there was no industrial sector capable of 
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absorbing the labour force generated by the villages. A prime example of the clash 
between industrialisation and conservative strategies was the period 1920-1923 when 
the agricultural party (BZNS) was in office. It tried to promote an authoritarian 
strategy, aiming to channel capital accumulation and distribution in favour of farming, 
a strategy which was uncompromisingly opposed by the other bourgeois parties. This 
conflict provoked two military coups, asserting further authoritarian and totalitarian 
tendencies. There was no typical leisure class per se interested in developing culture 
and sport in their own right. This particular composition of society allowed interests 
and strategic alliances to be formed in pursuing various state and sport projects, which 
are discussed below. 
0 6978 
97 97 
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Source: Kushev, 1986 and other state statistics (* hamlets-scattered groups of 
houses) 
To conclude, these political, economic and social developments nurtured a 
typical 
political and economic `partisan' culture, discredited political parties as populated 
by 
office seekers, created an attitude of distaste towards politics, and 
fostered a public 
perception about the state as a source of privilege. Political parties quickly 
developed 
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their own systems of clientelism, and were somehow reluctant to stop these practices 
even when in opposition, as they anticipated their turn to benefit from the system of 
privileges offered by the state. Party strategies were marked by the country's foreign 
orientation, the degree of closeness to the Palace, and inevitably by the question of 
nationalism. This explains the unprecedented state ban in 1934 on all political parties 
and associations, and confiscation of their properties under the authoritative regime 
imposed by Tsar Boris III (see Dimitroff, 1986). It is also indicative of the strategic 
behaviour of all state administrations, which always looked for critical support in 
outside factors - the Tsar, foreign states, the army, or entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, a dominant statist ideology emerged, underpinned by the notion of the 
state as the most adequate representative of public interests and as the supreme arbiter 
of group interests. Institutionally, the state's penetration of the affairs of civil society 
grew from a modest first cabinet with six ministries in 1879, to incorporate more and 
more spheres of state and civil activities (including sport), and exercised control with 
varying success over relationships and resource distribution. Dragan Tzankov, 
Bulgaria's Prime Minister (in 1880 and 1883-84), and one of its most influential early 
political figures, eloquently summarised the point: "the state in itself is of extreme 
importance, gained with many sacrifices and, therefore, the state interest has a 
natural priority over the civic" (quoted in Gavrilova and Elenkov, 1998: 75). 
4.3. Constructing the sports policy domain: state projects and 
interventions 
The above discussion instructs our understanding about the social, economic and 
political setting of Bulgaria's state and society. It is instructive also for 
comprehending how sport was constructed as a policy domain. There were four key 
contributing factors - `state generic', `utilitarian and sport-specific' policies, and 
`a 
public sport movement' that shaped sport as a specific domain, and a recognised area 
of state intervention (Figure 4.1). These will be examined in turn in the rest of this 
section. 
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Figure 4.1 Shaping the sports policy domain - state projects and public movements 
State Projects 
National and Territorial Unity 
State Intervention 
ý1 
Generic Policies Utilitarian 
Policies 
Constitution, Education of 
civil and youth in 
economic laws obedience to the 
Tsar and the 
motherland; 
military training; 
national cohesion 
Sports Specific 
Policies 
Public Sports 
Movements 
Ministry of Shaping various 
Education sports group sports 
budget; voluntary interests; issues 
organisations recognition and 
subsidies; staff promotion; 
training; sport national- 
laws and international sport 
measures; presentation 
Directive 
`Sportive Manhood' Project 
Membership, Structures, Policies, Relations 
109 
Chapter 4. Strategic relations in sport policy: the Capitalist period (1878-1944) 
The first were state generic policies carrying implications for sport. For decades, 
article 83 of the Turnovo Constitution (1879) remained the only judicial document 
regulating the establishment of civil organisations. It reflected the struggle between 
the two dominant political concepts - the conservative and the liberal. The former, 
promoted by Russian and Bulgarian conservatives, aimed to confine the freedom of 
association, while the latter sought more civil freedoms. A compromise was achieved, 
allowing for association as a civil right, providing it did not jeopardise state and 
public interests, religious and moral standards as defined by the state. 
Another informative example with clear implications for state-society-sport 
relationships concerned state legislation in the field of local authority self-governance. 
The 1886 Town and Village Municipalities Act, the 1909 Public Referendum on 
Community Issues Act, the 1922 Town and Village Municipalities Act, and the 1927 
Local Authorities Businesses Act gave a greater say to the people in all crucial public 
matters, including the election of local assemblies and mayors. Conversely, when 
Fascist-military tendencies advanced in public life, these rights were abandoned and 
substituted with greater state control through a series of pieces of legislation violating 
the spirit and letter of the Constitution, such as the 1924 State Defence Act, or the 
1934 Town and Village Municipalities Decree Act (see Manolova, 1994: 189-197). 
Secondly, the state's utilitarian policies reflected the use of sport for achieving other 
political goals. These were evident in: the Minister of Education's 
Order (1897) 
urging gymnastics societies to be established to provide essential military training, 
made necessary by the conditions imposed in the Berlin (1878) and 
Neville (1919) 
Treaties; in pursuing the ultimate end of Bulgarian education 
defined as 
love towards labour and creativity; passion and discipline; moral will; 
clearly defined national awareness; profound religious consciousness; 
heroism; self-optimism, and optimism in the people's 
future (Petrova et al, 
1985: 162). 
It was also evident in striving for closer political and economic 
integration with 
Germany in the case of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games which were much 
promoted 
by Bulgaria's government. 
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Thirdly, there were the sport-specific policies which saw sport as a legitimate sphere 
of government intervention. They were particularly aimed at regulating state-sport 
relationships and at setting guidelines for resource strategies and allocations. Other 
notable examples were the first establishment in 1926 of a Physical Education 
Directorate within the Ministry of Education with a separate budget for developing the 
government's ideas in physical education; the first Physical Education and Sport Law 
(1931), its amendment in 1937; the introduction of a Soviet military-fitness 
programme "Prepared for Labour and Defence" in 1938 under the name "Bulgarian 
Sport Badge" (despite its ideological background but in line with its totalitarian 
nature), and the setting up of Branik (Defender), a state youth organisation 
compulsory for 10-21 year olds. All these had the ultimate purpose of imposing 
central control over national sport movements. They were accompanied by respective 
financial mechanisms as Table 4.3 illustrates. The Ministry of Education's budget, 
from which sports were financed, had a constant share from the total state budget, 
with a noticeable exception in 1944 due to the set up of Branik. No accurate records 
for sports allocations were found, but given that sport did not enjoy a special status, it 
would have been justifiable to assume that the share of its subsidies followed a similar 
pattern. 
Table 4.3 Ministry of Education budget as percentage of the total state budget 
1925 1935 1940 1944 
total H1 
Source: Central state archive, fund 157 
1.4 1.3 6 
Fourthly, it is important to recognise the role of public sport movements in shaping 
the sports policy domain. As demonstrated by the previous discussion, modern sport 
in Bulgaria did not emerge as a typical leisure pursuit of an affluent class. 
Nor were its 
governing structures grounded in a wide network of clubs and 
local provision. 
Following the political and economic priorities set by the government project 
for 
building the new state, sports organisations clearly had similar missions. 
Thus, sport 
entered the policy domain as a military necessity and not as a social 
issue. The public 
discourse from that time is also instructive, as the most used names 
for clubs and 
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associations were those of Christo Botev and Levski (the brightest revolutionary 
figures who led the movement for liberation from Ottoman domination), Boretz 
(Fighter) or Unak (Hero) (see Tzonkov, 1963). 
From its very first days sport reflected the state project, and was bound to the military 
training of the population, an area where the state was otherwise banned from 
intervening by the Berlin Treaty. In 1878 the theme of military education was directly 
borrowed from the father of Germany's Turnverein (gymnastics movement) -Friedrich 
Jahn (1811) - by the founders of the first revolutionary Bulgarian `Edinstvo' (Unity) 
committees, and introduced in the form of shooting groups, in an attempt to save the 
country after its partition. However, when these groups no longer reflected the state 
unification project, efforts were made to reshape them into civil societies aiming 
"through organisation, discipline, physical exercise and education to defeat the 
honour and rights of the people, silence and public order in the country" (Petrova, 
1978: 42). These efforts, however, proved unsuccessful. 
The first gymnastics club established in 1883 was a German "Turnverein", followed 
by a Bulgarian club "Unak" (Hero) in 1895 with 18 members, assisted critically by 
Swiss physical education teachers. Three years later, it was transformed into a 
national union "Unak" which declared itself as a universal organisation promoting a 
holistic approach to the individual, and not bound conceptually to any particular 
doctrine of physical education. However, its ultimate goal was: 
to provide Bulgaria with physically and morally sound citizens, capable of 
protecting the country from internal and external threats - masculine 
patriot sons... who won 't stop at anything when the fatherland calls them 
to defend its supreme interests. 
(quoted in Vasev, 1950: 89). Subsequently, Unak took part in the first Balkan War 
(1912-3) raising several legions, including a regiment of 220 minors. 
This position of the Union helped to justify the importance of gymnastics 
both as in- 
school, and out-of-school activity for the physical and moral education of 
the youth. It 
was supported by the Ministry of Education, and although very 
limited in scope, sport 
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and gymnastics in particular (as the Union's only means for exercise) was given 
public recognition and defined as a policy domain. 
Further proliferation of voluntary sports organisations resulted on the one hand in the 
constitution of a wide network, and on the other, in the public recognition of sport as 
an issue, which was a precondition for its inclusion in the state system. Despite sports 
organisations' increased popularity, they never managed to become a real voice of the 
people, and so they did not develop a clear members' or customers' orientation. Most 
sport organisations' primary target group was the youth and schoolchildren in 
particular. However, membership in Unak never exceeded 15% of all pupils, and in 
other sport clubs 5%, and exhibited a steady decline. In 1932-33 Unak had 30,000 
members in 160 gymnastics clubs (averaging 187 members per club), while the 
Bulgarian National Sport Federation had 10,127 in 155 clubs (averaging 65 members 
per club) (Petrova, 1983: 133-35). These organisations did not differ conceptually; 
rather they competed over the distribution of limited resources as each tried to claim 
greater responsibilities in order to qualify for a greater state subsidy. This was 
particularly evident in Unak's obstructionist strategy aiming at preventing the setting 
up of a Bulgarian Olympic Committee in 1923, as it was projected to assume wider 
co-ordinating responsibilities in national and international sports affairs. 
By the end of 1939, after sixty years of existence, sports organisations total 
membership did not exceed 90,000 people (0.6% of the population), and the sports 
domain included some 600 clubs and 24 national federations (most of which 
composed of 2-3 clubs or were part of a bigger union). On average, it took seventeen 
years for individual sports to build up their national structures. A similar period was 
needed before Bulgarian national governing bodies joined international sports 
associations. This is indicative of most voluntary sport bodies' striving to secure a 
place in the policy domain and to qualify for state support. The pace of the process of 
forming a national sport policy domain in Bulgaria was much quicker than 
in two of 
the most advanced industrial societies, Britain and Canada. 
It took both of those 
countries between sixty and eighty years (between the beginning and the 
late 1800s) 
to legitimise their national sporting scene and to set up powerful voluntary 
bodies. 
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The above discussion poses two important issues - that of representation, and related 
to it, of the nature of sport projects and strategic relations for their implementation. As 
sport organisations were not grounded on solid membership support and a well- 
established national structure, it was difficult to substantiate the claim that they 
represented the real interests of their supporters. The records of local clubs and 
national associations' annual meetings offer ample evidence of endless squabbles over 
the distribution of various privileges, rather than strategic discussions (see Ministry of 
Education secret survey, 1934). Subsequently, driven by the ambition to help achieve 
the national ideal, and their leaders' personal aspirations, sport establishments 
gradually started to call for more state involvement. They surrendered totally to 
dominant state visions and became liable to political interventions of all sorts. This 
predetermined to a great extent their strategies and relations. 
4.4. Strategic Relations in sport policy making 
Instigated by the lessons of World War I, and in unison with Fascist tendencies in 
society from the 1920s, the notion of holism, that is, the balanced development of 
human physical and intellectual education was gradually replaced by a vulgarised 
doctrine of Apollonism (after the ancient Greek god of male beauty Apollo). This was 
Bulgaria's equivalent of athleticism, embodied in the strong male body and its 
utilitarian purposes. Furthermore, the emergence of `superman' as the epitome of the 
political athlete and its related body politic reflected the core Fascist pledges 
for 
effort, discipline and virility and the construction of new society, a task which would 
have been quite impossible for merely healthy people alone. It is imperative 
for an 
analysis to account for these visions which clearly underpinned the state and 
the 
related sportive manhood project, and which could explain strategic relations 
in sport 
in the next quarter of a century. 
As mentioned, the Bulgarian sport movement was not a complete stranger 
to the Nazi 
sport doctrine based largely on the three fundamental themes of 
Friedrich Jahn's 
corporal education -a feeling of racial superiority, 
the health of the Volk, and military 
education (see Hoberman, 1984). The idea of extending the notion of 
the `Political 
Athlete' to the body politic (in the pursuit of `superman') was grounded 
in the 
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transformation of the strong, healthy body into a public matter, or the introduction of 
body politic which represents an essential element of the fascist-totalitarian doctrine 
for subordinating society. Everything in society - political parties, organisations, 
religious groups, and individuals - would have to be subjugated to the communitarian 
will, and the individual and the community would become one. As Macridis 
(1989: 207) noted: 
Communitarism called for constant participation; it aimed to inculcate a 
spirit of individual attachment to the whole and a readiness not only to 
obey but also to sacrifice everything for the general interest as defined by 
the Nazi. 
The slogan launched by the Zveno Fascist group after the coup in 1934 was "Through 
sport for the mother country" and the proliferation of supportive literature (Sheitanov, 
1928, Zaimov, 1937, Mintchev, 1938, Grigorov, 1941) illustrates the point, and is 
symptomatic of public discourse promoting the notion of `sportive manhood'. 
The advance of the body politic was largely facilitated by the pursuit of a strategy 
which could be seen both as international and national. The struggle for control over 
workers' sport in the early 1920s witnessed the founding of two rival international 
sport organisations- Lucerne Sport International (LSI) and Red Sport International 
(RSI). The latter was led by the Soviet Union, recruited its members from countries 
such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Sweden, and its popularity was 
greater than the Olympic Games. As Peppard and Riordan (1992: 28) commented on 
this early form of Soviet sports diplomacy: 
for its part, the RSI was openly revolutionary in its goals and wanted to 
use sporting contacts with workers-athletes to enlighten them politically 
and prepare them for the class struggle with the bourgeoisie. 
The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP -a spin-off of a 
Social-Democratic party 
founded in 1891) which proclaimed as its ultimate goal the establishment of a 
Soviet 
society in Bulgaria, was very susceptible to the Red Sport 
International project and 
tried to promote it. In a BCP resolution of 1921 sport 
for young people was seen as a 
means for "developing a healthy body and unlimited energy needed 
for the 
forthcoming fights against capitalist slavery" (quoted 
in Petrova, 1978: 7 1). Both the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and the fascist governments perceived sport 
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predominantly as a political battleground, and the issue of who would control the 
sports establishments was one that mattered. For the triumphant (Fascist) athlete, and 
for the suffering (Communist) hero, the ultimate goal was elimination of the political 
opponent, and sport was given an essential role to play in this process. The interesting 
point, however, is that from different ideological standpoints, the two contesting 
camps tried to employ the same strategic project grounded on the notion of body 
politic and backed up by outside interests. 
As both this and the previous section have suggested, international relations played an 
essential role in shaping Bulgarian national sport policy. It is worth noting that, after 
about forty years of political and technical assistance, and provision of material and 
human resources in a number of sports, including rowing, yachting, chess, and tennis, 
the Russian school stepped aside to open the way to the influence of the German 
sporting system. It was not until the end of World War II, when Bulgaria was finally 
politically and economically subordinated to the USSR, that Soviet visions of physical 
culture became dominant. 
State policies for subordinating society manifested in sport through body politics were 
based on gradual introduction of a system of laws and norms which led to full 
centralisation and hierarchisation of civil organisations. The strategy for 
implementation of this policy is well captured by Gavrilova and Elenkov (1998: 44) 
who suggested that: 
an organisation is being set up for every activity under the control of the 
respective ministry (for sport it was the Ministry of Education, explanation 
added). It represents a union of organisations, and even unions on 
professional basis; these organisations have their branches in 
different 
establishments or territories. There is only one such organisation 
in each 
place as the rest are being dismantled; on the executive 
boards of these 
organisations by right sit state representatives. 
The rest of this section will illustrate the workings of the body politic 
by means of 
four examples, each providing evidence for the state's strategic selectivity and 
relations. Initially, critical strategic relations were established between the 
Ministry of 
Education as the most influential state agency with regards to sport and 
the voluntary 
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body Unak. The state commissioned Unak to provide training for all gymnastics 
teachers in exchange for regular structural and material support. In addition the Union 
acting as a professional organisation, tried to promote strategies concerning teachers' 
pay, conditions of work and further qualifications. Financial privileges were offered 
also to other voluntary agencies, but until 1923 Unak remained the key voluntary 
actor on the sports policy scene. 
The most effective way to create structural privileges and relations tended to be for 
different governments to try to set up their own umbrella sports governing body, thus 
ensuring greater state control over the sports movement. Notable in this respect was 
the intervention of the Sgovorist government between 1924 and 1926 to establish a 
new national umbrella organisation under the authority of the Ministry of Education - 
the Confederation for Physical Education (CPE), incorporating all national sport 
governing bodies. It took over all important aspects of sport policy and services 
previously delivered by voluntary organisations. Two particular outcomes are worth 
mentioning. First, Unak was deprived of the privilege of running staff training 
courses, a task previously assigned by the state, and which it had pioneered and 
successfully promoted for thirty years. Second, the struggle for supremacy in the 
voluntary sector between Unak and the newly established Bulgarian Olympic 
Committee (BOC in 1923) went beyond national boundaries, and provoked the 
organisers of the Olympic Games in Paris 1924 to inquire about which body was 
representing the country. At the same time the government did not deliver the support 
it had promised, and introduced a law banning the import of less than essential goods, 
including sports equipment (see Tzonkov, 1981). This produced a massive outcry, but 
because of their subordinate position, voluntary sport organisations were unable to 
intervene decisively. 
Another illuminating example was the introduction of the first Sport Act in 1931, for 
which the rationale put forward by the state was (1931: 1): 
- the poor physical condition of the youth; 
- the insufficient role of voluntary sport organisations; 
- the need of strengthening state governance and control. 
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These perfectly justified the concept of `sportive manhood', and physical education 
was made compulsory for all boys and girls under 21. The legitimation sought by the 
state was best illustrated by D. Ivanov, the chairman of the umbrella body, the 
National Sports Federation, in a rather harsh speech during the parliamentary debates. 
He argued (as quoted in Petrova, 1978: 81) that the aim of corporal education was: 
to develop youth morally and physically, to teach them how to fight, not to 
be like a granny, and to argue for eternal peace - there is such a peace 
only in the grave, but they should know that life is a fight, a fight for 
existence, that in some ways life is sport, just as in sport, there is either 
victory or a defeat. 
The Sport Act envisaged the following key measures in the sports domain: 
" developing and enhancing the physical and moral powers of youth; 
" increasing the number of Physical Education classes for all ages; 
" compulsory Physical Education for non-school youth; 
" committing all educational and working establishments to provide facilities 
and to pay annual membership fees for their personnel in sports 
organisations; and 
" delegating supreme control over the sports domain to the Ministry of 
Education and setting up a new Supreme Council for Physical Education. 
There were three important implications for sports membership, structures and 
practices. First, following the overall strategy described above, the idea of the 
corporate state was manifested in the attempt to set up workers' sport in the factories. 
Second, never before had the Bulgarian state committed a special budget to sport, and 
in the context of strategic control over sport, the law provided clear structural 
advantages. Third, the allocation of material resources was based on an approach to 
standards. Existing and newly established sport organisations were supposed to meet 
certain quantitative indicators, such as the numbers of affiliated members, activities 
and participants, in order to qualify for government subsidy. From an organisational 
point of view, this process marked the beginning of totalitarian government of sport, 
and paved the way for a specific management ethic, vulnerable to administrative 
ambitions or the political commitment of a small elite 
leadership of sport 
organisations. The Supreme Council for Physical Education which supposedly 
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represented the notion of governance (public-voluntary sector partnership), eventually 
had its first meeting in 1936. 
This environment explains the state's selectivity with regard to the project of the 
Balkan Games promoted by the Bulgarian Olympic Committee (BOC). A 1931 
decree of the government fully backed the project for the staging of a multisport event 
involving the Balkan countries, because it promised two distinct advantages - 
demonstration of supremacy over the rest of the region, and asserting national 
identity. It committed the whole state administration, and offered diplomatic, material, 
logistic, security and promotional support. Eventually it paid off - Bulgarian athletes 
were triumphant (Tzonkov, 1981, Bardareva, 1995). 
A third notable example of body politics was the state's intervention in the 
preparation for and participation by Bulgaria in the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, 
also known as the Nazi Olympiad. In 1929 the International Olympic Committee 
member for Bulgaria D. Stantchov resigned, and was succeeded by Stefan 
Tchaprashikov, a wealthy tobacco tycoon, ex-ambassador to Germany and chairman 
of the Bulgarian-German Chamber of Commerce. His ambitions to enter Bulgaria in 
the Olympic Games in Los Angeles in 1932 proved unrealistic, despite lavish 
promises. However, the arrival of an overtly Fascist regime in Bulgaria in 1934 saw 
the 1936 Olympics as an excellent opportunity for generating nationwide support and 
promoting relationships with Germany. 
Following a request from the BOC chairman, general Lazarov, the then 
Minister of 
Education (ME) A. Bojadgiev submitted an amendment (along with others) to the 
1931 Sport Act allowing for an extra Lev to be added to all tickets 
for sport 
competitions in order to generate cash for the `Olympic preparation' 
fund. The 
Ministry of Education also approved the BOC's charter and offered 
further structural 
and material privileges including free usage of all sporting 
facilities in the country 
(Tzonkov, 1981: 82-4). 
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The Olympic ideal had a strong appeal to the body politic, as the Olympic Games 
provided an opportunity to manifest fascist superiority. The state enthusiastically 
supported the idea for the Olympic torch relay to run through Bulgaria as proposed by 
the Third Reich's main sport ideologist and IOC member, Dr Carl Diem. In similar 
fashion to the Balkan Games project, the government ordered all participating urban 
administrations, heads of schools, police and army to become involved in this mass 
display. The Bulgarian government, otherwise reluctant to support the country's 
participation in the 1932 Games, was quick to attach a great deal of ideological 
meaning, and declared its support for the 1936 Nazi Olympics. Germany's gesture 
was in the spirit of true partnership. Hitler became personally involved and presented 
a grant of 200,000 Reich marks to the sport representative of the Bulgarian region of 
Varna to build a new stadium. An impressive national delegation of 94 members (the 
largest ever sent to the Olympic Games) and officials took part in this highly effective 
Nazi display, boycotted by various progressive movements and governments around 
the world. Bulgarian athletes participated in six of eighteen sports in the Olympic 
programme - athletics, cycling, gymnastics, equestrianism, fencing and shooting. This 
participation indicates the character and structure of Physical Education and sport, set 
in favour of military training of the youth, and with disregard for other sports (see 
Petrova, 1983). Table 4.4 shows Bulgaria's participation in the Olympic Games in the 
capitalist period. It illustrates the strategic importance of military oriented sports 
(shooting, fencing, equestrianism, cycling-at the time part of military training and not 
a popular leisure pursuit, and gymnastics to a certain extent) dominated by athletes 
who were also military personnel and who represented the core of the sport policy 
domain. This participation also showed how far Bulgarian sport was 
from 
international standards. As the BOC report on Berlin 1936 acknowledged 
"... it is 
clear that our sport is only in embryo and a long period of hard work 
is needed in all 
aspects of sport" (quoted in Vasev, 1950: 95). Olympic sport challenged more 
than 
athletes' military skills. 
The fourth example illustrates what could be called the pinnacle of 
the Fascist body 
politic - the law for an "Organisation of 
Bulgarian Youth" passed in 1941. It was 
preceded by a major escalation of state intervention 
in the sports policy domain. In 
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line with promotion of the state project for subordinating society, the 1931 Sport Act 
was amended again in 1937 (Petrova et al, 1985). This alteration gave the Minister of 
Education greater powers, enabling him to intervene directly in and demand full 
accountability from all sport governing bodies. What is more, the Minister enjoyed an 
unrestricted right to appoint a delegate to sport organisations' executive boards, and to 
dismiss these boards, and to appoint new leadership at the discretion of his 
representative. 
Table 4.4. Bulgarian participation in the Olympic Games in the capitalist period 
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To implement the state project, the Bulgarian government relied on German support, 
and invited again Dr. Carl Diem with a mission to develop a uniform state programme 
for Physical Education. His report suggested that the chief aim of Physical Education 
should be the pre-army training of the youth, and recommended that the Ministry of 
Education should be delegated dictatorial powers (State Archive, 1937). The end 
result of this strategic process was another structural reshuffling of the sport policy 
in 
the form of a new state organisation, Branik (Defender) with compulsory membership 
- individual or collective - of all youngsters aged 
10 to 21. The aims of the 
organisation represented a summary of the Fascist doctrine for the state - 
"Believe, 
Obey, Work, Fight". 
The prime purpose of the organisation was to "educate and train 
Bulgarian youth for 
a faithful service to the Tsar, country, state and people's aspirations 
". Further more, 
it was called to "strengthen youth 's consciousness about their supreme 
duty to the 
state ", to create "unanimity and a Bulgarian view of 
life ", to teach the youth "to lead 
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a modest and harsh life ", and "to be brave in defending its supreme duty" (Filov, 
1941), and to provide pre-military training for army service. Branik was given the 
supreme authority to control structures, membership and practices - from legitimacy 
of sport establishments to decision-making, activities, international relations, 
including appointing sport organisations' leaders (Branik, 1941). Sports organisations 
were put under full dependence, and that included the total subordination of Physical 
Education and sport, in a truly totalitarian manner. 
The strategic response of voluntary sport governing bodies could be seen largely as 
conformity, as they did not question the state project, and tried to demonstrate 
obedience and support instead. Always loyal to governments, Unak ordered that all 
Communists should be expelled from the organisation, while the Cyclists Union 
readily assisted the government in printing posters against the Resistance movement. 
However, this loyalty to the state, dictated by the need to gain privileges, was not 
unequivocal. As the BNSF 1936 Annual Report suggested (quoted in Vasev, 
1950: 94), not only the progress but the backwardness of sport was attributed to the 
state: 
it must be emphasised that decay has set in all sport organisations, 
provoked by the tactless actions of state representatives and their 
unnecessary intervention into the lives of organisations... there was no 
uniform system and planned actions during this period in any of the 
associations. Public attention towards sport was degraded, and athletes' 
drive was reduced to the lowest level. 
In similar vein, the BOC's Berlin 1936 report identified as a key reason 
for the 
constant struggle between sport organisations the lack of systematic state support. 
It 
made the conclusion that 
once and for all, the state power should realise that our sport movement 
has to be materially supported, because the poverty of sport associations 
is often the chief reason for in-fightings, criticism, squabbles and 
organisational decay (quoted in Vasev, 1950: 95). 
It could be claimed that this comment represented sports organisations' consciousness 
that sport was being exploited by the state to serve particular projects, and 
the interests 
of the athletes were being largely disregarded. But 
it could be argued also that, by 
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voicing concern about the state's insufficient role, sports organisations aimed to be 
assigned greater responsibilities which usually accompany greater state subsidies. 
This consideration partly explains why the voluntary sports sector never developed a 
strategy to combat this situation. 
Finally, essential for strategic relations was the role of both the state and voluntary 
organisations' managers. The state body politic's attempts to subordinate Physical 
Education and sport inevitably demanded the development of a cohort of loyal and 
obedient leaders in all national sport governing bodies. Communitarian values 
manifested themselves in the totalitarian principle of leadership and the institution that 
best combined authority and control with representation. All key appointments were 
considered a matter of high political priority, a policy developed further in the 
Communist period. The chairmen of national umbrella governing bodies (being party 
officials), were members of the parliament, top military officials, or in the case of the 
Bulgarian Olympic Committee - Mr. Tchaprashikov, Chairman of the Bulgarian- 
German Chamber of Commerce. The close relationships between the three 
fundamental elements - the state project for sportive manhood, the state's totalitarian 
sport policy, and loyal political leadership formed the core of the body politicum, 
initiated and promoted by the authoritarian-totalitarian sport projects in Bulgaria. 
4.5. Conclusions 
The struggle over the constitution of the new state highlighted the significance of the 
relationship of its territory, nation and institutions. Russia, Great Britain, and Germany 
tried to promote their interests by imposing a model of constitutional settlement 
running against the unity of these three aspects. The clash of national and foreign 
interests, the forming of strategic geo-political alliances, the introduction of various 
structural elements and policies shaped Bulgaria's national ideal for unification and 
predetermined the nature of state projects. These developments also prepared the 
ground for the emergence of an authoritarian-totalitarian state holding a vice-like grip 
over political, economic and social life. 
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As an organised activity on a wide scale, sport emerged in response to the threat of 
military invasion, inspired and supported by Russia and Germany. Later, it was clearly 
ideologically bound and fragmented on political grounds, and the project for `sportive 
manhood' was promoted in line with the state's overall political and economic 
orientation. The sports policy domain consisted of ill-organised national bodies and a 
network of some 600 clubs (of which only 6 were in villages where 70% of the 
population lived) totally subjugated to the Ministry of Education. Sports organisations 
were not specifically committed to represent their members' interests, and subsequently 
were not entrusted with the power to be a real voice in policy making. During the entire 
capitalist period, the state managed to sustain full control over eight key strategies of: i) 
defining sports projects, ii) setting policies, iii) determining membership in policy 
domain, iv) issue recognition, v) setting up structures, vi) resource allocation, vii) 
forming loyal leadership, and viii) setting standards for performance and effectiveness. 
In the pursuit of these strategies, the state asserted its role as supreme regulator of 
sport policy making by establishing crucial strategic relations. These can be put into 
two broad categories - intra-state and transnational relations. The 
intra-state category 
involved political/class and organisational relations. Political/class relations were 
manifested in the separation of sport on workers (Communist) and bourgeois (Fascist) 
(nurtured by a Red Sport International's decision in 1924 imposed by Moscow), 
where participation was determined not by the service provided, but by one's political 
affiliation. However, class separation which was closely intertwined with the political, 
did not have great impact, lasted for a short period of time, and after 1935 was re- 
evaluated both by the Comintern and the Bulgarian Communist Party (see 
Doncev, 
Tzonkov and Petrova, 1969, Petrova, 1970). As a result of this, a new political 
line 
was introduced which encouraged workers to join in bourgeois sports clubs and 
to use 
them to promote communist ideas. Political relations 
had a bearing on resource 
allocations, though communist-controlled clubs were essentially 
deprived of 
governmental (always anti-Communist cabinets) support. Organisational relations 
were established between state agencies (Ministry of 
Education, Branik) and the 
voluntary sector (Unak, BOC). Initially, they were between the 
Ministry of Education 
as a powerful governmental agency, aided later by Branik, another state 
organisation, 
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and voluntary sport organisations and their leadership, with the critical partnership of 
the army. These relations were imperative by nature, and had a crucial effect on 
determining membership in the sports policy domain, its structuring, devising policies 
and appointing leaders, and ensured only a limited autonomy to sports organisations. 
Transnational relations played also a significant role in devising sports policy. Foreign 
political and economic interconnectedness were influential factors for the success of 
various sports projects. Although the Czech and Swiss sporting systems enjoyed equal 
popularity with the German and the Russian schools, they did not make inroads 
because they lacked political backing, and so the Bulgarian state was disinterested in 
backing and promoting them (see Petrova, 1982). The shaping of sport projects was 
not seriously influenced by the international sport system, because by 1944 Bulgarian 
sports organisations were members of only five international sport federations, and 
had undertaken a modest participation in four (including the Olympic Winter Games 
in 1936) out of ten Olympic Games, which were still predominantly a European affair. 
Therefore, the content of the sports policy was predetermined by the disposition of the 
domain, and policies were defined with well-defined utilitarian purposes - to provide 
military training, to develop obedience to the Tsar, or to combat an ideological treat. 
The forming of sports policies as a process followed a pattern of state sanctioned 
actions. All major sports projects were instigated by governmental agencies (ME, MD 
or Branik), and in the case of voluntary organisations driven initiatives - such as the 
BOC's idea for a Balkan Games - the project was appropriated by the state to serve 
its 
aims. With regard to policy advocacy, both political actors and academic proponents 
tended to promote the notion of a healthy and fit body capable of any bodily 
achievements as a key rationale for introducing a body politic. The outcome of these 
policies was a structurally disintegrated and ill-organised sports movement, a 
high 
degree of state control and poor performances nationally and internationally. 
125 
Chapter 5. 
The State, strategic relations and sport policy making: 
The Communist period 11944-19891 
Chapter 5. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Communist period (1944-89) 
Key state interventions in Communist sport policy (1944-1989) 
1949 The first Socialist Sport Act 
1949 Communist Party sets up Supreme Committee for Physical Culture and Sport 
1957 Communist Party sets up Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sport 
1964 BSFS is given mandate by the Party to improve sporting excellence 
1969 Politburo decision on improving sporting excellence: focus on athletics, 
swimming, gymnastics 
1971 Politburo decision: State Committee for Youth and Sport (CYS) set up 
1974 Council of Ministers' decree (5 of 26/1/74) for improving Bulgarian athletes' 
mastery 
1976 National programme for Healthy Way of Life; CYS dissolved 
1985 Politburo decision to dismantle army (CSKA) and police (Levski) 
representative teams 
1988 Communist Party's perestroika attempt to reconstruct the sports movement 
This chapter discusses the Communist (totalitarian) period of the Bulgarian state. It 
reveals the transformations from the capitalist period to the new stateness, the 
evolution of state projects, concepts, structures and relations, and their effects on sport 
policy. More specifically it pursues the following objectives: 
i) examining the socialist state's constitution and the nature of its project and 
strategies; 
ii) analysing the socialist project and its impact on the conceptualisation of 
sport and its structuring; 
iii) establishing the state's key strategies and strategic relations in sport policy 
making 
5.1. Building the socialist state and its projections for sport 
As result of the geo-political reshaping of Europe after 1945, Bulgaria undertook 
the 
task of building a new socialist stateness. On 8 September 
1944 the Red Army 
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occupied the country, and facilitated a military coup led by the political group Zveno, 
which put in power a government of the Fatherland Front, dominated by the 
Communist Party. It was hardly a coincidence that to assert the one-party system, 
Moscow used the same key actors who masterminded the previous model coup in 
1934 - Kimon Georgiev and Damjan Veltchev. The former, now as then, became the 
new Prime Minister. 
As for the previous period, Jessop's notion about constituting the state proved useful 
but limited for an analysis where global geo-political interests prevailed over other 
considerations. Bulgaria's strategic orientation for the next 45 years was decided in 
the arrogant "percentage deal" struck by Stalin and Churchill in October 1944 and 
sealed later by the Yalta Conference. This deal determined the participation of the 
USSR, Great Britain and the USA in controlling the Balkans. For Bulgaria the initial 
90%: 10% influence in favour of the Soviet control was finally negotiated to 80%: 20% 
and the country was placed in the Soviet zone of influence (see Toshkova, 1994). 
Furthermore, despite the army's contribution in freeing the regions of Pomoravia, the 
whole of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia from German occupation, the country's 
territory was reshaped again, and Pomoravia, Macedonia and White Sea Thrace were 
cut off by the post-war agreements. 
These developments were facilitated by the lack of a firm stance by the government in 
defending the country's national interests. The head of the delegation P. Stajnov, who 
was authorised to sign the armistice in Moscow, pledged the country's readiness: 
"to 
wipe out the guilt [for the war, explanation added] with streams of blood in the 
fight 
against the Nazis, and to obey the verdict of the alliance " (quoted 
in Toshkova, 
1994: 50). To further testify to its attachment to the anti-Nazi coalition, the 
government dismantled all Fascist political, military and public organisations, 
released political prisoners, and abrogated all Fascist laws and 
decrees. This strategy 
did not work, however, and the national ideal for unification of 
Bulgaria's nation and 
territory suffered another major catastrophe. 
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Internally, the country's constitutional settlement was decided in a referendum held in 
an environment dominated by political repression, and in the presence of Red Army 
regiments. It was declared a republic -a decision supported by the major political 
parties. The government's programme from 17 September 1944 (Rabotnicesko Delo, 
17/9/44) proclaimed the re-establishment of the Turnovo (1879) constitution, but it 
also promoted social and economic demands which could not be regulated by law. 
The contest over the constitutional arrangements became a critical issue. The 
Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP - then Bulgarian Workers Party - Communist) tried 
to promote some key principles for a state regulated economy, the nationalisation of 
heavy industries, and direct intervention in solving social problems as a basis for 
achieving its ultimate goal of establishing a Soviet type of society. For that it needed a 
new constitution, a project opposed by the other bourgeois parties. The original 
project of the new constitution which enjoyed a certain political consensus in the first 
round of Parliamentary discussions was replaced in 1947 by a socialist version, 
prepared with the participation of Soviet referents (full time appointed representatives 
of the Soviet government, Metodiev and Stoyanov, 1990). After its territorial 
settlement, the institutional settlement was decided in line with socialist visions of 
what a state should be. The success of the Communist Party's strategy was guaranteed 
chiefly by USSR pressure as, with a modest 15,000 membership and a weak working 
class of 300,000, the Party lacked the political and social resources needed to win 
such a strategic battle. 
Regarding state-society relations there were three crucial implications. First, a mass 
and deep transformation in the forms of ownership occurred, which in turn changed 
economic relations and subsequently the social structure of society. Through 
expropriation, coercive collectivisation of the land, and further legislative measures, 
the backbone of the country's economics - the owners of small and medium size 
businesses - was abandoned. The new socialist state was entrusted 
with a monopoly 
over all strategic sectors of the economy and a leading role 
in planning and 
controlling, and labour was declared the major factor in regulating socio-economic 
life. Second, the introduction of the leading Soviet principle of inseparability of 
the 
legislative, executive and juridical powers opened the way 
for extra-constitutional 
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forms of governance, and later for the Party's uncontrolled intervention. Third, both 
the 1947 constitution and the new overtly Communist version endorsed in 1971 
finally declared the renouncing of the national ideal and its substitution by an 
ideological construct - the building of socialism. As Velev et al (1997: 96) put it: 
Bulgaria was forced by the ruling BCP to deny its national ideal, which is 
being declared `pan-Bulgarian and chauvinistic'. The national cause was 
subordinated to the class struggle and sacrificed in the name of `socialist 
revolution '. 
Subsequently the BCP and its governments demonstrated an unprecedented national 
nihilism: firstly in 1946 by forcing some of its own people to give up their nationality 
to comply with Stalin's and Tito's decision about Macedonia Vardar (based on an 
early 1934 Comintern decision to create a `Macedonian nation'); and secondly, by 
approving in 1963 and 1964 a secret plan to unify Bulgaria with the Soviet Union by 
voluntary action (see Peikov, 1996, Velev et al, 1997, Zhelev, 1998) . 
BCP's leading role was constitutionally endorsed (articles 2 and 3) along with an 
inadmissible abandoning of national sovereignty (articles 3,12 and 13). Bulgaria was 
declared part of the world socialist system (articles 13 and 15), and part of the global 
Socialist economic community (articles 13 and 32); the state received a full monopoly 
of governing the public, individual and economic life entirely, as only personal, not 
private ownership was allowed (Metodiev and Stojanov, 1990: 15-8,37-81). This 
precluded the formal process of total subordination of society by depriving people of 
their basic human rights - the inviolability of the person, the 
freedoms of speech, of 
information, and of travel around the world. It also confirmed Arendt's (1973) 
conclusions about the totalitarian state's rootlessness, neglect of national 
interests and 
contempt for utilitarian motives. 
The Soviet intervention was not only decisive in Bulgaria, but it also marked a 
geopolitical restructuring of the world's political and economic 
balance, and signalled 
the beginning of the Cold War. A new phenomenon appeared - the world 
Communist 
system comprising the USSR, eight states in Europe, Cuba and some 
Asian countries - 
which had great impact on state strategies and policies 
for sport. Long term political 
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(the Political Consultative Council of the Communist Parties), military (the Warsaw 
Pact) and economic (CMEA) treaties were introduced, and bound these countries to 
well planned and controlled patterns of development. As will be demonstrated, sport 
made no exemption. 
To sum up, the creation of a socialist state with its territorial, national and institutional 
dimensions was a project externally imposed by Soviet doctrine for a world socialist 
revolution, and was critically assisted by Great Britain and America. For a short 
period of time the socio-economic and political foundations of society were reshaped, 
long standing national aspirations abandoned and subordinated to foreign visions, and 
an atmosphere asserted of total negation of a public heritage. This led to the 
emergence of an omnipotent totalitarian state possessing full control over society, the 
economy and individuals, and brought to light new actors and relations. From a 
political perspective, though, as the previous chapter suggested, this tendency was not 
a novelty, rather it demonstrated a substantial continuity in terms of a political model 
for state construction and compliance with foreign visions, thus leaving less 
contingent givings for the new state builders. 
5.2. State projects and society 
The abandonment of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism, and other ideological 
principles ensured that building a Socialist society under the lead of the Communist 
Party would dominate the political and economic agenda. In a way similar to the pre- 
totalitarian period, this state project appeared to be a controversial issue because the 
Communist Party was not well structured, and did not have wide social support. 
In 
achieving its aims, the state project presupposed pursuing three interrelated processes 
- of capital accumulation (industrialisation), of generating social 
(political) support, 
and destratifying of society (which could be seen equally as a purpose and as a result) 
- where sport was assigned an essential role. 
However, the state was capable of 
endorsing its agenda mainly by coercive power backed politically and economically 
by the USSR. 
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The advance of the one-party system was accompanied by parallel measures in 
shaping state institutions and economics. The parliament was declared the supreme 
governing body, while, following the Soviet formula, the Council of Ministers was set 
up as the executive and distributive organ. Later in 1971, a new powerful institution - 
the State Council - was introduced and entrusted with enormous power to govern by 
decrees between sessions of the parliament. In reality, it undertook most legislative 
functions, turning parliament into a symbolic body whose role was to approve its 
decisions. The Council of Ministers was subordinate to the parliament but also to the 
State Council. For the first time, the number of ministries was not fixed, thus leaving 
space for institutional manoeuvring. This structure of institutional power placed the 
State Council and its head (de facto also the chairman of the Communist Party) at the 
top of the state hierarchy, and opened the way to an uncontrolled command method of 
state-party governance. 
Moreover, this institutionalisation combined with the ideological enthroning of the 
Communist Party perfectly exemplified the disappearance of any dividing line 
between political and administrative powers. From a strategic relations perspective, 
there were two important implications of this process. Firstly, it resulted in the state 
apparatus losing its independence from the Communist party, and secondly, in 
blurring the boundaries of prerogatives of the different state and public bureaucracies. 
The duplication of administrative, public and party offices destroyed actors' and 
agencies' sense of responsibility and competence. Sport's organisational and decision 
making structure illustrates the point. Party representatives sat on all sport governing 
body committees and boards at national, district and local levels. Strategic decisions 
as well as staff key appointments had to be approved by the respective Party 
committees which supervised sport organisations. Subsequently, sport organisations' 
performances were judged not by those whose interests they were supposed to 
represent - members and general public - but 
by the Party. 
The nationalisation of capitalist industries and banks in 1947 accomplished a 
transitional stage before the introduction of socialist industrialisation. 
This ambitious 
project could be summarised in the much-quoted words of Bulgaria's 
Prime Minister 
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(1947-49) G. Dimitrov, that "Bulgaria has to achieve for 20 years what other peoples 
have achieved for centuries. " The political, economic and organisational mechanism 
for achieving this task was the omnipresent state Plan, as an epitome of the supreme 
knowledge possessed by the party-state and the socialist organiser. Everything in the 
economy and society was subject to planning and approval from the top. The logic of 
the plan presupposed the setting of an ever-increasing spiral of measurable outputs 
and their over-achievement (mere achievement was not good enough), which in sport 
was judged in terms of the numbers of participants, events and medals. 
Bulgaria's economic growth was rather a statistical fiction, as it did not affect the 
standard of living. In 1980 the country was ranked 3rd in Europe and 5th in the world 
by the annual growth of industrial production, first in production of motocars 
(forklifts) and cigarettes (Tzvetkov, 1994: 54). These otherwise impressive statistics 
had very little if any bearing on the standard of living, as in 1976 the per capita annual 
expenditure on sport equipment and apparatus were 3.12 Leva, and 4.03 Leva in 1981 
(the cost of a pair of plimsolls) (BSFS Statistical yearbook, 1982: 226). In addition to 
this argument is another datum showing that the socialist economy ended its 
industrialisation in 1989 with foreign debt of $10.5 billion equal to 65% ($16.3 
billion) of annual exports (Tzvetkov, 1994: 47-8), or $1,000 per head - an average 
annual salary. 
However, these efforts gradually started to produce their intended results as 
by 1953 
the state's share of the total industrial output reached 87.9%, compared to 
10.7% by 
the co-operative and 1.4% by the private sectors. In terms of GDP the contribution of 
the three sectors was 57.6%, 21.8% and 1-2% respectively. 
The integration with 
Soviet and other socialist economies moved closer. In 1981 exports 
to the CMEA 
countries represented 68.3% and imports 73.9%, reaching 
in 1989 84% and 83% 
respectively (Statistical Year Book, 1990). The long-term agreement 
(1977-1990) for 
co-operation between the Soviet State Committee for Physical 
Culture and Sport and 
the BSFS clearly reflected the same economic pattern, envisaging 
that the USSR 
would export 20 different sport products to Bulgaria and would 
import 5 products (see 
Andonov, 1982). 
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The state project for mass industrialisation in fact represented a structural-creative 
process which inevitably evoked the transformation of the basic principles for 
structuring society. The core of the socialist status order as Minev (1997: 74) argued 
was a "system of social rights, widely deployed but on a low level. A central axis of 
this system is the proverbial `right of labour', but (and this is remarkable) 
transformed into a `duty of all socialist citizens. " Civil rights were very limited which 
prevented an independent third sector from developing, including in sport. 
Arable land in 1939 was owned by 1 million households (only 13% of poor villagers 
did not own land) and nearly equalled to that in 1989 (respectively 47.9 and 46.5 
million decars (or 11.5 billion acres), 87% of which was owned by the state 
(Tzvetkov, 1994). This change of form of ownership from private to state and co- 
operative, and the need of industry for human labour resulted in a massive migration 
from the countryside, producing extra 135 towns (from 102 in 1935 to 237 in 1989) 
and almost reversing the village-town population ratio from 77: 23 to 68: 32 in the 
same period. This social engineering also suggested that for most people the salary 
granted by the state appeared to be their main source of income, thus making them 
easy to control and subordinate to the general interest. The Bulgarian Communist 
Party (BCP) even declared in its 10th congress that the differences between village 
and town had been eradicated, and proclaimed a classless society (BCP, 1976). 
The above process represented an essential step towards eliminating the demarcation 
between state and society and their merger into a `People-as-One'. More essentially, it 
also had an important bearing on defining group interests as a precondition for 
forming strategies. As Dimitrov et al (1997: 45-52) suggested, in order to prevent the 
forming of groups with consistent homogeneous status which could have provided 
them with clear consciousness about their place in social hierarchy, the 
Communist 
party used different ideological and economic mechanisms: labelling the working 
class the `vanguard' of society with the mission to establish a proletarian 
dictatorship, 
giving various sectors of the economy priorities and privileges, or remunerating 
poorly the highly prestigious labour of the intelligentsia. For example professors' 
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salaries were never anywhere near those of bus drivers (see The Working Youth, 
1983). In this respect Dimitrov et al's (1997: 47) argument summarised the point that: 
the dichotomy `social diversification-group identification' (or at least 
consciousness of private interest) is extremely important from the point of 
view of forming civil society... Sociologists have sufficient evidence 
suggesting that while the first process was taking place, the second was at 
its starting point and was actively impeded by the ruling party. 
It also helps us to comprehend the transformation of the social base of sport and its 
structure and participation. 
5.3. Constructing the sports policy domain - state projects and 
interventions 
From a political perspective sport was seen both as a subject and as an essential 
contributory factor for asserting the state project. In line with Marxism's socialist 
visions of sport which were based on a profound disdain of body culture and the 
perception that it could only be viewed as a constructive leisure, sport had to be 
transformed to become a `people's movement'. Subsequently, all sport organisations 
were labelled Fascist and their activity and their sporting achievements were 
disregarded and banned, while athletes had to join the Fatherland Front's committees 
and participate in building the new people's state (Naroden Sport, 25/9/44). 
The shaping of the sport policy domain as a process of establishing strategic relations 
was influenced by four key contributing factors - the state's generic, utilitarian and 
specific sports policies, and the public sports movement. These policies were 
implemented through a complex ideological, legislative, executive and clientelistic 
mechanism incorporating Communist party theses and decisions, parliamentary acts, 
ministerial decrees and measures, and the sports organisations' struggle to secure 
greater privileges. As a rule, the last instance of the truth and direction setting was not 
the legislative or the academic, but the party tribunal. 
The state's generic policies carried some important implications 
for the construction 
of the policy domain. In 1945 the new regime abandoned the 1934 
legislation banning 
135 
Chapter 5. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Communist period (1944-89) 
political parties and public organisations. In addition the 1947 constitution guaranteed 
several universal civil rights such as free education and health services, paid holidays, 
equal opportunities, state pensions, and freedom of association. The right to create 
associations and societies had to comply with a public order defined by the state and 
was further developed by the Persons and Family Act (1968). However, with the 
advance of socialism nationally and internationally, this liberal approach was 
changed, and a new law was endorsed in 1951 abandoning all pre-1944 legislation. 
This act dismantled the normative basis of the third sector and laid the foundations for 
new centralised and simplified structures through unifying and merging the 
associations. It also signalled the end of their autonomy and voluntary identity in 
return for state subsidies. This was about to change according the BCP's July (1987) 
Conception for socialism, which was the party-state response to Gorbachov's 
Perestroika in the Soviet Union. Despite its more open character, this document did 
not transform the heavy ideological dependency of society from the Party. The 
BSFS's response to the BCP's attempt at reconstruction -a policy document 
Conception or a Profound Reconstruction of the BSFS (BSFS, 1988) - never received 
approval by the BCP's Secretariat and was not even published for discussions. 
State utilitarian policies with implications for the sports domain could be broadly 
divided into three categories. First, were those concerning the building of a socialist 
society's material base (laws and measures for urban and industrial development) - for 
example the Urban Planning Act (1962), the Industrial Establishments decree (1970), 
both envisaging compulsory construction of public sport facilities in living areas - or 
the Council of Ministers' decree (79 of 1961) for reducing state administration. 
Second, were policies referring to the people's general well-being and the 
defence of 
the country, such as the Labour Acts (1963), the Health Care Act (1976), the 
Military 
Service Act (1958), or various Communist Party Congress decisions. These regulated 
universal civil rights, and in the case of labour legislations committed all 
municipalities, industrial and service estates to establish social and cultural activity 
funds to provide for pupils' and workers' leisure. Third were policies 
dealing with the 
moral and physical development of the individual encompassed 
by the Public 
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Education Acts (1948,1983), BCP Politburo theses for youth (1967), or a 
parliamentary decree for setting up a Youth and Sport Commission (760 of 1968). 
Between 1945 and 1989 the party-state sport specific policies comprised more than 35 
critical interventions addressing a wide range of issues. These included two Acts of 
Parliament (1945 and 1948), politburo decisions and ministerial decrees concerning 
single sport development (e. g. a Council of Ministers (CM) decree 48 of 1969 for 
wrestling), to the setting up of state structures (Committee for Youth and Sport - 
Politburo decision - December 1971). They varied in degree of concreteness as some 
CM decrees (36 of 1972) envisaged the exact amount for sport allocated by the 
government to each member of society aged 6 to 60, while others set standards of 
provision for the elite sport (5 of 1974) (see BSFS 1986,1986a). The party-state 
intervention became gradually more overt and influential, a process which is 
illustrated by the transformation of students sports movement. Professor P. Slantchev, 
the first chairman of the Voluntary Student Association `Academic' (1947, and 
currently a president of the Bulgarian Association for Sports Science) elaborated that: 
at the beginning Academic was a truly voluntary and independent 
organisation full of sport lovers. However, by 1952-53, it all changed due 
to political considerations as more paid staff were appointed, and the 
organisation 's leadership became fully accountable to the local Party 
committee. Today's sport is not made by students (interview, 5 August, 
1998). 
In many instances, political decisions promoted by the Party had a more powerful 
bearing on sport's conceptualisation than formal legislative acts. For example, a 1949 
Politburo decision reflected the subordinate position of sports scholarship in regard to 
practice. One fragment of the Party's decision stated that "the curricula of the Higher 
Institute of Physical Culture and Sport, and the Ministry of Education have to be 
approved by the VKFS (The Supreme Committee for Physical Culture and Sport) " 
(BCP, 1949: 53), and indicated the uncritical environment of the sports domain 
established at the very beginning of this period. Virtually no academic analysis or 
survey was published challenging sport policies and practices - this was strictly 
territory reserved for party judgements only. 
. 
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State generic, utilitarian and specific policies had significant implications for the 
sports movement's conceptualisation and structural relations, as well as for domain 
membership and agenda setting. The shaping of the socialist sports movement 
followed the general principles for organising society according to which sport was 
assigned by the party-state to become a people's movement, thus involving masses of 
people in physical activities. This strategic project was accomplished by conceptual, 
principal and structural transformations which set the boundaries of the policy domain 
and determined its policy community. 
Borrowing largely from the Soviet example, the first major step for the unified and 
centralised governance of sport was the establishment in 1948 of the VKFS as a state- 
public body. Its mission was three-fold: to involve the working population in sport; to 
increase labour productivity; and to enhance people's ability for self-defence (Vasev, 
1950: 62). In addition, a few voluntary sports organisations which were centred around 
the main trades unions (those of the miners, builders, light industry), together with 
four departmental sports organisations (for the army, militia police, students, and 
army construction forces) were also formulated. Gradually, two structural tendencies 
started to emerge -a growing number of local sports establishments (from 600 with 
170,000 members in 1944 to 2,260 societies with 362,000 in 1946) and a reduction of 
national governing bodies - from 24 unions and associations in 1944 to a single state 
agency in 1948. 
The process of structural centralisation of sport was inevitably accompanied by 
another essential step towards classifying sports organisations which shaped the core 
and the periphery of the domain in a truly extensive manner. It has to be pointed out 
that all four major sports categorisations in 1949,1958,1969 and 1988 were 
instigated by BCP Politburo decisions. These can be seen as deliberate political and 
social engineering aimed at promoting sports with high utilitarian potential. 
The initial 
justification given for emphasising sports with well established traditions 
does not 
stand up because, as will be demonstrated, priorities changed according 
to more 
rational criteria. Between 1949 and 1959 these were based on team sports' capacity 
to 
organise large contingents and generate support for the Party's committees 
(BSFS, 
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1958). Bulgaria achieved its major international success in basketball and volleyball 
in this particular period. The third classification in 1969 was provoked by two key 
factors: sports' capacity to provide young people with basic training and military 
skills for defence and to win international prestige (BSFS, 1986). Team sports were 
harder to administer and sustain and less cost-effective for the system. For example, a 
team of twelve volleyball players could only bring in one medal, while six gymnasts 
were in a position to win potentially nineteen medals. The fourth reshuffling of the 
sports domain followed similar criteria, and included only single sports or sports for 
individuals rather the team, though their numbers increased along the way (BSFS, 
1988a). This restructuring of the sports movement had great impact on the distribution 
of resources and privileges as well as for pursuing strategies. Table 5.1 shows the 
changes in priorities for sports' development. 
Table 5.1 Sports classification in policy domains imposed by the Communist Party 
Weightlifting 
"ytnmlc 
gymnastics 
Three more interrelated crucial factors - the principle of setting the sports movement - 
that is, how to become a member, the nature of sports delivery and participation, and 
the international sports system, deserve attention in order to comprehend 
fully the 
nature of the sport policy domain. First, following the 
BCP's Central Committee's 
1988 
Gymnastics 
Volleyball Swimming swimming 
Wrestling Wrestling 
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decision of 1948 the principle for organising the sports movement was fundamentally 
transformed. The `territorial' principle, that is, individuals' ability to take part in sport 
by joining any local club or activity was substituted by a `professional and 
departmental' one, suggesting that sports participation should take place 
predominantly where people studied and worked. Hence, a network of sport clubs in 
schools, factories and institutions began to be set up. Gradually, a network of sport 
clubs in residential neighbourhoods also emerged. A clarification is needed here. The 
interpretation of the term `sports club' will be rather conditional, as until 1989 three 
terms describing grass-root level bodies were used interchangeably - councils, 
societies and clubs. Moreover, for 45 years no clear analysis appeared in the domestic 
sociological and organisational literature concerning the nature of these 
establishments (none of them had legal status), and administrative statistics have 
never been a reliable source to numbers or active membership. 
The key `productive units' of the national sports domain however, were not the clubs 
but the sports societies (DFS) established locally. As Table 5.2. illustrates, changes in 
the number of DFSs was a well-regulated process, exhibiting the same tendencies of 
reduction and centralisation. In addition, after 1970 all DFSs were categorised into 
five groups according to a number of factors, including their contribution to Olympic 
sport. 
Table 5.2. Sports domain members on a local level 
1958 1965 
tort Clubs 9,000 6,000 
-auý, . /w 
1971 1976 1981 1 
4,800 
924 
4,500 2,697 2,600 
276 
Members 420,000 608,663 
Source: BSFS I-VII Congress reports 
991 324 
758,194 938,270 
Those in group 1 and some in group 2 were assigned to produce elite athletes, whereas 
the rest (groups 2 to 5) were given the role of nurseries - to identify and select talent 
and provide initial training. By 1981 there were 19 DFSs in category 
1 based in 12 of 
237 towns nation-wide, but more than half of the districts 
(16 out of 28) did not have 
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top teams or athletes (BSFS, 1982 statistical yearbook). However, despite their 
significance for the sports movement, no DFS's representative ever sat on the BSFS 
Executive Board. The number of other than central bureaucracy representatives on 
BSFS's working commissions was also strictly controlled as after 1981 there were 
only one chairman of a District Sports Council (of 28 districts in total), four 
representatives from National Sports Federations (of more than 45 federations) , and 
one active athlete (of more than 1,000 on the BSFS's payroll alone) (BSFS, 1990: 38). 
Formal membership in sport organisations was supposed to be individual and 
collective. As clubs were not grounded on people's interests, individual membership 
quickly turned into a fiction. This issue for the first and only time was acknowledged 
in the BSFS's founding Congress report (1958: 77) stating that from the planned 
contribution of 800,000 Leva individual and 950,000 Leva collective membership 
fees, only 70,000 Leva (5.6%) and 617,000 Leva (65%) were collected respectively. 
The concept of collective membership fees needs a little elaboration. This was, in fact, 
a transfer from municipalities and the social-cultural activity funds of 
factories/institutions which had been provided by the state, to the central sport 
governing body budget. However, this practice also gradually disappeared. 
Because of the principle of collective membership in sport, the main patterns of 
participation were also collective, and their meaning as a vehicle to promote and 
regulate sport consumption was diminished. The tendency identified above 
for a 
steadily decreasing number of sports establishments coupled with an ever-growing 
number of members supports the point. As a rule participation was 
free of charge, 
except for some symbolic charges for a few activities such as 
for swimming, tennis or 
skiing. However, as a representative survey by Tzonev and Bankov 
(1989: 309-10) 
demonstrated, between 3% and 13% of the people were taking part on a pay-as-you- 
play basis. This number was substantially higher amongst working people 
as 30% 
were prepared to pay in return for a wider and well-informed choice. 
At the same 
time, sociological surveys (Bankov, 1984, Tzonev, 
1985, Stoychev, 1986), and BSFS 
congress reports (I-VI, 1958-1982) claimed relatively stable rates 
of participation, 
which for school-aged youth ranged between 
25% and 50%, compared to 10% to 20% 
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for workers and 3% to 8% for peasants. These trends perfectly illuminate the 
workings of the socialist project based on centralised governance and the efforts of 
organisation and participation as primary criteria for its effectiveness. The form of 
sport production - consumption did not offer much added value to social well-being 
because it did not stimulate job creation, diversification of services or general 
satisfaction. 
Third, as the Party assigned sport to win prestige for the socialist system, international 
contacts and competitions became important. Between 1964 and 1983, the BSFS 
signed over 140 agreements and protocols (including with governmental agencies) 
with 42 countries, and 100 Bulgarian representatives sat on various committees in 37 
international sports governing bodies (Haralampiev and Bankov, 1983). The co- 
operation between Soviet block countries was seen as essential and was organised in a 
comprehensive manner. It included five areas of mass and elite sport, sport science, 
resources, and ideology, where working groups were established with the objective of 
advising national sports governing bodies, and co-ordinating a socialist position 
internationally. It has to be pointed out though that Bulgarian representatives' position 
hardly ever promoted specific national interests, and never differed from the collective 
stance adopted by the socialist block. 
5.4. Strategies and strategic relations in sport policy making 
As discussed in previous sections, structurally and conceptually the sport policy 
domain was shaped largely by the socialist project and state interventions. 
These 
developments had great effect on the pursuit of particular interests ensuring strategic 
relations in sport policy. This section examines the workings of the two 
key strategic 
projects in socialist sport - mass participation and elite sport - and 
illustrates the 
process of promotional strategies and alliances by three examples each representing 
different approaches used by various actors seeking to secure a place 
in the core of the 
domain and to gain more privileges - state support 
for wrestling, the role of the CSKA 
and Levski (army and police) sports clubs, and the bid 
for the winter Olympics. 
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Before analysis unfolds, it is essential to comprehend the specific role of the 
Communist Party in channelling the strategic orientation of sport. In line with its 
leading role in Bulgarian society, the Party controlled and regulated sport in seven 
main directions, as Sotirov (BSFS's Vice-Chairman, 1986: 22-3) argued, ranging from 
defining strategies to disseminating the Party's experience with voluntary 
organisations. 
Following a decision of the Central Committee of the BCP (June, 1957), the national 
sport scene was eventually shaped by the setting up of an umbrella governing body - 
the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sport (BSFS). Despite its full doctrinal 
and financial dependency on the Party-state, the Union (as with other voluntary 
organisations) was an attempt to join public, voluntary and economic potentials of 
society to achieve greater social and political results. BSFS's charter perfectly 
mirrored the founding principles of socialist constitution. Article 1 (BSFS, 1982a: 3) 
asserted that it was to be a "mass voluntary organisation of the people... voices the 
interests of its members, and creates conditions for expressing their aspirations and 
abilities in sport. " It went on to claim that the "BSFS is learning from the rich 
experience of the Soviet and other socialist countries' sports movements. BSFS is an 
inseparable part of the progressive sport movement, works whole-heartedly for 
enhancing the friendship between Bulgarian and the athletes of socialist countries... " 
Naturally, sportpeoples' interests were viewed as identical to society's interests as 
defined and promoted by the Party, as evidenced in the closing words of the article 
that "the BSFS realises its multi-sided activity under the guidance of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party. " 
Sport's general strategies, therefore, followed society's strategic projects as promoted 
by the Party. Table 5.3 shows the Communist Party's various strategic orientations 
and its related sports strategies. The political mechanism 
for ensuring congruency 
between party visions and voluntary sports organisations' responses 
followed a route 
from the Party congress to the BSFS congress. Usually, the 
BSFS received an address 
from the BCP Central Committee containing an evaluation of its work and guidelines 
for the future. In return the Party-state provided various structural, material and 
moral 
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privileges. Between 1971 and 1976 alone, 333 sport administrators and athletes were 
decorated with State Council medals and orders including the highest honour, the 
`Hero of Socialist Labour' (BSFS, 1977a). It has to be stressed, though, that the 
discourse employed by the Party to promote state projects was very difficult to 
comprehend, and did not make much sense to most people. For example, Socialism 
was presented as consisting of several states, which were labelled with various 
adjectives - `developing', `developed', `intensified' or `expanded', and society's 
energy was channelled to achieve one of these stages. 
It is evident that, as in most countries, mass participation and elite sport were the two 
key themes of the BCP's and the BSFS's strategies. The former was supposed to 
generate much needed social participation and support, while the latter sought to gain 
political recognition for the system in the outside world. However, from the very early 
stages of forming the socialist sports movement, it became increasingly clear that the 
BSFS was not in a position to pursue these two projects equally with the resources 
available to it and its structure. As the pressure from the Party for better results and 
effectiveness increased, BSFS' strategic response was further centralisation, tougher 
control, and further structural disintegration of mass and elite sport. This outcome was 
predicated by the territorial and departmental principle because BSFS did not have 
direct control over grassroots sports establishments. More than 95% of sports clubs 
were set in schools, factories and institutions which financed them, and they managed 
80% of sports facilities. 
Furthermore, after 1970 BSFS' main structural elements - DFSs at the local, and sport 
Federations at the national level - were given a mandate to 
focus on elite sport 
production (BSFS, 1971, BSFS, 1998). Two examples illustrate the process of 
distorted development. Between 1972 and 1980 (the time of the Munich and Moscow 
Olympic Games) there was an increase from 6% to 10% in the number of sports 
participants, in contrast to a 100% (from 21 to 42) increase in the number of 
Olympic 
medals won by Bulgarian athletes (BSFS, 1982 statistical yearbook). 
The lack of a 
strong correlation between socialist mass and elite sport 
is well demonstrated by 
gymnastics and weightlifting. From 1968 to 1988 with 
fewer than 20,000 gymnasts, 
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Bulgaria won 30 medals in the Olympic Games, World and European championships. 
But from a national perspective, gymnastics may well be considered a mass sport, as 
during the same period some 4,000 weightlifters brought in more than 400 medals. As 
Gartner (1989) and Riordan (1991) pointed out, the public-good aspect of 
international sporting success bore more forcefully on centrally planned allocation 
decisions than the results produced by the market. After all, as the former head of the 
state and Secretary General of the BCP, T. Zhivkov, admitted in 1980 "we might not 
have the right resources to provide for sport for all, but we can always find some 40- 
50 millions levs for our top athletes " (Girginov, 1998: 125-6). 
This indicates how the struggle for limited resources and privileges was shaped. As 
the BSFS had no clear commitment to cater for its members's needs and demands, 
most strategies promoted in mass sport aimed to gain government recognition for 
political promises made by the Party, thus committing the state the more to its project. 
In this regard, the Council of Ministry decrees 36 of 1972 ensuring standard annual 
state aid for sport for every member of any school or working establishment, 63 of 
1980 for improving the economic management of sports organisations, 3 of 1983 
establishing the national fitness complex Rodina, and the inclusion of mass sport 
indicators in the state plan were considered huge successes. In reality, these measures 
delegated rights and responsibilities to other state and voluntary agencies operating in 
the domain, thus further blurring collective responsibility, and easing the burden on 
the BSFS. The very nature of these strategies offered virtually no personal privileges, 
rather they made all actors in the domain vulnerable to subjective judgements by state 
officials. 
The BSFS was fully aware that to ensure mass participation was beyond 
its capacity. 
All congress reports (see BSFS, 1966,1972,1977,1982b congress reports) provided 
clear signals about that, but the only strategic response the Union was capable of 
producing within its structural and ideological mechanisms was to 
further centralise 
its activities and exert tougher control. For example BSFS's 
Vth congress voiced 
concern about disregarding the norms of the Council of 
Ministers decree 36 of 1972 
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stipulating an annual state sport subsidy of 6 Leva for every working person. It was 
reported that on average the allocated amount did not exceed 2 Leva (BSFS, 1977: 30). 
Subsequently the BSFS sought to encourage individual participation in residential 
areas but the mechanism approved by the Congress was to introduce a uniform state 
plan and system for participation (BSFS, 1977: 30,155-9). In similar fashion, the 
BSFS VIth Congress was alarmed about the poor fitness of the population and the 
need for more individual sport services as opposed to centrally organised mass 
activities. In this regard, some incremental measures were undertaken. For example, 
the set up of health-consultancy centres (see Bankov, 1988) -a health and sports 
authorities partnership -a new entry in the domain, which proved short lived. The 
strategic response, however, was the introduction of a uniform system for 
participation and a central co-ordinating planning unit. Plan indicators (for mass and 
elite sport) for all DFSs were developed and in the spirit of Socialist democracy, they 
were given the freedom to `uncover their reserves' by increasing centrally given 
quotas for medals and participants (BSFS, 1982: 90). 
Elite sport was more attractive for all actors - from party functionaries to instructors, 
because it offered many tangible and intangible privileges. Although party officials' 
personal sporting endeavours were not publicised at all, their partialities towards 
sports and teams were well known. One of the Communist Party's top long serving 
officials, a member of the Politburo, Mr. P. Kubadinski, was chairman of the 
Bulgarian Wrestling Federation and a keen supporter of equestrianism. Another highly 
influential figure in Bulgarian sport, Mr. H. Meranzov (BSFS vice-chairman 1963- 
1980) was for 1980-1989 deputy head of BCP' CC organisational 
department 
responsible for overseeing sport. Each area of society's life being overseen 
by a Party 
department). Meranzov recollected how in 1969 he managed to gain a 
Council of 
Ministers' decree ensuring more resources for the sport of wrestling. 
The significance 
of this achievement could be judged by the fact that, 
in the whole history of the 
Bulgarian governments' interventions in sport, there were only 
two special decrees 
regulating particular sports - one for wrestling 
(48 of 1969) and one for equestrianism 
(266 of 1975). It also exemplified the significance of strategic relations 
between the 
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Party executive powers and voluntary organisations for asserting their place in the 
sports policy domain. 
Despite wrestling's undisputed contribution to the country's Olympic glories, the 
Politburo's crucial decision of 1969 identifying priority sports only foresaw these as 
athletics, gymnastics and swimming. The leadership of wrestling and of the BSFS 
were acutely aware that this could mean fewer resources and prospects of future 
medals. Until the 1968 Mexico Olympics, wrestling was responsible for 70% of all 
Bulgarian Olympic medals, and still contributed 42% in the Munich Games. 
Generally wrestling and weightlifting were the two prominent sports which together 
brought in 69 of the 116 Olympic medals won by Bulgaria until the 1988 Seoul 
Games (60% - 49 from wrestling and 20 from weightlifting), but they still had to 
compete for resources. 
After being categorically told by the Prime Minister that such a proposal for a decree 
for wrestling would not stand, and after failing to promote it through official channels, 
Mr. Meranzov went to see the chairman of the Federation. Mr. Kubadinski promised 
to persuade the head of the Politburo, T. Zhivkov, to sign the proposal first, which 
would then proceed without any obstructions in the Council of Ministers. And so he 
did - the decree was approved on the next day (interview, H. Meranzov, 1 September 
1998, see appendix 1). 
One of the key implications of the principle for the departmental structuring of sport 
was the emergence of two giant sport societies - CSKA, based in the army and Levski, 
funded and run by the police. Heavy state support for the Defence and Internal Affairs 
Ministries was largely justified by the socialist project and for waging the Cold War, 
and they managed to set up real sporting empires, with well developed structures and 
mechanisms. As military service was compulsory for all men, prospective sporting 
talents were easily available to CSKA. In addition both of these societies could afford 
to offer privileges to staff and athletes, such as the highest salaries, free meals and 
housing, full medical and technical support, or military rank, as no one else was able 
to do. Subsequently, CSKA's and Levski's athletes contributed 35% of all medals 
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won by Bulgaria between the 1952 Helsinki and the 1980 Moscow Olympics (BSFS, 
1982 statistical yearbook). 
The role of state managers proved critical for establishing strategic relations in this 
case as well. D. Djurov, Minister of Defence and a member of the Politburo, 
guaranteed the political stability of CSKA, while his son-in-law, a colonel himself 
without single day's service in the regiment, was the DFS's chairman. However, 
regular concerns were voiced about the monopoly position both DFSs were put in, 
and the lack of fair competition. The opportunity for changing the situation presented 
itself in 1985 in the form of a large scale incident amongst players during the final of 
the national football cup between the teams of CSKA and Levski. The five item 
decision of the BCP's Central Committee Secretariat (June, 1985) was formulated the 
same night by those members of the Politburo who wanted to abandon the military 
and police's monopoly in sport. Despite BSFS' attempts to prevent its enforcement, 
the decision was published, and its first item proclaimed the dissolution of all 
representative teams of the two DFSs. No sports body nor leader was consulted, and 
this act had long-term detrimental effects causing an in-principle restructuring of 
sports, the loss of identities and supporters' loyalties, and other privileges, which can 
still be observed today. More specifically, the two football clubs were separated from 
their societies and transformed, under new names (Sredetz for CSKA and Spartak for 
Levski) into independent clubs; the leadership of most sports developed by those 
societies was opened to civilians and not only to army and police personnel; the 
number of athletes on the payroll and those who were considered conscripts was 
significantly reduced. Both CSKA and Levski did not lose their leading positions 
overnight, but their monopoly was seriously shaken. 
A third illustration of strategy and relations involved the most prestigious project 
Bulgarian sport ever undertook - Sofia's consecutive 
bids to host the 1992 and 1994 
Winter Olympic Games (WOG), launched in 1983. The background of the case 
involved several interrelated events. In terms of sport, it was Bulgaria's contribution 
for restoring in 1973 in Varna the tradition of Olympic movement' congresses after 
40 
years break; the work of its representatives in the Olympic movement; and socialist 
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sport general enhancement boosting the confidence of sport minded officials and 
leaders for staging an event of highest calibre. In addition, between 1977 and 1983 the 
country's two principal winter resorts - Borovetz and Pamporovo - hosted a series of 
nine successful European and World Cup Alpine and Nordic ski events, including the 
World Students Winter Games in 1983. These developments were backed by a special 
Council of Ministers' decree (N36/1978) regarding winter sports. 
Politically the end of the 1970s was also an interesting period, as Bulgaria made a 
serious attempt to rebuild, at least morally, its national identity, in sharp contrast to 
Brezhnev's doctrine for limited national sovereignty. The late Mrs. L. Zhivkova, 
daughter of T. Zhivkov (for 32 years the constant head of state and Communist Party 
Secretary General), was promoted to the post of chairperson of the state Committee 
for Culture, and later installed as a member of the Politburo. With her father's support, 
she launched a massive national and international campaign to celebrate the 1300th 
anniversary of the Bulgarian state (681-1981). The ultimate goal of this project was to 
open Bulgaria to the cultural heritage of the world, and to promote the national culture 
abroad, thus raising national consciousness and transcending the boundaries of 
socialist reality. 
Moscow overtly detested the project, as the USSR had never staged any major event 
in its cultural programme; Zhivkova was never seen by any senior Kremlin official; 
the Russians even claimed authorship over the Slav alphabet, invented by the 
Bulgarians Ciril and Methodius. This perhaps explains the highly hypocritical speech 
of Zhivkov during a solemn meeting to launch the 1300 years programme, aiming to 
demonstrate its compliance with the Communist project. Instead of praising national 
achievements, he stated: "Our love towards the country and the party of Lenin is 
already an irrevocable trait of our national character, of our socialist stateness. 
... Our ideals and aims are common, our way 
is one" (quoted in Andonov, 1982: 194). 
However, this background helps to appreciate the political and cultural as well as 
sport-specific environment which nurtured the idea of staging the 
Olympic Games and 
the interests behind it. 
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The personal interests of state and voluntary organisation managers and their 
ambitions also came into play. Brief elaboration on the timing and characters involved 
is needed here. A person rapidly progressing in the Party and administrative ranks - A. 
Lukanov - was in charge of foreign economic relations, was Bulgaria's representative 
in CMEA, and was very close to Moscow; a Soviet subject himself, he stood clearly 
behind the success of the tourist resort of Borovetz. His personal attachment with 
tourism was well known, as he became chairman of the Bulgarian Tourist Union, and 
after the events of 1989 the first Prime Minister. Politically, together with the then 
Minister of Culture, Mr. G. Jordanov, they were also the only candidate-members of 
Politburo (a political rank, the last step before the top of the Party hierarchy). 
However, the ambitions of winter sports and their leaders were not sufficient for such 
a strategic undertaking. The supreme sanction from the Party was needed and it came 
partly by accident, in the form of another key appointment. In 1982 L. Zhivkova's 
husband, Mr. I. Slavkov, was moved from the post of Director of Bulgarian 
Television and appointed as chairman of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee (with just 
one member of staff). According to the Party's current standards for punishment, this 
was a major one. Slavkov, however, became a pivotal figure in the realisation of 
Sofia's WOG project, and for three years, was even the successor as the IOC member 
for Bulgaria to General Stoychev. 
The BCP Secretariat's decision (844 of 1983) to promote Sofia's bid for the WOG as 
well as the Bulgaria 1300 project turned the hithero low profile Cultural Minister G. 
Jordanov into a very popular figure, and he was also appointed by the BCP as 
chairman of the Initiative Committee (BCP CC, 37 of 1984 decision, BOC, 1989). 
Despite the Party's decisions, the bid did not take off because it had to overcome three 
serious contesting interests. The first was an economic concern voiced by A. Lukanov 
and the group behind him, whose arguments were very strong (not at least because of 
the Moscow 1980 Olympics which incurred massive financial losses). These people 
managed to make the disagreement over the bid in Bulgaria's state apparatus known 
to people in IOC circles, in a conscious attempt to prevent its success. After all, a 
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state's guarantees of political and economic stability were crucial factors influencing 
the IOC's decision about a host city. 
The second critical concern was expressed by the Environmental Ministry and citizens 
of the city of Sofia living at the foot of the Vitosha mountain national reserve. 
Because of the advantages a capital city could offer, the Games were projected to be 
hosted in Sofia, neglecting the interests of Borovetz. These opinions were promoted 
by the member of the Initiative Committee V. Josiffov, who was also chairman of the 
Union of Bulgarian Journalists, who wrote several critical articles about the negative 
environmental impact of the Sofia project. 
The third resistance came from the Communist party's ranks. Key national and local 
level officials (so called `local party barons') rightfully feared that an Olympic Games 
in Sofia would have cut severely budgets for local economic and social programmes, 
and in addition, inevitably would have attracted massive material and human 
resources from all districts to the capital. The Party functionaries' reluctance was 
reinforced by the clientelism and nepotism of national politics. Once in power, most 
officials felt obligated and felt it necessary for their prestige to do something for their 
home place and relatives, thus securing greater local eminence, support and privileges. 
Often they abused their power by influencing decisions or by redistributing resources 
for various projects. Sport developments such as the erection of a 15,000 seated 
stadium in a settlement of 4,700 people, or building an Olympic standard swimming 
pool to serve a small village provided ample evidence of the effect of political 
cliaentelism (see the Party guidelines to BSFS's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Congresses). 
Contesting political, economic and ecological considerations were dealt with 
by 
different strategies. These were elaborated by Slavkov himself (interview with 
I. 
Slavkov, 7 September 1998). As noted, despite the Party decisions to support the 
bid 
(between 1983 and 1989 there were nine altogether, some very 
detailed), the 
government's various branches did not show great enthusiasm, and 
hindered progress. 
Slavkov went to see his father-in-law in his residence on the Black 
Sea and shared his 
concern about the bid's slow development. Zhivkov referred to 
Sofia's bid as `a 
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political project with great significance' and as `fools' those who underestimated its 
meaning. He quickly ordered the preparation of a Council of Ministers's decision (113 
of 1984) and the bid really took off. The government was left the task of devising 
detailed BCP decisions through its Central Committee, and of providing finances and 
other support. 
Environmentalists were disarmed publicly by selectively disclosing the hypocrisy of 
their claims. Slavkov published an open letter to Josiffov questioning his real concern 
about Vitosha, as the latter had his country house built in a preserved area on the same 
mountain. Subsequently, Josiffov was sacked. With regard to opinion polls, another 
key member of the bidding committee - D. Haralampiev, currently BOC Secretary 
General - admitted that public views were never an issue and the polling results on the 
support for Sofia's project were simply made up (interview, 5 August, 1998). 
However, the contesting political, economic and ecological interests indicated 
insufficient of unity, did the damage, and Sofia's bids for the `92 and `94 winter 
Olympics failed. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The totalitarian period of sport reinforced further the critical role of the state as site, 
generator, product and mediator of strategies, and blurred its boundaries with civil 
society. As demonstrated, despite specific circumstances, state projects were 
formulated by the Communist Party, inspired and controlled by Soviet doctrine. All 
significant sport projects were in line with the Party programme, and reflected the 
interests of a small leading elite. The people never became a factor in sport policy 
making, as it was believed that these elite groups' interests coincided with, and best 
represented the general interest. 
The success of the socialist sport project was facilitated by the general principle for 
organising society. The omnipotent Party-state intervened, from its first critical 
decision in 1949 until the late 1980s, and promoted the concept of "command 
competition". All political committees, public, trade and voluntary organisations were 
obliged to take part in a nation-wide competition for "the best sports work". 
It may be 
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argued that there is nothing wrong with competition, since it is a prominent feature of 
sport. However, the competition was not about sport, rather it was about the work 
done by different sports administrations. No national or local sport programme ever 
made reference to the `people's needs', or used them as a policy rationale. This was 
true even for the only national conference in the whole period devoted to sports 
services. Nowhere in its materials, the concept of `needs' is mentioned (BSFS, 1981). 
The public discourse adopted as early as the 1950s represented exactly the belief that, 
like the production field, sport should also be put in a measurable framework, its 
progress directed by administrative decisions. The claim that BSFS was a mass 
voluntary organisation, as Staykov (1989: 182) demonstrated, was difficult to 
substantiate. In a representative survey of youth and adult population, he found that 
individuals volunteered to devote 14% of their time to attending Youth Communist or 
Communist Party meetings, as opposed to 0.7% of the time being engaged in other 
voluntary activities including sport. This policy resulted in the creation of a working 
ethos aimed at satisfying the omnipresent economic Plan quotas, and urged sport 
organisations to include sport as indicator of state's general planning. Sport's 
conceptual and structural construction of its domain presupposed an extensive style of 
development, gradually breaking the sports movement into two well defined sub- 
domains - mass and elite - each competing for some privileges and core position. 
Despite rhetorics for the importance of people's health and fitness, the outcome of the 
mass-elite sport struggle was presupposed by the real powers delegated to the BSFS, 
and the constitution of elite sport as a highly centralised and specialised system which 
had no clear links with mass sport. The Union was assigned a full responsibility 
for 
mass sport but lacked the structural and financial leverage for implementing the 
various major demands set by the Party. Its budget for mass participation never 
exceeded 3% to 5% of the total. 
Membership and structures in the sport policy domain were 
ideologically constructed 
and politically regulated. As all key appointments in state and voluntary sport 
organisations were strictly politically controlled, this established a more or 
less one- 
way trilateral movement of strategic relations - the Party to executive 
to voluntary 
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sport. In 1982 72.3% of BSFS's Central Council staff and 100% of its leadership and 
Executive Board were members of the BCP (BSFS, 1982b). 
The state bought out the voluntary sport organisations' independence by means of 
regular financial support, but although finance grew in absolute terms, its relative 
share of the state total budget remained relatively constant. (Table 5.4 shows the 
allocation of the state budget to sport). 
Table. 5.4 Budget of the central sport governing bodies the VKFS (1945-1949) and 
BSFS (1959-1988) as percentage of state budget 
Year 1945 1949 1959 1969- 1979 X1988" 
% Total j 0.01 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.04 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Archives, fund 163 and BSFS, fund 597 
It has to be noted, though, that the table only covers the budget of the VKFS, and after 
1958 that of BSFS, and does not take into account subsidies for sport provided via 
other channels - the youth organisations, the trades unions, the Ministry of Education, 
or governmental programmes for athletes' Olympic preparation. As H. Meranzov put 
it: "the BSFS never knew what exactly its budget was. We have always spent more 
than planned" (interview, 1 September 1998). This comment reflects the importance 
of key agents' placement in a policy domain. Persuading party or government officials 
on whatever grounds was not impossible at all, as they could have easily allocated 
extra resources using the popular resolution `by exception'. 
As the discussion in this chapter evidenced, the process of constructing sports policy 
was influenced by certain strategic relations. These can be put into two broad 
categories - intra-state and transnational relations. Manifested the 
first category were 
political, organisational and personal relations. Political relations were established 
between various Party committees, and sports structures at central, regional and 
local 
levels, when proved critical for forming policies. Organisational relations 
involved 
dealings between state apparatuses - the Council of Ministers, 
Ministries of 
Education, Defence, and Internal Affairs - and central (BSFS, 
BOC), and local 
155 
Chapter 5. Strategic relations in sport policy: the Communist period (1944-1989) 
(CSKA, Levski) sports organisations. They included also relations between voluntary 
sports and non-sports organisations - the BSFS and DFSs, Trades Unions, the Youth 
Communist League, at both levels. Personal relations proved also essential, 
particularly in making strategic decisions, and for actors' placements in the domain. 
Of particular significance were nepotic relations (of Slavkov and Hristov), but non- 
kinship relations were also relevant (Meranzov). 
Transnational relations bore the sign of collectivism, or rather of Soviet domination. 
Multilateral co-operation between the Soviet block countries within the framework of 
political, economic and military treaties, and its extension in the sporting area was 
critical for establishing state and sports projects. The shaping of elite sport was clearly 
influenced by the nature of the international sports system nurtured by the East-West 
rivalry but the participation of Bulgarian representatives in various international sports 
structures was used more as a means of promoting collective socialist visions than of 
specific national interests. 
Therefore, in a similar fashion to the previous period, the content of sports policy was 
dictated by the Communist project, which used sport for utilitarian purposes. Initially, 
this was to gain support in asserting the influence of the Communist Party, and later to 
prepare people for effective labour and defence of the country, and to bring 
international recognition and success for the system. Seen as a process, the sports 
policy always stemmed from Communist Party's decisions and aspired to achieve the 
goals it set. Policy advocacy in this period presented an interesting case because of 
socialism's belief in science and its power to transform society. It is very difficult to 
draw a fine line between the political and the academic discourse due to the 
supportive role science played for political rationale and the desire of political leaders 
to sound scientific. The sports policy outcome was a highly centralised sports system, 
disintegrated on mass and elite sport, and bound by uniform planning. 
Mass 
participation was limited to several events for casual sport with little choice, while 
the 
elite system developed as a fine tuned, sophisticated and competitive engine 
for 
producing international success. 
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Key state interventions in democratic sport policy (1989-1999) 
1992 New Committee for Youth and Sport (CYS) formed by the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) government - Chairman not appointed 
1993 Chairman of CYS appointed - Mr Tz. Barchovski 
1992-4 Disbanding of multi-sports societies into single clubs by CYS 
1993 Council of Ministers decree on control over sports organisations - 27/7/93 
1995 Service government - New Chairman of CYS for 45 days- Mr V. Zhajakov 
1995 New Chairman of CYS appointed- Mr Tz. Barchovski 
1995 Socialist government - New chairman of CYPES- Mr Ch. Christov 
1996 Government Conception for Sport and New Sports Act 
1996 State Fund for Physical Education and Sport Assistance set up 
1997 UDF government - New Chairman of CYPES appointed- Mr Tz. Barchovski 
1997 Council of Ministers National Programme for Physical Education and Sport 
1999 State Fund for Physical Education and Sport Assistance abandoned. 
This chapter sets to investigate the transformations from the Communist to a post- 
Communist sport policy, discussing the emerging new democratic state, its projects, 
strategies and relations, and their impact on shaping strategic relations in sport policy. 
The latter will be demonstrated in the form of two case studies in Chapter 7. 
Therefore, the scope of this chapter will be confined to: 
i) studying the project of building a democratic state/society and related 
strategies; 
ii) investigating the effect of the democratisation project on sport's 
conceptualisation and structuring; 
iii) analysing sports policy's strategic orientation in the new environment. 
6.1. Setting up a democratic state - arrangements and strategies 
The formal event heralding Bulgaria's transition from a totalitarian 
to a democratic 
settlement was the `palace coup' of 10 November 1989. 
For 33 years T. Zhivkov had 
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been head of the Communist party and the State Council. He lost his positions both in 
the Party and state apparatuses, and this initiated a chain of political, social and 
economic transformations. The party meeting which announced the change was 
preceded, however, by several crucial international and domestic developments. The 
world socialist system was undergoing a deep crisis, although Gorbachov's 
perestroika policy was trying desperately to preserve its unity. Bulgaria's satellite 
position in relation to Moscow proved critical, however, when the latter withdrew its 
support, this almost determined the end of Zhivkov's rule. Domestically, the regime 
was demonstrating increasing inefficiency and reactionism, by violating people's 
fundamental interests in ways such as social security, growing ethnic conflicts and 
escalating foreign debt. To dispel any misunderstanding about the spontaneity and 
independence of the transformation, it has to be noted that the `palace coup' was 
endorsed by Moscow, and its key actors were briefed there days before it took place. 
Unlike the two previous periods, the 1989 transformation did not involve any issue of 
Bulgaria's boundaries. Nevertheless its constitution and nationhood were at stake. 
This time, however, for reasons elaborated in the previous chapter there was only one 
key player on the political stage - the Bulgarian Communist party. Hindered by 
various coercive political and economic mechanisms already discussed, increased 
social differentiation did not result in a clear consciousness of group identification, as 
a basis for forming group interests and related strategies. The existing social and 
economic resistance therefore, was not against socialism per se but rather it was 
confined to socialism's crisis. Thus, from the very beginning the construction of the 
new democratic stateness was deprived of its most effective political mechanism - 
democracy- as a regulator of contesting but structured, and economically motivated 
interest groups. Moreover, the middle class which was supposed to lead such a 
transformation, was small and very loosely defined, and its creation was purposefully 
impeded by delaying privatisation measures and by inadequate legislation. 
The responsibility for constructing the new state and its public institutions was 
assumed by the Communist Party, and more specifically by its elite, critically assisted 
by Moscow, but challenged by Washington. The form chosen was of a 
Round Table 
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negotiation. Everything from the roster of participants to its agenda and timing was 
carefully controlled by the Party. Despite the multitude of participating groups 
ranging from dissidents to youth, environmental and religious formations, often 
poorly defined and with blurred interests, sport was not given public recognition, and 
subsequently no sport organisation was invited to take part. The ultimate purpose of 
the Round Table was to legitimise the power of the new party elite and the 
constitutional settlement of the state. An essential step in this process was the change 
of party name from Communist to Socialist (BSP) with a vision of trying to join the 
democratic left forces in Europe. From an international point of view, also it had to 
demonstrate to the West that the formula by which Bulgaria and the USSR `shared the 
same lungs, the same circulatory system and the same heart' was changing, and the 
restoration of limited national sovereignty was a priority task. 
In reality, the Round Table took away the legislative functions of parliament and the 
executive functions of the State Council and the Council of Ministers. It `negotiated' 
and forged the laws for political parties and the parliament, as well as the law for 
changing the constitution, and abolished Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution affixing 
the leading role of the Communist party. These were then voted on without debate in 
the old Communist parliament, approved and enacted. Round Table debates were 
televised live, but all the critical decisions were reached by small `contact groups' 
(nicknamed `the chequered Politburo') behind closed doors. Society was never offered 
a clear understanding, nor a political contract of what had been negotiated, nor it was 
consulted in any way. 
This explains why `Bulgaria bucked the trend', to use M. Glenny's phrase, because 
the renamed Socialist Party, which ironically had employed a British advertising firm 
to run its campaign, returned to power in June 1990 with a comfortable 47 % of the 
vote, against 36% polled by the UDF. These results were achieved 
despite 
Washington's overt diplomatic and financial intervention (a total of 
$1.3 million for 
the election alone), including the presence of America's vice-president 
Dan Quail at 
the UDF's final pre-election meeting on 7 June 1991 in Sofia 
(see Peikov, 1996). 
These relations with Washington and Moscow indicated the traditional state policy of 
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having a Great Power (America or Russia) patron. In line with this trend, the BSP and 
the Chinese Communist Party were the only ones which did not condemn the Moscow 
state coup in August 1991, and took an ambiguous position. 
The state's new constitutional settlement included a division between legislative, 
judicial and executive powers and their independence was a direct outcome of Round 
Table negotiations. The first free elections voted for a supreme parliament, of which 
the opening session took place in the medieval Bulgarian capital of Veliko Turnovo. 
This was a symbolic gesture, intended to mark the continuity between two sovereign 
Bulgarias. It was however, undermined by a BSP strategy implemented earlier, which 
in sharp contrast with the constitution allowed the registration of the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (MRF). This was a conscious attempt to prevent the UDF 
capitalising on the votes of the Turkish minority (representing 7% of population) 
which had been discriminated against by the Communist regime. The MRF was based 
on ethnic principles, and aimed to defend the rights of the Turkish minority. Anti- 
Turkish demonstrations prevented the leader of the MRF attending the opening of 
parliament. The net result, however, was that the MRF gained 16 seats in the new 
parliament, and assumed the position of a balancing factor between the BSP and the 
UDF. 
This incident was indicative of a re-emerging national self-consciousness, and as 
Todorova (1995: 98) pointed out: 
`the Turkish problem '..., presents a much more serious challenge... it 
involves many independent issues outside its scope - problems of regional 
security, global security, ethnic minority status, the right to protect ethnic 
minorities, and the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a 
neighbouring nation, among others. 
From a Strategic Relations perspective, this episode suggested that fundamental 
issues 
concerning the constitution of the state's key components - 
its boundaries and 
nationhood - in contemporary times cannot 
be resolved only by forces acting within 
the state. It is necessary for the state to place them in a global context, and 
to consider 
other circumstances and interests. By the end of 1991 the 
integrative segments of the 
socialist political (Consultative Council), economic 
(CMEA) and military (Warsaw 
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treaty) structures were dismantled, thus lifting any formal constraints on further 
assertions of national sovereignty. 
The state's institutional arrangements represented several paradoxes, and for ten years 
did not manage to establish stable institutions which enjoyed public support. The 
constitutional settlement which delegated greater powers to the parliament, and 
doomed the political system to failure had several important impacts on state-society 
relations. Essential for comprehending the peculiar nature of Bulgaria's 
transformations is the fact that the key actors did not emerged as those unfolded, but 
rather they were appointed by the old Party elite. For example, 46% of the BSP 
deputies in the Supreme Parliament were from the Party's old top nomenclature, while 
most of the UDF's leaders were secret service agents (see Dimitrov et al, 1996). As 
future events demonstrated however, they displayed interests and strategies different 
from those of their ideological master. 
Another significant impact of the transformation with critical implications for state- 
society relations and sport policy, was the emergence of a deep ideological cleavage, 
revolving around the notion of `restoration' (for a comprehensive analysis on political 
and social cleavages in post-Communist Bulgaria, see Karasimeonov, 1998). For 
those who had supported the building of socialism, restoration implied returning to 
what had been before 1944 - Fascism - whereas for the rest it meant going 
back to pre- 
1989 Communism. As many commentators argued (Dimitrov et al, 1996, Minev and 
Kabakchieva, 1996, Krastev, 1997, Minev, 1997), both the BSP and the UDF 
identified themselves not as social and economic communities, both rather as separate 
cultures (or subcultures) sharing memories from the past. Hence, the core of the BSP's 
supporters perceived democratic changes as a U-turn to restoring the pre-1944 
political regime. Ironically, the two key political formations were 
interested in 
maintaining these cultures as an effective collective mobilising mechanism and a way 
of legitimation. For instance, aided by the secret services, the BSP set fire to 
its 
headquarters and blamed the opposition for seeking barbarian revenge, while 
the 
UDF's main pre-election poster represented a black map of the country with scattered 
skulls and cross-bones in white indicating Communist concentration camps. 
The fire 
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was later used by the BSP to claim that most of the Party archives, and particularly 
those of the Politburo and the Central Committee, had been irretrievably lost. Initially, 
these developments provoked a period of hyper-political activity, with some 95% of 
the population turning out at the first election in June 1990. As the gap between 
political promises and actual delivery widened, people's trust in state institutions was 
undermined, and in 1994 the parliament and the government received only 7% and 
12% approval respectively, while in some regions of the country, only about 33% of 
the electorate voted in local elections (PER, 1999). 
A territorial issue, that of land and property restitution, has occupied the political and 
social agenda ever since. The coercive collectivisation, land appropriation and 
migration of 1947-1950 now presented enormous problems. Over 80% of citizens in 
district towns had a piece of rural arable land for which they claimed restitution. This 
process affected also sport, as many facilities, buildings and terrains were given back 
to their earlier owners, or simply lost because no sport organisation could afford to 
pay them the compensation. As in the past, the changing form of ownership was not 
merely an administrative procedure, but rather it presupposed a structural-creative 
process, reshaping society's structures, interests and various actors' positions. 
In conclusion, Bulgaria's transformation from totalitarianism to democracy can be 
seen as a result of several key factors. First, it was a consequence of Communism's 
global crisis, marked symbolically by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The end of 
the Communist era eroded strategic relations and resources which had made possible a 
totalitarian regime in Bulgaria. Second, the post-Cold War remapping of the world, 
despite the power vacuum it produced, left the state in the Russian (ex-Soviet) orbit of 
interests. Third, the transformation was designed and implemented by the only 
significant political and economic actor - the Communist party elite - and 
its key aim, 
as Minev (1997: 75) argued, was "the re-creation of the elite's eroded power, and 
chiefly of reconcentrating its economic power, which had been lost in the process of 
industrial development" (for Minev, the term socialism is just a label for the process 
of industrialisation). The new stateness was politically and socially constructed 
in an 
atmosphere of secrecy, obscurity and uncertainty, where civil society was grossly 
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excluded, and which did not allow clear group interests and strategies to be expressed, 
apart from those of the key actor. 
6.2. State projects: forging state's formal and substantiative unity 
Thus the building of this new stateness was a negotiated process in which the key 
actors initially were appointed to their roles by the Communist Party. It is important, 
therefore, from a Strategic Relations perspective, to analyse the state projects which 
set the framework necessary for its formal (institutional) and substantive (social) 
unity. This we do by examining the processes of the political, economic and social 
construction of the Bulgarian state. 
Politically, the foundations of Bulgaria's post-totalitarian party system were set by the 
BSP during the Round Table, as many analysts have argued (Kolarova 1994, 
Karasimeonov 1996, Minev and Kabakchieva 1996, Dimitrov et al 1997, Krastev 
1997). For eight years (1990-1998) the attempts to shape the political system resulted 
in three general elections and a presidential one, and eight governments with different 
configurations in the parliament. Five blocs including 32 civil formations, together 
with 34 political parties registered for the first free elections in 1990 and competed for 
votes. These figures increased to 106 registered parties for the 1994 elections, each 
claiming to represent specific interests and to have unique programmes (Mitev, 1994). 
The variety of competing political actors poses the essential question, how far they 
were really representing structured group interests and were bearers of specific values 
and ideas. 
At first reading, this hyper-activity suggests that the political scene was a highly 
contested terrain where different individual and collective actors tried to promote their 
strategies. However, the analysis of the pre-election programmes of the key political 
actors - BSP, UDF and MRF - challenges this notion and 
illustrates to a great extent 
these parties ideological positions and their visions for transformations. A 
comprehensive study conducted by the Centre for Studying Ideologies (Mitev, 1991, 
1994) advanced several important conclusions. 
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First, the three political parties had identical dominant demands revolving around 
three issues - freedom, democracy and rights. Similarly, another three key categories - 
privatisation, control and responsibility (which inevitably accompany the first three) - 
were given either no or very little mention. Second, no messages of these political 
programmes were addressed to particular groups. Instead, parties preferred to employ 
vague and abstract categories such as `joining civilised Europe'. Thus, the political 
vote was barely influenced by the programme, rather it depended on psychological 
and symbolic identifications. This conclusion was reinforced by a study of 34 
members of parliament and leaders of the BSP, UDF and MRF (Minev and 
Kabakchieva, 1997: 126). Only one person interviewed from BSP and LTDF said they 
served their voters and national interests, and felt most dependent on them. The rest 
gave rather abstract answers such as `all people' or the `whole nation'. 
Third, these attitudes nurtured a culture of non-accountability of political parties, and 
the use of state funds as a main source to finance their activities. Despite that the Law 
on Political Parties (1993) demanded an annual financial report, this practice only 
lasted for about two years, and then was abandoned. The main political parties, 
however - the BSP, the UDF and the MRF - clearly derived financial benefits while in 
power as Table 6.1 shows. Sports organisations, as will be demonstrated, developed a 
similar attitude to the state and their members. Fourth, the economic reform which 
was supposed to be at the heart of these transformations as a basis for changing the 
fundamental regulatory principles of the new democratic market society was not a 
subject of discussion. These facts seriously undermined all intentions for social justice 
and economic progress the different parties declared they would pursue. Moreover, 
they highlighted the importance of ideological and identification mechanisms such as 
`Communism-anti-Communism', or `past-present' as a means for constructing a 
national political and institutional settlement. Although the right of every individual to 
sport and the state's responsibility for provision was fixed in the new constitution, no 
political party recognised sport as an issue. 
165 
Chapter 6. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Democratic period (1998-99) 
Table 6.1 Incomes and expenditures of Bulgarian political parties (000 Lv) 
Party 1994 1995 1997 
UDF 18,405 / 18,405 29,001 / 29,001 921,718 / 282,994 
BSP 117,012 / 117,012 138,522 / 138,522 no report-138,541 
deficit 
MRF 12,533 / 12,533 8,002 / 8,002 no report 
Source: (Capital, 29-4 February, 2000) 
Economically, the underlying process shaping the national economy was a massive 
redistribution of national capital. Abandoning the system of central planning did not 
deprive the state of its position as owner of most of the national wealth, rather it lost 
the ability to defend its interests in the new role. The negotiated transition from a 
centralised to a market economy was accompanied by a process of national wealth 
distribution, in which as Avramov and Genov (1997: 25) argued "at the start, 
individuals and groups who possessed the real economic power during the previous 
regime have an advantage. " Consequently, these actors were state economic 
managers and secret service personnel. As the latter were not legitimate, they needed 
the assistance of the former nomenclature as political patrons to operate in the new 
environment. None of them, however, displayed the knowledge or behaviour of real 
market subjects. 
Bulgaria lost its traditional markets, accounting for 80% of foreign trade turnover, as a 
result of the disintegration of the socialist economic system. Hence, capital 
accumulation, as in previous periods, had to take place predominantly at the expense 
of the state. Until 1994 the state undertook no serious steps to change the structure of 
ownership, and no public firm was closed. In 1992 total national economic 
losses 
represented 15.3% of GDP and reached 17.6% in 1993, with industry being the major 
contributor, incurring 71.7% of them (Avramov & Genov, 1997: 28-32). At the same 
time, the share of industry in the GDP decreased progressively, 
from 59% in 1989 to 
42.3% in 1993 (Bartholdy, 1995: 526). Foreign exports shrank from 16% in 1989 to 
3.3% in 1992, and imports from 14.9% to 3.6% respectively, with 
inflation rates 
ranging from 26% to 334% (Horvath, 1995: 41). This poor economic 
development was 
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complemented by a massive transfer of Bulgarian capital abroad in the form of 
properties and financial investments. According to Avramov and Genov (1997: 37), in 
1993 this transfer amounted to $ 828.6 million (8% of GDP), while the state's gross 
external debt reached $12.6 billions. This process was facilitated largely by the 
proliferation of banks and state overseas companies set up in the 1980s which were 
transferred into private enterprises. Eventually, in 1997 the UDF government 
published a list of 2,000 credit millionaires (see Peikov, 1996), but they were not 
expected to repay their debts because earlier (in 1993), the Communist-dominated 
Parliament had passed a bill about uncollectable credits. 
The degree of penetration of the private sector in the economy is still very limited; 
according to the National Institute of Statistics, it was about 20% in 1994. Political 
disagreements hindered the process of land restitution, and by 1995 only 22% had 
been returned to previous owners for use. Although the contribution of the private 
sector in GDP in 1995 reached about 35%, it remained the lowest amongst all East 
European countries (NSI, 1995). The lack of clarity over property and capital 
ownership freed all economic agents from the responsibility for any economic losses 
incurred. This opened the way for an unprecedented seizure of capital, in the form of 
the socialisation of company's losses, irreparable credits and transfer of capital 
abroad. 
Socially, this economic reshaping resulted in a changing structure of labour and 
people's sources of income, as two factors which directly bear on attitudes towards 
and participation in sport. The economically active population decreased 
from 82.4% 
in 1990 to 59.1% in 1994, with an alarmingly high unemployment rate rising 
from 
1.4% to over 20% in the same period. It was particularly high amongst youth, where 
every fourth person was unemployed. People's incomes in 1995 
dropped significantly 
to 50.7% of the 1990 level. The contribution of working salary to 
household income 
also diminished drastically from 55.9% in 1989 to 38% in 1995, at the expense of 
other sources such as home production of food and services, which changed 
from 
0.6% to 27.6% for the same period. A direct consequence of this was a 
decrease in 
leisure time and people's disposable income for leisure pursuits. 
For example, the 
167 
Chapter 6. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Democratic period (1998-99) 
number of holiday takers using both seaside and mountain resorts between 1989 and 
1994 dropped by 50%, and in the same time the average leisure expenditure per 
person fell from 4.2% to 2.8% of general expenditures (National Statistical Institute, 
1995: 81,1996: 37-41). 
Two distinct demographic trends played a critical structural role. Bulgaria is a country 
with an ageing population, where every fourth person is aged 60 and above (24.4%), 
and mass emigration in excess of 550,000 people under 45 years of age happened 
between 1989 and 1994 now continuing as a steady annual outflow of 30-40,000 
people. In addition there was internal migration, resulting in the deserting of entire, 
mostly economically underdeveloped regions. At present the population in over a 
third of all settlements is fewer than 200 people (NSI, 1995). State economic 
restructuring together with demographic trends eventually led to a deep stratification 
of society, which is one of the critical determinants for forming identities and interests 
and generating social support for state projects. 
Finally, two key processes legitimising transformations with strategic implications for 
sport policy were the degree of decentralisation and the formation of a viable third 
sector. Here analysis and reality are confronted with a complex paradox. 
Decentralisation (or deregulation) inevitably invited more regulation. Dismantling 
totalitarian structures and mechanisms in a democratic way could be achieved only by 
their replacement with modern legislations making them accessible and accountable, 
and fixing the boundaries between the state and civil society. At present both 
processes of decentralisation (increased local autonomy for sports structures) and the 
formation of a voluntary sector are impeded by conflicting legislation, 
lack of 
understanding on part of the state's agencies and their reluctance to assist. 
The 
unprecedented freedom granted to local governments (municipalities) by the 
Local 
Self-Government and Local Administration Act (1991), including the power 
to 
approve local social and economic agenda, own budgets and the right to 
borrow for 
capital investment projects ensured only limited decentralisation. 
This is because the 
financial relationship between the central government and the municipalities 
continued to be regulated by the 1961 Budget Law, which has been the cornerstone of 
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centralised control of municipalities. It stipulates that collected revenue must be sent 
to central government and then redistributed from Sofia to municipalities. At present, 
53% of municipal finance is obtained from locally generated sources and 47% from 
state subsidies, controlled by the government. As Jepson et al (1995: 107) argued: "in 
practice, the Ministry of Finance has a significant hand in determining municipal 
budgets, through legal regulation as well as through the provision of subsidies and 
the redistribution of local finance. " 
In a comprehensive study of intergovernmental (central-local) fiscal relations in 
Bulgaria, Martinez-Vazquez (1996: 218) revealed that: 
... the centre 
has given little attention to implementing what legal reforms 
it has instituted... Bulgaria cannot even be said to be at a policy 
crossroad" and "because of economic and political instability brought on 
by the transition, the government will be tempted to further centralize, 
rather than decentralize. 
As will be demonstrated, this conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the same 
relationship in the sport sector. 
The transformations also urged on the emergence of a plethora of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in all sectors of society. Their proliferation was particularly 
noticeable in 1990-1991 mainly for two reasons - the needs to shape long-suppressed 
social energy and interests, and to legitimise existing structures (sport clubs included) 
as a result of deregulation. As several studies on the third sector indicated (Nikolov, 
1993,1994, Gaskin and Smith, 1995, Jordanova, 1998), this process was hindered by 
two key factors - lack of proper legislation, and 
finance. Non-governmental 
organisations still had to be registered according to a 1949 Communist Law 
for 
Persons and Family (despite several amendments), which, in this particular respect, 
ironically reproduced the same 1932 Fascist Law texts. Furthermore, the 
lack of 
effective legal financial mechanisms to differentiate between profit and non-profit 
sectors stimulated corruption, and prevented clear regulation. 
With regard to support for NGOs, Nikolov (1994: 81) suggested a very 
limited role 
for the state, as only 53 (16.1%) of all 330 organisations studied 
had received state 
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resources, compared to 116 (35%) assisted by other NGOs. Another obstacle which 
NGOs needing to generate cash faced was the ban on currency accounts, which 
prevented improving financial stability and making international contacts. There was 
also a general attitude of scepticism concerning NGOs' role in society because of 
revelations for wide-spread abuse of not-for-profit organisations to make quick 
profits, mostly by smuggling alcohol, cigarettes or oil (as in the case of the Sapio 
Foundation, 1992). 
Sport organisations as a form of shared interest groups, appeared to be the most 
popular non-for-profit organisations in the third sector. A snapshot survey of the 
sector in the region of Shoumen revealed that 44% of all registered organisations were 
sport associations (Jordanova, 1998: 10). Another study comparing eight European 
countries, by Gaskin and Smith (1995: 34) stated that the highest single proportion of 
active volunteers was in the field of sport and recreation - 28% on average. This 
figure, however, was notably lower for the two Eastern European countries in the 
sample - Bulgaria (4%) and Slovakia (12%) - and, as will be demonstrated, a growing 
number did not reflect structured group interests. 
From a Strategic Relations perspective, however, the structuring of the third sector 
followed a specific path as Jordanova (1998: 7) argued: 
the institutionalisation of an NGO follows not a line of expansion and 
mobilization of civil initiatives, irrespective of their type, public interest 
and even power and public intensity about particular issues, but rather it 
follows the line of financial stabilization through joining a community of 
sponsored non-for-profit organisations. 
This trend, coupled with the state's reluctance to facilitate voluntary organisations, 
and generally low social rating of the third sector suggests two important conclusions. 
First, establishing strategic clientelistic relations with financially viable central 
organisations was a prerequisite for becoming a member of the domain (culture, sport, 
environment), and not the scale of social support a voluntary organisation enjoyed: 
two example are the students' association `Open Society' sponsored generously 
by the 
powerful Foundation of the same name, and the Foundation Bulgarian 
Sport which 
enjoys the sponsorship for its major projects from the Foundation 
Civil Society (both 
170 
Chapter 6. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Democratic period (1998-99) 
based in America). Second, state policies regarding the third sector, carried out 
through legislative and executive bodies, have been coercive and destructive. In this 
respect, it is significant to note that major studies on the third sector in Bulgaria have 
been conducted and paid for by foreign institutions, such as the American John 
Hopkins Institute and the Foundation for Development of Civil Society, the British 
Charitable Know-How Fund and Volunteer Centre, or the European Union. 
To sum up so far, the forging of the institutional unity of the post-totalitarian state was 
shaped by prevailing central political forces and modest incremental democratic 
changes. This process was partly presupposed objectively by the pressing need to 
deregulate the totalitarian state, but subjectively by strategies promoted by the former 
Communist Party elite in attempts to stabilise their economic power. Linked to that 
was the process of building the state's social unity. Whether seen as a political or a 
civil project, social unity was sought not through the support of particular social 
groups, but rather it was based on clientelistic relations between political parties, state 
or foreign agencies and the third sector, including sports associations (for a 
comparative analysis see Miller, 1992). 
Massive and constant restructuring of the political, economic and social fabric of 
society prevented other interest groups, than the political and economic nomenclature 
being given a democratic chance to compete for various structural privileges. This was 
chiefly achieved by effectively substituting state projects with their ideological 
construction involving false images of Communism and painful comparisons with 
modem democratic methods. The key strategies used by all major actors in this 
process, as Kolarova (1994) described them, were of consciously eschewing 
contingent issues and tacit agreements about the constitutional settlement, the 
distribution of powers and key appointments, or the processes of economic 
restructuring. 
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6.3. Constructing the sport policy domain - interests 
interventions 
and 
Constructing the sport policy domain became a struggle involving two major actors in 
the form of groups - the voluntary sport organisations under the leadership of the 
national umbrella body, the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sport (BSFS), 
and the state in the form of a governmental Committee for Youth Physical Education 
and Sport (CYPES). We consider these as group and not individual actors because 
their structure or membership incorporates various agencies not directly concerned 
with the domain, such as parts of the jurisdiction, branches of government (CYPES), 
or other voluntary partners (BSFS). Thus, accounting for those key actors and their 
interests, the post-totalitarian period of sport policy can be divided into two. The first 
period which lasted between 1989-1992 is identified as `voluntary versus voluntary 
sector', and the second, from 1992-1999 as `the state versus voluntary sector'. 
The formal event that signalled the sport domain's transformation was the resignation 
of the BSFS's chairman in November 1989. The cleansing undertaken by the 
Communist party reformers in the aftermath of the palace coup (the 10/10/1989 
Communist Party's plenary session which voted Zhivkov out of office) aimed to take 
out of the party's governing body - its Central Committee - the most loyal supporters 
of Zhivkov's regime. The chairman of the BSFS was one of them. After 22 years of 
service his resignation was observed by all key members of the domain with 
unprecedented standing applause. This was very illuminating for members' 
perceptions of forthcoming changes calling for a balanced development of both mass 
and elite sport. They had no serious reason to think about it as Bulgarian sport 
had just 
concluded the most successful year in its history - the 1988 Seoul Olympics with 
35 
medals, including 10 Olympic titles. 
Eventually, in February 1990, the BSFS organised its long overdue 7th congress 
(the 
6th had been held in 1982) with the aim of deciding its future strategic 
direction. It 
acknowledged its heavy ideological dependence on the past and 
blamed its failure to 
deliver mass sport on the Communist party for assigning a voluntary 
body such a 
great strategic task (BSFS, 1990). However, the new charter 
defined BSFS as "an 
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independent, democratic and self-governing voluntary organisation for individual, 
amateur and professional sport" (article 1 BSFS, 1990a), and its mission of 
democratising sport as a precondition for pluralist and diversified development. These 
claims were made concrete by some figures, envisaging increased allocations for free 
of charge services from 7.5% to 11.1 % of the budget and a decrease in elite sport and 
in Union administrative subsidies from 20.4% to 17.8%, and from 10.6% to 7.4% 
respectively (BSFS, 1990: 44). These outcomes, as will be demonstrated, were never 
delivered. The Congress also called persistently for decisive state intervention to set a 
Ministry of Sport. 
The three key parameters of the new sport policy as set in the BSFS' eclectic structure 
incorporated recreational services, amateur and professional sport, and a gradual 
distancing from mass sport (see Chapter 5). Together with the post-Communist 
attempt to bring the state in, they presupposed to a great extent the constitution of a 
sport policy domain and different interests. First, the BSFS clearly could not rely on 
massive grass root support as during the totalitarian period it established itself mainly 
as a professional organisation because for the pursuit of excellence. At the same time 
it did not want to sacrifice the central position it occupied in the domain. This explains 
why it still claimed to represent the interests of such diverse and incongruent groups 
of participants, ranging from fitness doers to professional athletes. Second, by 
correctly labelling the party/state assignment to introduce mass sport as ideological 
and unrealistic, the BSFS was seeking to justify a new legitimation for its structure 
and policies. While politically and economically the state was in crisis, the elite sport - 
BSFS specialism was undeniably successful, and at most needed cosmetic 
adjustments to comply with the calls for democratisation. Third, the call for more state 
involvement was no more than asking the government and other state 
institutions to 
undertake the responsibility for providing mass sport, and to assign to the 
BSFS only 
the task of elite sport production. In the 1992 BSFS' remaining structures 
dealing with 
mass sport were finally abandoned, and in 1993 an independent 
Sport for All 
Association was established (see Chapter 8). 
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The first two years of the democratic period clearly demonstrated the quasi-voluntary 
character of BSFS as the key actor in the sport policy domain. As it never represented 
its individual members' real interests, the Union did not try to generate mass public 
support and to produce a powerful collective voice demanding privileges for a broad 
membership. This conclusion was supported by empirical data from a national 
representative survey amongst people aged 14 to 55 and 27 leading Sport for All 
experts, carried out in conjunction with the introduction from Australia of the health 
and fitness campaign Life. Be In It. It revealed that 62% of the experts believed that 
the most effective and safe way to present the campaign would be to give a 
governmental agency the leading role. This was in sharp contrast to the opinions of 
most of the sample, who did not have any confidence in the state - only 13% approved 
(Girginov et al, 1991). 
BSFS's reaction to the first and only attempt to address critical sport policy issues 
raised by a non-domain actor was very indicative of its real intentions. In 1989 a 
group of intellectuals, physical educators and members of the public organised a 
national Open Forum for Reconstruction of Physical Education and Sport (OFRPES, 
1990). It exposed the failures of totalitarian planning and governance of sport in 
catering for people's needs, documented regular malpractices in sport such as child 
abuse and exploitation, and devised policy guidelines for state and voluntary sport 
organisations. Amongst the 81 founding members of the Forum (and its subsequent 
meetings) was not a single representative of the BSFS' Central Council. The latter 
perceived the gathering as an ideological and structural threat, and allowed only one 
representative of the Forum to take part in the 7th Congress of the Union several 
months later. The fate of similar attempts in other transforming Eastern European 
countries - Russia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic - was much the 
same (see Stolyarov, 1989, Foldesi, 1991, Krawczyk, 1992, Arvisto, 1995). 
Despite declarations about democratisation, throughout the 
first two years of 
transformations, the BSFS preserved its close relations with its 
former ideological 
master - the renamed Socialist Party. 
For example, various branches of the BSFS were 
used by the socialists to give away much-needed sport equipment 
to influence the 
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votes of conscripts in Sofia. They were perceived by the BSP as volatile but critical 
for the outcome of the elections, particularly in some constituencies where their 
regiments were based. In return the BSFS enjoyed the support of the BSP-dominated 
parliamentary Commission for Youth and Sport and of the party leaders (personal 
communications with key officials, Gruev, Dimitrov, June 1990). Thus, the project for 
democratising and transforming the sport policy domain was substituted by the 
BSFS's actions, with its logical slogan `don't throw the baby out with the bath water'. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of national surveys suggesting that 72% 
of pupils, students and workers lacked physical activity and would participate in sport, 
including on a pay-as-you-play basis if they could (Girginov et al, 1991, Stoychev and 
Tzonev, 1995). In reality the three strategies promoted by the BSFS further weakened 
the ability of the underdeveloped civil sector in sport to create interests different from 
those of the bureaucratic apparatus capable of pursuing their own strategies. Instead a 
hostile environment was nurtured, which in the long run determined sport policy's 
strategic orientation, coupled with the ideological tension of Communist-anti- 
Communist ideal. 
Eventually the state stepped in, and a UDF governmental decree (161 of 18/8/1992) 
set up a Committee for Youth, Physical Education and Sport (CYPES-in its 1996 
version, after being renamed three times). It was assigned to implement state sports 
policy with key functions to develop programmes, co-ordinate activities, allocate and 
own properties and control the domain. Following the anti-Communist 
line of 
transformation promoted by the UDF, the CYPES' mission was preoccupied with 
ideological concerns. The BSFS and DFSs were declared to be totalitarian and 
illegitimate structures, and so had to be destroyed, and their leaders and practices were 
ruthlessly suppressed. More specifically, for six years, 
involving numerous 
applications and court hearings, the BSFS was refused official registration as 
a 
voluntary body, and so could not be considered a partner of the state. 
An attempt by 
national sport federations to form a confederation materialised only 
in part, as its 
registration is still being refused. 
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The reshaping of the sport policy domain began with no clearly formulated visions 
and strategies. The CYPES' first general policy document was published only in 
1996, four years after its establishment. Policies followed a clear path of fragmenting 
the sport movement by dispersing national and local multi-sport organisations into 
single sport clubs. Three basic mechanisms - structural, financial and functional - 
were used in deconstructing the membership of the sports domain: 
(i) a compulsory licencing of all associations in the domain granted by the 
CYPES, and its consequent monopoly over resources; 
(ii) allocation of sport facilities (previously owned by the BSFS) and finance 
(both state subsidy and toto money), and 
(iii) a direct administrative intervention in voluntary organisations' affairs. 
Their impact justifies the characterising the period between 1992 and 1999 as `the 
state versus voluntary sport'. We shall examine each of these in turn. 
(i) Licensing. 
The regulation (CYPES, 1998) for licensing sports establishments made no reference 
to private clubs which encouraged either mass participation or excellence, thus 
depriving largely private actors from participating. The regulation for financing sport 
clubs and associations, however, was even more restrictive and exclusive. Since its 
creation in 1957 the national sport Totalizer (Toto) had been the major source of 
revenue for all sport organisations. According to the CYPES (1993,1998) regulations, 
grass root sports clubs (those established in schools or residential areas) did not 
qualify for state subsidy, only local (at municipal level) and national (Sports 
Associations). Furthermore, the criteria for assessing sport organisations' performance 
in order to qualify included: 
-measures taken for selecting and preparing young athletes; 
-athletes' and teams 'performances in international, national and 
regional 
championships; and 
-the demonstration of self-generated revenues 
in supporting these 
respective activities (CYPES, 1996: 2). 
In addition, all sports were divided into two categories - 
Olympic and non-Olympic - 
and their championships were attributed a coefficient of 
importance. For example, in 
1995 rhythmic gymnastics was given the highest coefficient of 
2.26 for its national 
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championships, compared to 1.15 for women's wrestling (CYPES, 1996b). The point 
here is, that the actual mechanisms for inclusion/exclusion in/from the domain devised 
by the state contradicted its proclaimed mission for democratisation of sport and more 
free choice for all people. 
(ii) Financial allocations 
Unable to deliver crucial services to its productive units (the DFSs), the Union 
disintegrated, and as a national survey of 665 sport and tourism clubs in 1994 showed, 
only 31% were members of the BSFS, whereas 79% were members of a national 
federation where memberships ranged from 1 to 120 clubs. Until 1989 100% of DFSs 
had been members of the BSFS (Slavkov and Girginov, 1994). Table 6.2 shows the 
membership of the sport policy domain, and needs clarification. Sport clubs listed in 
1989 were those set up at grass-roots level - in schools, universities and factories - 
which after 1992 were no longer considered as actors in the domain, and did not 
receive support neither from the BSFS nor from the CYPES. The 1994 and 1999 
figures represent only those single-sport clubs licenced and subsidised by the CYPES 
which emerged as result of disbanding the DFSs. 
Table 6.2 Sports domain membership (1989-1999) 
Members 1989 1994 1999 
Sport Clubs 2,600 1,114 1,228 
Sport Societies (DFSs) 276 68 54 
National Sport Associations 42 59 145 
(for an explanation of the differences, see text) 
The case of Shoumen county previously cited in Jordanova is instructive here for the 
role of the state in structurally determining sport policy. Only 15 (20%) of 72 
registered sport clubs in the county received grants from the CYPES in 1997, and this 
distribution was limited to four sports - basketball, volleyball, 
handball and riding. 
According to the coefficient of their sporting potential, these clubs were ranked 
between the 49th and 331st places, which in turn determined the amount of subsidies 
allocated to them. 
177 
Chapter 6. Strategic Relations in sport policy: the Democratic period (1998-99) 
From being a core member of the domain, the BSFS gradually lost its structural 
privileges and relations, was effectively replaced by the CYPES, and eventually in 
1998, after 40 years of operation, ceased to exist. The end of co-ordinated governance 
of the voluntary sector did not seem to cause either public or government concern; 
instead it was proudly noted by the CYPES's chairman, Bartchovski, in an interview 
for the biggest daily newspaper (24 Hours. 23/8/98). At present it seems that the only 
strategic issue binding together the various core actors and urging them to act as a 
collective force is preserving the Totalizer for sport. As a state agency the CYPES was 
politically sensitive about this issue, and did not assume a central role, leaving the 
lead in voicing the matter to the voluntary sector (sports federations). However, the 
lack of clearly co-ordinated strategic visions and interests predetermined the poor 
outcome of an unprecedented meeting of all key actors with the President of the 
country, a former athlete and sport-minded person P. Stoyanov, in February 1999. In 
effect, the meeting discredited the sports movement as disorganised and preoccupied 
with short term, narrow interests of individual organisations, and managed only partly 
to promote the issue of preserving the TOTO money for sport on the political agenda. 
Eventually, the 1999 Gambling Law exempted the totalizer from taxes, and preserved 
all its money for sport. 
Another set of actors with great potential for reshaping the sport policy domain was 
the municipalities. Two centrally controlled processes, however, still prevented them 
from becoming key actors in sport in particular. First, is their restriction by law to set 
their own budgets and most municipal fees and charges. Second, is the municipal 
ownership of sport facilities (about 80% of the total) which was reinstated by a 
Council of Minister's order (110 of 2/11/1992a), which is an obstacle to converting to 
a market economy. Around 65% of the sport facilities in the country are used free of 
charge, and only 15% demand usage fees from sport clubs (Slavkov and Girginov, 
1994). Given that the sports clubs' financing by the CYPES favours elitism, and that 
both they and the municipalities deliver very limited services to the public, municipal 
ownership becomes a burden because sports facilities consume resources for 
maintenance, and bring poor returns from usage. 
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(iii) Administrative intervention 
The state's administrative intervention was crucial for structuring the sport policy 
domain, and forming its strategic relations. The Council of Ministers' 1993 (27/7/93) 
decree was a replica of the 1937 decision of its predecessor in delegating unrestricted 
rights to the CYPES (in 1937 it had been the Ministry of Education) to intervene and 
override all voluntary sport organisations' collective decisions. It is worth noting that, 
apart from the Bulgarian Olympic Committee (BOC), no organisation took a stance 
on that matter. The 1997 licensing regulation also contained a clause (#11) 
empowering the CYPES to withhold a licence from a sport organisation in a case of 
breaching its charter, the procedures of its annual assembly, or flaws in its training 
and competition processes (CYPES, 1998: 167-7). Clearly, voluntary sport 
organisations were put under legal, financial and administrative dependence and 
control, and as the next section reveals, virtually no co-operation and dialogue was 
established between the state and the voluntary sector. CYPES's position in the 
domain, however, was not uncontested. In 1998 the CYPES and its budget were put 
under the control of the Ministry of Education, and after that the Committee had to 
compete for budget allocations on an equal footing with another 1,000 subsidiary 
branches of the Ministry. 
The central role of the state in the sport policy domain was finally cemented by the 
CYPES' Conception for the System of Physical Education and Sport (1996), and 
further perpetuated by the Sport Law (1996b) and Council of Ministers decrees (1997, 
1997a) and CYPES regulations (1997,1998). At the same time voluntary sport 
organisations were largely marginalised with regards to strategic policy decision 
making and put under centralised control. The above documents constitute a political 
and structural mechanisms for shaping the domain in line with the state's vision of 
assuming the responsibility to represent the general interests of society. 
According to 
the CYPES conception the major aim of the sports system was "to improve the 
health, 
physical development, fitness and capability of the nation, providing the necessary 
conditions for regular participation of all members of the community" 
(1996: 8). As 
we have seen, none of the criteria for assessing the players 
in the domain 
corresponded to this aim. The Law (article 8. (2) 1-5,1996b: 5) 
fixed the central role 
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of the governmental agency in the domain and delegated the key functions, policy 
formulation, supervision, licensing and finance allocation to it. The national 
Programme for Physical Education and Sport (Council of Ministers decree 1031 of 
19/12/97) ensured the structural and financial backing of the CYPES and 
operationalised the functions of domain members. Voluntary sports organisations are 
given only a supportive role (1997: 96): 
the Council of Ministers reckons that... the voluntary sports organisations 
must take their responsibilities, rights and duties in synchrony with state 
agencies and municipalities in implementing the national programme. 
Despite its time span, for 1997-2000, the programme itself contained no specific 
tasks, targets, deadlines, specified individuals/agencies in charge and resources, thus 
dooming the implementation to administrative interpretations. Table 6.3 sums up the 
status and the key projects promoted by the voluntary and the governmental agencies. 
6.4. Strategic orientations and relations 
From previous discussions it is clear that despite declared policy intentions for Sport 
for All, both the BSFS and the CYPES sought legitimation through elite sport. The 
football team's 4th place in the 1994 World Cup in the USA was commonly perceived 
as a great success and was used by politicians to generate social unity and to assert 
Bulgaria's national identity. At the same time, though, as will be demonstrated in 
chapter 8, the elite orientation served global more than national interests. Moreover, 
elite sport was quantified and offered tangible privileges as opposed to mass 
participation with loosely defined social effects. For example, the state subsidy 
offered to a sport club for an Olympic gold medal ($3,000) exceeded the annual 
contribution made to any sport club in more than 120 municipalities (of 160 financed 
in total) in 1997 (CYPES, 1998,1998a -document). 
Sport policy's strategic orientation was never subjected to a structured public 
consultancy process. Various attempts for wider discussions on projects such as the 
draft Sport Law (initiated by the Chancellor of the National Sports Academy in 1991), 
the National Round Table for sport (organised by the BSFS in November 1993), or a 
Sport in Society conference (jointly organised by BSFS, Bulgarian Tourist 
Union and 
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BOC in May 1994) were either poorly organised and attended, or boycotted by key 
actors in the domain. 
Subsequently, no sport policy conception was ever based on an analysis of Bulgarian 
society's complex transformations, and it could be argued therefore, policy was not 
anchored in real life processes, rather it was predominantly an outcome of key actors' 
interests. A typical example was the CYPES's 1996 conception which has determined 
and controlled the sport domain ever since. Essentially, the document was a `single- 
person creation' developed by Tz. Zheljazkov - one of the country's leading 
professors (and a long-serving head of department at the National Sports Academy) in 
the methodology of sport training, a founder and proponent since 1964 of the elite 
sport system, and for many years until 1989 the BSFS vice-chairman responsible for 
national Olympic teams (personal communications, August, 1996). Now, from his 
position as vice-chairman of the CYPES, he promoted a classical complex, academic- 
style document (40 pages dense text only in its English version) advocating that the 
state take the leading role with elite sport, and having nothing to do with political 
rationales for making decisions. 
The above developments nurtured an environment dominated by state agencies and 
managers oriented to elitism, and marginalised the voluntary sector by preventing it 
from forming viable organisations based on clearly identified group interests. As 
major restructurings of the sport domain occurred without prior strategic visions 
offered for open consultation, this resulted in the emergence of a clientelistic culture 
revolving around relations between key actors' placements. Besides the above 
example of policy advocacy, clientelistic relations were responsible 
for a unique 
distribution of power in national sport policy making. During 1994-96 
(with some 
minor changes until 1999) sixteen key positions in the domain were shared 
between 
three people, two of whom were detested by the vice-chairman of the 
CYPES. Figure 
6.1 illustrates the placement of those actors and their positions 
in the sport domain. 
Of particular significance is the configuration of these positions 
between the three 
actors, who are supposed to represent conflicting interests. 
For example, Zhajakov 
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was appointed chairman of the CYPES (a state agency), but remained president of the 
BVF (a voluntary body), and of Orbitours (a private company). 
Figure 6.1. Key actors roles and relations in the sports policy domain - 1994-1996 
BSFS 
Chairman 
Vice-Chairman 
NSA 
Jcienuiic uouncll 
Chairman 
Sport & Science 
--/ Editorial Board -' ---f 
CNSF 
Chairman 
Vice-Chairman 
ý_ I. Slavkov 
'```ý 
Chairman 
Dept. of Gymnastics 
NSA 
Head 
Orbitours Ltd 
Chairman 
V. Zajakov N. Hadjiev 
BFU 
\_ _ 
Chairman 
- ------------ 
NC PEST BFV 
ME Chairman 
Chairman 
Key to figure: CNSF (Confederation of National Sport Federations), BOC (Bulgarian 
Olympic Committee), BASfA (Bulgarian Association Sport for All), BFU (Bulgarian 
Football Union), BFV (Bulgarian Volleyball Federation), NC PEST (Ministry of 
Education National Council for Physical Education, Sport and Tourism), Orbitours 
(the biggest chain for youth tourism and recreation), NSA (National Sports Academy). 
I. Slavkov (BOC Chairman): "If the state wants medals it has to pay for them" (a 
personal statement on a poster hanging in his office reception area) 
N. Hadjiev (BSFS Chairman): "Fundamental is the role of the state body - the CPES, 
which determines the state order for everybody" (1995: 5) 
V. Zajakov (CNSF Chairman): "The state body should assume supreme responsibility 
in shaping national sport policy" (personal communication, September, 1994). 
Hadjiev served for more than two years as a full-time chairman of the BSFS (a 
umbrella voluntary organisation), but kept also the chairmanship of the BSfAA (a 
voluntary body). Slavkov is full-time chairman of the BOC (the voluntary body 
responsible for all Olympic sports), and also of the BFU (a single sport on the 
Olympic programme). 
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The pro-state stance of those three managers presiding over the most powerful 
voluntary sports governing bodies is indicative of their political thinking and vision. 
Illuminating of the elitist character of these organisations is the fact that no-one ever 
questioned the holding of several offices both in the public and voluntary sectors by 
the same person. Equally, they never formed an alliance to devise common course of 
actions and policy for the voluntary sector. These findings support the notion that the 
sports policy network (Marsh, 1998) was based more on structural than interpersonal 
relationship, and emphasised strategic calculations of key individuals. 
In an attempt to secure a better place in the domain, I. Slavkov, in violation of the 
BOC charter, set up a political party `Forca Bulgaria' (copying his Italian friend 
Berlusconi's example), and participated in the 1994 elections. Most of the party's 
candidate-deputies were former and present top sport managers and elite athletes, but 
none were elected. The relations of sports with political actors became prominent as 
boards memberships and presidencies of popular sports federations/clubs turned to be 
a highly attractive position for top politicians of all breeds. At present, the presidents 
of six national federations (equestrian, ski, jetski, pentathlon, volleyball, boxing) are 
acting ministers. Between 1992 and 1999 three ministers and five members of the 
parliament served as presidents of the Basketball Federation, two ministers presided 
over the Tennis and Swimming Federations, while the recent crisis in the Volleyball 
Federation was solved by the election of a new president, the Minister of Agriculture. 
Mingling politicians with sport was encouraged by the Prime Minister Kostov 
himself, as he did not see this as a political intervention, but rather as a 
"healthy 
process" which aims to "help sport, and keeps people with dodgy interests away 
from 
it" (Capital, December, 1999). (The actual word he used was `mutri'(ugly faces) a 
slang for the Mafia). 
The fragmentation of the sports movement was a structural-formative process with 
great implications for sport organisation's financing and mode of operation which 
in 
turn, dictated further their strategic orientation, relations and place 
in the domain. In 
1993 the BSFS did not generate any revenue from services while the expenditure 
for 
staff salaries represented 46% of the total. In 1994 the revenue 
from membership fees 
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and services was only 2% and 3% respectively, with salary expenditures reaching 
61% of the total budget allocations (BSFS 1993,1994). The structure of National 
Sports Federations and clubs budgets was very indicative of their autonomy and 
relations. A survey of 44 NSFs and 665 sport clubs (Girginov, 1995) revealed that 
they remained heavily state financed bodies with no affinity in spectator sports or in 
serving the public. Table 6.4 shows the structure of NSFs' and sport clubs' revenues 
and supports the thesis about their strategic orientation towards elitism and reliance on 
clientelistic relations instead of serving wider group interests or being market- 
oriented. 
Table 6.4 National Sports Federations' (NSFs) and sports clubs' sources of revenue 
8 2-9 
Similarly, as Table 6.5 shows, between 1993 and 1998 the CYPES spent between 
75.3% and 94.7% of state sport budget for 22-24 Olympic sports and some 200 
athletes (CYPES, 1996b). In 1999 state selectivity favoured three sports - athletics, 
wrestling and volleyball - which together received 25% of total 
TOTO subsidy, 
9.88%, 8.57% and 6.82% respectively (Capital, 29-4 February, 2000). 
On average, a weightlifting club received nearly five times more subsidy than 
its 
counterpart in athletics. The criteria for allocations set by the government agency 
did 
not stimulate the setting of a wider network of structural elements, the clubs. 
As 
result, only 15 of 51 (this number was usually 40 but some sports received occasional 
grants) subsidised by the CYPES sports had affiliated clubs 
in all regions of the 
country, while others simply concentrated on a few clubs capable of 
bringing 
competitive success. This undermined the very basis of these clubs' existence - 
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satisfying their members' needs and deprived large groups of people from having a 
say in policy formulation. 
Table 6.5 Top ten state grant beneficiary NSFs and their club network (1998 ) 
National Sports Sport clubs Total Subsidy Average per 
network (mill Lv) club 
(No) (mill Lv) 
34 365.4 10.75 
77 288.2 8.74 
120 274.6 2.29 
104 272.6 2.62 
13 216.3 16.64 
19 198.2 10.43 
24 174.7 7.28 
15 167.8 11.18 
38 159.0 4.18 
10 140.7 14.07 
Contrary to the sphere of politics, the transformation from Communism to Democracy 
in sport policy making was not negotiated, but rather an imposed process. Its very 
nature was legitimising a contradiction between policy declarations, outputs and 
outcomes long masked by the previous regime. All key actors in the sport policy 
domain identified and legitimised themselves by means of elite sport promotion. 
Sport 
for All was declared as a basic right of the people, and an `anonymous state' was 
assigned to provide for it. It must be pointed out, that, although the 
CYPES did 
formally associate its name with Sport for All, in the case of the 
joint CYPES and 
BASfA BULPHAR 2000 (Bulgarian Physical Activity and Development, 1998) 
programme, none of its 19 sub-programmes commits the governmental agency 
financially or structurally. 
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The process of building the new stateness represented a structural-creative process 
with critical implications for the conceptualisation, structuring, production and 
consumption of sport. The point here is that for ten years no conception of sports 
policy ever considered any of the political, economic or social trends identified above. 
This allowed an analysis to argue, that as in the political sphere, the key actors' 
strategies - of the BSFS and CYPES, were grounded on ideology and not on 
principles of common interests. As such, they did not offer mechanisms for the 
majority of sport participants and athletes to promote their interests and rights, and 
served the interests of the elite from the old sport clientele. 
Under the lead of the CYPES agency, the project for sport democratisation was 
substituted by an ideological interpretation fitted within and limited to the 
Communism-anti-Communism dichotomy. The previous 45 years of sport history 
were labelled totalitarian, and accordingly its concepts, structures and actors had to be 
dismantled. This strategy materialised in the disbanding of strong sports societies into 
thousand of single sport and other small clubs with no collective co-ordinating 
voluntary body other than the CYPES. The ideological trap it threw sport policy into 
is still felt very strongly as in 1998, ten years after the transformations began, a UDF 
member of parliament Berberjan (a former CSKA tennis coach and army officer) 
proposed a lustration amendment to the Sport Law (Article 17) banning former 
Communist party members from taking leadership positions. Clearly, very little in 
conceptions or policies pursued in the domain can be seen as synergetic, that is, as 
joint state-voluntary, or voluntary/private organisations strategies aiming at common 
ends. 
Sports' formal and social unity was forged not around strategic visions but rather 
around an ideological construct. Voluntary sport associations were granted limited 
autonomy and non-negotiable contracts (see Chapter 7), ensuring both their place 
in 
the domain and giving a formal unity to the sport democratisation project. 
The 
CYPES retained full central control over major strategic resources - 
finance, facilities 
and legal leverage for intervention. It supported financially only 40 of more than 
100 
sports on offer, dispensed to the licenced clubs and sports federations 
15% and 13% 
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respectively of the sport TOTO money, compared to 22% for its administrative 
expenses. The autonomy given by the CYPES to sport associations implied that this 
governmental agency currently negotiates and supervises directly 1,220 sport clubs 
and 51 NSFs. A similar approach can be seen as a precondition for furthering 
authoritarianism in and the bureaucratisation of sport policy making. 
This type of formal unity was matched by nurturing a form of social unity based on 
clientelistic relations, and not on well-defined group interests. Inescapably, the jobs of 
key actors turned into major assets for gaining privileges and ensuring a core place. 
Ironically, this construction of the domain and its relations was in the best interests of 
all core agencies and managers: for BSFS and CYPES because of their inability to 
provide for mass participation, for NSFs because of their historical commitment to 
elite sport, for the leading DFSs because of their strategic interests in being basic elite 
sport production units. 
Subsequently, in a similar way to the capitalist and communist periods, three types of 
intra-state strategic relations - political, organisational and personal - were evidenced. 
Political relations were established between state political apparatuses (the President, 
the Council of Ministers, Ministries of Education and Finance) and various voluntary 
sports organisations (National Sports Federations). Relevant for this category also 
were the relations between politicians and sport organisations. Organisational 
relations involved state agencies (the CYPES, Ministries of Education or Finance), 
and voluntary organisations (the BSFS, sports federations). Personal relations were 
established between key actors in the voluntary sector, and between key appointments 
in state sport administrations and powerful politicians (for example, the re- 
appointment of Barchovski as chairman of CYPES in 1993,1995 and 
1997). As noted 
in the beginning, these relations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
7. 
For seven years (1989 to 1996), the sports policy content was not clearly 
defined and 
was marked by many improvisations. Although the CYPES's 
Conception for Sport in 
1996 could be seen as an attempt to channel the sports movement 
in achieving 
particular aims, the dominant practices pointed to a destructive 
tendency, aiming to 
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dismantle totalitarian sports structures and to prevent former officials from getting 
back into office. The policy process was marked by harsh state interventions, ensuring 
its grip over strategic resources - conceptualisation, membership in the domain, 
financial allocations and evaluation. Oddly enough, the voluntary sector also called 
for more state intervention. Sports policy advocacy represented a classic example of 
ideological statements (from 1990 to 1995) and a mixture of political rationales and 
academic analyses. It was, however, dominated by pragmatic (political) visions. So 
far, as an outcome, sports policy produced another major paradox. In contrast to the 
democratisation project, voluntary sports establishments were not allowed to have say 
in forming sports policy, and their collective governing body, the BSFS, was 
dismantled. Greater choice and opportunities for sport were not created either. Guided 
by political considerations so as not to run counter to the Ministry of Finance's 
position about the status of TOTO, the CYPES let the voluntary organisations take the 
lead in lobbying to preserve this major source of cash for sport in the Gambling Act 
(1999). Their efforts, and the personal intervention of Bulgarian president, made this 
strategy a success. 
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Disentangling Strategic Relations in Sport Policy Making: 
The Cases of Aerobic Union Bulgaria /lova Sport Fitness Centre 
and the Bulgarian School Sports Federation 
Chapter 7. Case Studies: Aerobic Union and School Sports Federation 
7.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology), the approach undertaken to the case studies 
presupposed an analysis of Strategic Relations in sport policy to place the focus on the 
content, process, advocacy and evaluation of the policy process. This enabled the 
research to examine the conditions, the complexity and the coping strategies of the 
cases. Previous chapters revealed the key role of the state as generator, promoter and 
controller of national sport policy. The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to present 
the uniqueness of the two cases - Aerobic Union Bulgaria and the National School 
Sport Federation - by placing them in the particular context of the mid 1990s, thus 
highlighting how and why particular sports policies arise. This will be achieved by 
developing the structure of the chapter following the path identified by Stake 
(1995: 127) as "description one by one of several major components of the case. " First 
to follow is the case of the Bulgarian Aerobic Union. 
7.2. Setting the scene 
For the purposes of this analysis, it was essential to provide some background 
information regarding the diffusion of aerobics in Bulgaria to set the scene for further 
interpretations. Aerobics emerged and proliferated in Bulgaria after 1982, more that 
ten years after it became popular in North America and Western Europe. The reasons 
for this late introduction were not ideological, but rather structural. Elsewhere mass 
aerobics was largely commercially organised, that is, on a pay-as-you-play basis, and 
it was one of the fastest growing sectors of the sporting industry. Since there were no 
similar market preconditions in Bulgaria, the above principle was unacceptable as a 
foundation for promoting and controlling aerobics nationally. However, the decision 
to set up a national co-ordinating body was heavily influenced by the participation of 
Bulgarian experts at a Trim & Fitness conference on the Isle of Man in 1982, where 
examples of aerobics from around the world were demonstrated, and expertise shared. 
In the next six years great efforts were made by the BSFS, the 
National Sports 
Academy and the Ministry of Health to develop a national co-ordinated programme, 
including staff training, research and publications, allocating resources, setting 
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standards, organising championships, and promotion aimed at establishing aerobics as 
a major component of a healthy way of life of young and female Bulgarians. 
Given the public character and the authority of the three institutions mentioned, the 
developments until 1989 helped to legitimise aerobics and the agency dealing with it 
as in the domain of public policy. Issues concerning different aspects of aerobics were 
placed regularly on the agendas of these decision-making bodies (BSFS, MH) and 
discussed at national conferences as hundred thousands of people became involved as 
participants, instructors, administrators and spectators. Despite the scope and the 
success of its activity, aerobics was never given the status of an autonomous 
institution. Instead, it was put in the framework of a National Aerobic Commission 
within the remit of Sport for All Department as structural element of the BSFS' 
Central Council. 
Due to the political, economic and structural crisis of late 1989, in the next eighteen 
months the National Aerobic Commission gradually faded away. The BSFS's new 
strategy for coping with changes envisaged identifying the Union purely with the 
image and priorities of National Sport Federations, that is, with elite sport, and to 
separate from Sport for All, encouraging the setting up of new structures. From being 
a subject of co-ordinated efforts of several national agencies, all of a sudden Sport for 
All turned into a no man's land. The vacuum produced by the withdrawal of the state 
and its agencies from providing services to mass sport led in the next three years to a 
profound restructuring of the Sport for All sector. Notably, it was marked by the 
emergence of five national agencies - the Aerobic Union, the Sport 
for All 
Association, the Veteran Athletes Federation, the Sport for Disabled Federation and 
the School Sport Federation - which took the responsibility of catering 
for services 
previously provided by the BSFS, the Youth Communist League and the 
Trade 
Unions. 
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7.3. Aerobic Union Bulgaria 
The Aerobic Union Bulgaria (AU) was created on 19th April 1991 in Sofia as a non- 
profit association of amateurs. Nevertheless, it cannot be perceived as the successor to 
the National Aerobics Commission because there was no continuity - neither assets, 
charter, programme, structures nor staff were transferred. The new body came into 
existence as an extension of the private fitness centre Jova BG founded eighteen 
months earlier by a former world champion and Olympic high jump silver medalist, 
Mrs Jordanka Blagoeva. Its mission, as one of the first private establishments in the 
field, was to promote a healthy way of life. Until August 1994 Jova BG and the 
Aerobic Union ran in parallel, but in fact were difficult to distinguish since even the 
accountancy of the latter was managed (following a decision of its Management 
Board) by the former. After that, Jova BG ceased to exist, or rather merged with the 
AU, having changed the name of the centre to Jova Sport and adopting the slogan - 
`Good health is good business'. The range of services offered included classic, step, 
slide and funk aerobics, body-work, as aerobic school for children, callanetics, 
stretching, martial arts, and supplementary services such as sun-beds, massage, sauna, 
hairdresser, shop and snack-bar. Membership of the AU is individual and open to 
everyone. The members of the Jova Sport fitness centre average some 250 people a 
month, which makes it very successful. The AU (Jova Sport) does not possess any 
facilities, but rents a whole wing of one of Sofia's most prestigious sports halls, 
Universiade, located centrally and very close to the city's largest park. Part of the 
foyers are converted into a permanent shopping centre. All this, together with regular 
sporting and entertainment events, gives an extra advantage to the promotional 
strategy of the centre. 
The Universiade hall (as a national sport centre) is owned by the Committee for Youth 
Physical Education and Sport (CYPES) which charges the AU a rent of 550 000 Lv 
per month, a sum representing over 60% of the CYPES's contribution to the AU. For 
nearly four years the AU has not had a fixed budget, that is, activities other than 
participation in major championships were planned provisionally and with great 
uncertainty. Firstly, this is due to the volatile economic situation in the country, and 
secondly, to the criteria set for financing sport - through the state and the commerce. 
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Sponsors, for example, get no tax relief and so are not stimulated to invest in sport. 
The peculiarity of this situation will be discussed in the next section. 
The AU seeks to pursue four major aims and objectives (AU Charter, 1993: 2): 
1. to assists in developing and popularising aerobics; 
2. to generate and provide information concerning the activity of its 
members; 
3. the Aerobic Union represents and defends the interests of its members 
in front of the state bodies, local and foreign organisations in order to 
create equal conditions for realisation of its programmes together with 
similar organisations; 
4. the Aerobic Union assists its members in activities aiming the 
popularisation and development of aerobics. 
AU's structure is shown in Figure 7.1. It comprises four levels of management, the 
supreme governing body being the General Assembly (GA). The GA is the decision- 
making body on matters of overall policy and strategies, as well as the Union's 
performance and international links. It holds its meeting every two years. The 
Management Board is the executive organ composed of seven representatives, 
including the president and the general secretary. It sits at least once every three 
months. All posts are subject to election and approval by the General Assembly, but 
only that of the Secretary General and the technical secretary are paid. 
Figure 7.1. Organisational structure of the Aerobic Union Bulgaria 
194 
Chapter 7. Case Studies: Aerobic Union and School Sports Federation 
7.4. The politics of aerobics as a social construct and public domain 
Because of its broad appeal through fitness, entertainment, fashion values, and world- 
wide popularity, aerobics easily proved to be an activity contributing to a healthy way 
of life, and became part of the public domain policy. Aerobics was socially 
constructed around the idea of promoting physical fitness, and a better quality of life, 
while legitimately seeking strategies to establish itself both nationally and 
internationally. Its implications, though, far exceeded the pure health benefits gained 
by the individual and affected the sports industry and education. 
It is necessary for an analysis here to differentiate between aerobics as a domain of 
public policy before 1989 and after. As discussed, aerobics entered Bulgaria's sport 
scene on a mass scale in 1982 as an activity introduced through a decision of the 
central sports governing body - the BSFS. Subsequently, several other national 
agencies were involved through joint programmes. The institutionalisation was 
sanctioned by the state (for which read the Central Committee of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party) and aerobics took off as a popular leisure pursuit. There was no 
need for international co-operation and approval, or for a mass demand. 
With the setting up of the state Committee for Youth Physical Education and Sport 
(CYPES) in 1992, the domain of sports policy was given a formal framework through 
the introduction of compulsory legal court registration and licensing granted by the 
state body. Every sports establishment which could satisfy these requirements was 
licenced, and entitled to state funding and participation in the national sport 
movement, subject to a specific contract. The licence and the contract however, do not 
turn automatically a sport association into a key actor on the sporting scene. These are 
simply prerequisites, or from the point of view of the state body - the CYPES - filters 
for reducing and controlling the number of entries in the field. 
7.4.1. Becoming a key member in making aerobic policy 
Currently, there are over 120 national sports governing bodies in Bulgaria, including 
54 single sports federations (NSFs) and other activity/interest associations. Added to 
this number is the group of the strongest sports clubs/societies which do not operate 
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on a national level but deliver athletes and competitive results, and consequently have 
a strong say in policy matters. The forum which is supposed to represent the interests 
of the national bodies - the Confederation of Sports Federations (CSF) is also refused 
a licence by the CYPES and so, it cannot voice legitimately their needs and demands 
to be a partner to the state in the policy bargaining process. This urges individual 
federations to pursue independent strategies in order to ensure their place at the 
decision-making table. 
In the case of the AU the most effective way to become a member in the making of 
sport policy, as the General Secretary J. Blagoeva put it, is `personally'. As an ex- 
world champion and Olympic medalist she was and is a well-known personality and 
could have easy access to people and institutions without prior legitimation. However, 
two particular strategies deserve attention here. They are examined within the 
framework of actors' individual placement in structures and networks, and AU's 
structural relations in the sport policy domain. 
As pointed out, the AU emerged as an extension of the private fitness centre Jova BG. 
In 1990 Jova BG competitors took part in the World Aerobics Championships in 
Tokyo. The success of this event further motivated leaders and sponsors to develop 
aerobics on a wider scale, and on return to Bulgaria they decided to organise the first 
national championships. At the time there were no structures or calendar, only an 
informal network of athletes/instructors and a few officials. Hiring a sports hall to 
stage the competition proved a burden, as private individuals did not have this right, 
only institutions. Consequently, the AU was registered and the formal obstacle 
eliminated. 
This move, though, posed the need to pursue two interrelated and equally 
important 
strategies - national and international - both of which would 
have guaranteed a key 
place on the sporting scene to the AU. Nationally, the AU had to cope with 
the 
policies and criteria set by the CYPES. Basically, these aim to promote elitism, and 
state subsidy is made available against results - i. e., medals and rankings achieved 
at 
international competitions. The emphasis on athletes' participation and winning 
is 
196 
Chapter 7. Case Studies: Aerobic Union and School Sports Federation 
supported by the breakdown of the AU's 1998 budget, in which 35% of the income 
comes from the CYPES, 23% from outside sources (e. g. sponsors), and only 19% 
from services to the public. Subsequently, 75% of the expenditures go on the 
international sport calendar, the second big item being rent and maintenance costs 
amounting to 11 %. 
Internationally, the AU must play an active role within the International Aerobics 
Federation (IAF), if it wants to gain organisational, promotional and financial 
privileges. After all, it is on the international stage where the AU's representatives, the 
officials and athletes, can to a great extent justify its existence nationally, to obtain 
state funding and other privileges. This applies particularly to the distribution of the 
annual Aerobics World Cup/Grand Prix tournaments by the IAF, which come with 
guaranteed international television coverage and sponsorship, meaning a significant 
boost and extra revenue for domestic aerobics. 
At national level, four important factors - political, economic, organisational and 
structural - determine the AU's strategies and success. First is the political 
environment, dominated by a strong and open anti-Communist stance (according to 
the CYPES chairman all sports societies and clubs established before 1989 are 
labelled as `incubators for Communist cadres'), and the commitment of the CYPES to 
the policy of the governing Union of Democratic Forces party (UDF). The following 
example illustrates this point: in 1996 the functioning of the Jova Sport fitness centre 
was blocked for two months by the CYPES on the grounds that the AU's main 
sponsor -Molov Bank - was alleged to have 
been `a Communist establishment for 
laundering money'. 
Second, the general hostile economic situation - big fluctuations 
in the currency 
exchange rate (until 1997, when the Bulgarian currency was tied to the 
German mark), 
unfavourable interests on loans, uncertainty of the banking system, high 
import taxes 
and rates of payment for electricity, water and heating. Maintenance 
for sport 
establishments (offices and facilities) is charged at the highest tariff, as 
for industry. In 
order to avoid the unbearable import tax on sports equipment, the 
AU's athletes 
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participating at the 1998 world championships in the USA had to carry back in their 
personal baggage equipment and apparatus provided by the International Aerobic 
Federation. The peculiarity of the domestic economic reality even forced the AU to 
pay Bulgarian Television US$ 500 for 30 minutes highlights of the National Aerobics 
Championships in 1997, in order to make the sponsorship deal for the event possible. 
Organisationally, by Charter the AU is set up as an association of individuals, but the 
representation in its General Assembly and Management Board is collective, that is, 
individual members can sit in either of these organs if delegated by a club. At present, 
there are 47 aerobic clubs across the country affiliated to the AU but fewer than half - 
18 (38%) - are licensed, that is, entitled to state subsidy, participation in tournaments 
and legitimate representation of their members' interests. In 1997 only 7 clubs based 
in four big cities - Sofia (3), Plovdiv (2), Varna (1) and Haskovo (1) received state 
subsidy amounting to 667,111 Lv (DM700), 78% of which was awarded for 
international achievements. The rest of the clubs did not satisfy the CYPES criteria for 
resource allocation, and received nothing. The early development of the Aerobic 
Union outlined above points towards a restricted geography and an unviable network 
of grass-roots clubs, which must impact on its strategies. 
The structural relations of the AU involve transmitting information, exchanging 
resources, and boundary penetration. There are several essential formal and informal 
channels through which the AU transmits information. These include the CYPES 
circulars, regulations and letters as well as reports and questionnaires from the Union; 
circulars, letters, reports and minutes to/from the BGF, the CSF, the Bulgarian 
Olympic Committee (BOC), clubs and the IAF. These formal channels ensure the 
day-to-day operation of the Union and are complemented by some informal but no 
less important ones, such as lobbying, developing a network of private business 
contacts and patronage. Examples for networking and patronage are the activities of 
the President of the AU - Agnesa Ilieva, President of the Doverie 
(Trust) Privatisation 
Fund, which creates links with business partners and introduces them to the 
opportunities offered by the Union for sponsorship and other business deals. Another 
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is the help from business people who are members of Jova Sport in photocopying, 
shipping, or internet services in exchange for free access to the Centre. 
With regard to the exchange of material resources there are three key sources - the 
CYPES, the IAF and local sponsors. Despite the criteria for funding allocations 
established by the CYPES, it is still possible for the AU (as for any other federation) 
to receive more than what has been planned because the final decision for distribution 
is taken by the Ministry of Finance (MF) after discussion, and is subject to 
negotiation. This can be achieved if the Union manages to persuade the CYPES' vice- 
chairman P. Krastev dealing with the budget to clinch a deal at the final round with 
the MF Commission, and as he himself admitted this had happened on a number of 
occasions (interview, 31 August 1998). 
Another significant source of income (exchange of resource) is the IAF, which 
allocates resources in the form of direct or in kind support to national associations. 
This applies particularly to television rights and sponsorship money for organising 
major tournaments and workshops. Local sponsors are also important, as they 
contribute 23% of the 1998 AU budget. Nutrasweet, for example, provided $6,000 
cash, while the UFA advertising agency paid for participation in the 1998 World Cup 
tournament in the USA. In return, the AU offers high quality national and 
international publicity and business opportunities to the sponsors through well run 
events and by winning European and world titles. 
The third element of structural relations - boundary penetration - deserves more 
attention as it may determine the outcome of the previous two exchanges. It involves 
the personal positioning of the AU's officials in the network of national decision- 
making bodies, and relationships with other agencies. The driving force of the AU, 
its 
Secretary General, holds key positions in four bodies responsible for shaping national 
sports policy. Mrs Blagoeva is founder and director of Jova Sport, the most 
important 
structural element of the AU. She sits also on the Executive Boards of the 
Confederation of Sports Federations, the Bulgarian Olympic Committee and 
the 
International Aerobics Federation, and has direct access to first-hand information and 
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the decision-making process. As Secretary General of the Union she enjoys an almost 
unchallenged privilege to define the agenda of the Executive Board meetings, thus 
setting priorities and alliances and influencing decisions. It has to be noted, though, 
that any member or club of the Union is entitled to make proposals for the agenda, but 
it is the Secretary General who decides on the timing and format of their inclusion. 
Structurally, the Aerobic Union shares a unique position with another key actor on the 
national stage - the Bulgarian Gymnastics Federation (BGF). Ideally, the two bodies 
should have been perceived as partners, not as opponents. This however, is not the 
case and although the AU is autonomous and licenced by CYPES, the tensions and 
complex relationships between the International Gymnastics Federation (IGF) and the 
International Aerobics Federation (IAF) have had repercussions on the relationships 
between their national counterparts. Despite an agreement for co-operation signed by 
these international organisations in July 1997, in the Bulgarian case, the BGF 
demonstrated complete disregard towards the AU as it did not pass important 
information and correspondence (sent to the BGF by the IGF but concerning aerobics) 
regarding rules amendments, seminars, invitations for workshops and competitions 
and other matters, thus seriously undermining the scope of operation of the AU. It 
appeared that, the leadership of the BGF is dominated currently by academics from 
the National Sports Academy (NSA): the Chairman and some key officials are staff of 
the Department of Gymnastics and they pass correspondence and vital information to 
the aerobics club NSA, instead of the AU. This state of affairs has become known to 
the IAF, the CYPES and the BOC, which independently, in special letters to the BGF 
Chairman, insisted that he should settle the issue, and respect both international 
agreements and national legislation (letters 444 of 25/5/98 from CYPES, and of 
21/5/98 from BOC). This example is indicative for the structural environment and 
policies which influence the behaviour and strategies of the AU. 
7.4.2. Forming aerobic policy 
This section looks at the policy process by examining two particular strategies put 
forward by the Aerobic Union. The first, participation in the 1999 World Cup 
in 
Tokyo, concerns the main priority of the Union - the preparation of elite athletes and 
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their performances. This tournament is of crucial importance to the AU for two 
reasons: it enables it's competitors to win medals and ensure ranking, vital for 
meeting plan targets that guarantee state subsidy; also it is entered in this event that 
the IAF Executive Board's decides who will host the 2000 AD Grand Prix 
tournament, and Sofia was one of the favourite candidates. Clearly, participation will 
be a test for officials and athletes, and its outcomes will have serious implications for 
the future of the AU. 
The second strategy deals with setting up children's aerobics schools, initially for a 
period of three years but with prospects for expansion. The basic aim of these schools 
is to serve as places for talent identification and preparation of athletes for the national 
team. In addition, their design should enable children to fill their leisure time with 
fascinating activities by doing aerobics and rehabilitation exercises, learning foreign 
languages and socialising (AUB, 1997). The first stage of this project envisages 
establishing schools, each with 26 groups and 150 children aged 8 to 14 years, across 
the country. As these schools are expected to be self-financing, no major investments 
are projected on behalf of the AU. It has to be pointed out, though, that the formal 
decision was made in 1997 the project is still in a embryo, with the problems far 
exceeding the solutions. 
With respect to the process of the AU's policy-making, it can be argued that it is the 
very nature of its structural and strategic relationships which dictate the recognition of 
a problem in the first place. It is the Executive Board which formally defines the 
strategy and then the officials responsible generate choices for its implementation. 
Given the main aims and objectives of the Union, criteria for gauging 
its 
effectiveness, and the structure of its revenues, participation in the Tokyo 1999 
World 
Cup is an inevitable priority. Moreover, it will be an essential part of the efforts to 
raise the $90,000 cash needed for the AU to cover its 1999 international calendar. 
This represents 83% of the Union's budget compared to 17% ($18,000) required 
for 
the rest of its activities. 
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It is interesting to note that, in the face of this daunting task, the chosen solution did 
not include co-operating with the omnipotent state body and the local authority. Quite 
the opposite: the AU addressed the CYPES and Sofia City Council with a clear 
statement categorically disengaging them from any financial commitment (in 
principle, and in staging the 1999 Grand Prix in Sofia in particular), but asking for an 
understanding in leaving the Union in the premises it currently occupies, and not 
changing the terms of rental. Similar is the situation with the second strategy - of 
setting up children's aerobics schools. There are no planned actions, joint programmes 
or special budgets in the 1999 plan for implementing them. 
More peculiar seems the use of these strategies by the AU not for an immediate gain, 
but for constructing an argument aimed at committing the state closely to what it 
plans. Mrs Blagoeva claimed that: 
since the elite performance is at the top of the state (CYPES) priorities, it 
will do a huge justice to the whole sport movement if all Secretaries 
General of sport associations are paid by the state. More measures are 
needed for keeping qualified experts in the country as at present, in 
gymnastics alone (where most of the aerobics instructors are recruited 
from) 57 experienced coaches work in the USA. Sponsors also have to 
receive incentives from the state (interview, 5 August 1998). 
This kind of thinking portrays the AU as an extension of state policy and not as an 
independent body capable of setting its own agenda and pressuring the state to co- 
operate and facilitate it. 
7.5. Conclusions 
Although the emergence of the Aerobic Union can be attributed to the particular 
conjunctures of the transitional period, it capitalised successfully on the achievements 
of its predecessor - the National Aerobics Commission - as 
it did not have to pursue 
strategies for legitimation, but that ensured no continuity either. Instead, by promoting 
predominantly strategies of elitism, the AU shifted drastically the image of aerobics 
from a mass to an elite and entertaining activity but one still attractive for the general 
public. It also changed its strategic orientation from a mass to an exclusive provider. 
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The make up, geography and structural relationships of the AU with intra-state and 
transnational actors have crucial impacts on the process of policy formulation and the 
pursuit of specific strategies. Nationally, the relations with the CYPES which set the 
standards for performance, evaluation and resource allocation were critical. Relations 
with voluntary bodies (BOC, CNSF) were also important, but the most essential one, 
with the Gymnastics Federation was marked by tension and lack of co-operation. 
Central (AU) - local (sports clubs) relations did not have great impact on policy 
formulation. Personal relations appeared crucial giving access to information, 
resources, and decision-making bodies. Transnational relations proved also vital as 
they ensured access to major international events and sponsors. 
Problem recognition, generating choices for solution, placing the problems on the 
decision-making body's agenda and making authoritarian decisions appear to be more 
under the firm control of the Union executives, and less from its collective organs. 
This poses an issue about the importance of individual actors' positions in the policy 
network and diminishes the role of the agency per se as representing its members' 
voices. The implications of such a scenario are threefold: (i) encouraging the pursuit 
of strategies with a very narrow and short term focus, (ii) preventing the Union 
addressing the key issue of the relationships between the state and the voluntary sector 
in sport, and (iii) perpetuating the leading role of the Bulgarian state as the supreme 
regulator of sport. 
The final observation concerns the relationships between the newly emerging private 
and voluntary sectors in sport. It appeared that the present political and economic 
environments do not stimulate private initiatives by offering structural privileges. The 
voluntary (civil) sector has better chances to promote its cause and to play a role 
in the 
making of aerobics policy. 
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7.6. The Case of the National School Sports Federation - Setting the 
scene 
The unfolding of the of the National School Sports Federation's (SSF) case will 
follow the same logic of analysis as for the Aerobic Union. Thus, in order to examine 
the SSF's strategic relations and coping strategies, it is necessary to provide 
background information. School sport was undoubtedly the first clearly identified area 
of state intervention in setting policies in the field of sport dating back to the early 
1880s. Since then, with no exceptions, every state and sport administration has 
expressed concern about pupils' health and fitness, and has tried to promote different 
strategies to tackle these issues. 
Historically, school sport has always been within the remit of the Ministry of 
Education (ME), assisted during different periods by voluntary (quasi-voluntary), 
public and private agencies. However, due to the Ministry's organisational structure, 
which does not contain specialised local bodies (usually only Physical Education 
experts at district level), the credit for providing services to this group has often been 
given to the front line partner agencies working in/with schools and students. This 
specificity, together with society's sensitivity about students' well-being, helped to 
legitimise both national associations and local sport clubs operating in this area. 
In a similar way to the Aerobic Union, the SSF emerged as one of the new voluntary 
agencies after the politico-economic crisis in 1989. In 1992 the Sport for All 
department of the BSFS responsible for delivering out-of-school sport activities 
ceased to exist, causing serious disturbances in the provision of school sport for more 
than a year. This transformation affected all 4,012 schools and 1,212,000 pupils aged 
7-19 in the country. 
Before 1989 there were 585 centres (outside schools) for child and adolescent sport, 
aiming to identify talent at an early age and to nurture the elite sport system. In 
addition, there were more than 1,000 school sport sections, responsible for the regular 
participation of 50% of all school age boys and girls. The target for involvement set 
by the BSFS in 1982 envisaged to increase this to 65-70% by 1988. According to 
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official statistics for the same year, nearly 70% of the pupils have reached the 
standards for basic physical fitness of the National Fitness Complex (BSFS, 1982). 
Issues concerning pupils' health and fitness have been regularly placed on the agenda 
of various responsible national agencies, including the Ministries of Health (MH), 
Education (ME) and Defence (MD), youth organisations (Branik and Youth 
Communist League), and sport unions. A voluminous body of programmes and 
initiatives promoting different strategies have been produced as well. It has to be 
noted, though, that despite variations in ideological rationale, all major national 
programmes have tried to place school sport within a broader concept, like enhancing 
pupils' patriotism, obedience to the motherland, military preparation, good 
citizenship, or health and fitness. School sport, therefore, has been seen by different 
strategies rather as an instrument for achieving external objectives than as means of 
the self-expression, development and fulfilment of individual youngsters. 
7.7. The National School Sports Federation 
The National School Sports Federation (SSF) was created on 15th January 1993 as an 
independent non-profit voluntary organisation based in Sofia. Its mission is to 
preserve and continue the traditions of school sport, and to create conditions for 
pupils' involvement in sport by establishing a working partnership between the state 
(CYPES, ME, MH, and MD) and voluntary agencies (the BSFS, the BOC, the Sport 
for All Association-SfAA), school authorities, parents, pupils and experts. In this 
respect, the emergence of the SSF can be considered both as an extension of the 
efforts of previous administrations, and as an attempt to ascribe a leading and co- 
ordinating role to a voluntary body for matters concerning the state's social policy. 
More specifically, the SSF's main concern from the outset was the organisation of the 
National School Sports Games (NSSG), which had ceased to exist between 1988 and 
1993. The idea of these Games is to encourage as many pupils as possible to get 
involved in regular competitive activities and to provide a forum for schools' teams to 
perform in regional, national and international competitions. The SSF's headquarters 
shares a small office with the editor-in-chief of the Sport & -Science 
Journal in the 
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premises of the CYPES. As it has no access to a telephone and very limited use of fax 
(because of the CYPES' terms for rent), the day-to-day operations are carried out with 
great difficulties, which lessens their efficiency. 
The membership in the SSF is collective, and any school sports club can become a 
member. There are about 135 member clubs at present but as no membership fee or 
any other form of feedback is required, the actual number of affiliated clubs and their 
profiles remains an estimate. The School Sports Federation has never had a budget as 
such. All the cash received is provided purposefully for organising the NSSG, and 
only a small contribution, equal to one and a half months minimal salary is set aside to 
pay for the Executive Director's job, and for the bare minimum of stationary and 
postage. The organisational structure of the SSF (Figure 7.2) is almost identical to 
that of the Bulgarian Aerobic Union. 
Figure 7.2. National School Sports Federation - organisational structure 
From a management perspective this structure involves one strategic decision-making 
body (the General Assembly) and three executive organs accountable to it. The 
General Assembly gathers once every two years to discuss long and medium term 
policies, but the real driving force is the Management Board. By constitution 
it must 
have at least six meetings a year. The Board consists of thirteen members - seven 
school teachers, two experts, two directors of sports schools, one director of a school 
(as chairman), one academic, and the executive director - the only paid staff of 
the 
Federation. It's concern is to implement short and medium term strategies as well as 
to develop long term policies. Its composition appears to be strictly expert, as no 
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people from other areas are included, which poses questions about SSF's proclaimed 
aims for wider co-operation and partnership. President of the SSF from its creation is 
Mr. Stoyan Tonchev, director of a High School in Sofia. 
7.8. The school sports policy as a social construct and public domain 
From a state perspective, sport has always been thought of as a major contributing 
factor for building young people's character, their military training and obedience as 
citizens, or as a means of enhancing health and preventing delinquent behaviour. 
These underlying assumptions have served to construct an area of public concern of 
great priority, and to legitimise the agencies dealing with the issues. With regard to 
school sport, or more specifically the curricular activities, though the only agency 
authorised to deliver them has been the Ministry of Education. Thus, other 
organisations providing sport services could only do so in out-of-school programmes, 
but these still have to be sanctioned by the ME, particularly if they involve large 
populations on a regular basis, and the use of school premises. This suggests that 
legitimation for non-state organisations on the school sports scene can be successfully 
achieved only if approved by the state agency. At the same time the state agencies, 
due to limited human and material resources, need voluntary bodies and their grass- 
root structures as direct providers of physical activities. Thus, the co-operation 
between different actors' interests is embedded and presupposed. 
At present, the provision of sport for school children is viewed by the Council of 
Ministers' conception for a system of physical education and sport in Bulgaria 
(CYPES, 1996) as part of the overall physical, intellectual and emotional development 
of individuals. More specifically, sport is expected to contribute to improving young 
people's fitness and opportunities for realisation in life; to serve as a basic factor for 
recruiting talented children, and preventing youngsters from committing crime and 
other offences, as well as offering normative regulation concerning physical abilities 
of young recruits for military service, as set out by the Ministry of Defence. 
This 
detailed and instrumental vision of sport demanded very little improvisation on 
behalf 
of the SSF in order to comply and legitimise itself. 
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Here, of course, the long tradition of collaboration between the ME and the BSFS 
(between 1957 and 1989), comes into play ensuring continuity in terms of strategic 
objectives, resources and staff. The people who now run the affairs of school sport 
both in the ME and the SSF are pretty much the same ones who used to do it ten or 
fifteen years ago. Finally, the process of defining school sport as a public domain was 
put in the framework of a licencing and contractual scheme by the CYPES (Contract 
No 024,27/3/98), binding the SSF to receive state funding against particular services, 
as is now common in the OECD states in government agency relations. The next 
sections will look at the struggle of the SSF to be a key player in school sport policy 
domain, and the strategies it is trying to pursue. 
7.9. Becoming a key member in the making of sport policy 
The School Sports Federation emerged on a much contested terrain, having to 
compete in asserting its structural and subject position: structurally, alongside 54 
national sport federations and several dozens associations, all claiming responsibility 
and targeting the school age group in their activities. In an attempt to secure a place on 
the policy scene and legitimise itself, the obvious strategy for the SSF was to 
capitalise on the traditions and promises of continuity, and to adopt a complex co- 
ordinated approach to school sport, a responsibility which no other body could have 
assumed. Of course, of crucial importance was the partnership with the Ministry of 
Education, as well as with the CYPES and other sport organisations. 
Two other significant steps in cementing the SSF's role on the national sporting scene 
were: to take membership first of the National Council for Physical Education, Sport 
and Tourism (NCPEST) under the chairmanship of the Minister of Education, and 
second of the International School Sport Federation (ISF), ensuring its position as the 
only legitimate representative of school sport nationally and internationally. 
Furthermore, the SSF was affiliated to the BOC, and was a founding member of the 
Sport for All Association. Within a relatively short time, these developments helped to 
shape its profile as a unique co-ordinating body for out-of-school sport, and 
"as a 
structure which assists the ME for practical realisation of out-of-class sport 
activities " (SSF Annual Report, 1993/4: 6). 
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The strategies pursued by the SSF are largely determined by a number of political, 
economic, organisational and structural factors. Politically, the SSF is treated by the 
licensing body - the CYPES - within a dichotomy of a totalitarian (Communist)- 
democratic organisation. As the Chairman of the Federation did not have a sporting 
past, in the spotlight of ideological scrutiny is its executive director, who had had a 
long career in the Youth Communist League and BSFS sport departments (both 
considered by the CYPES as pillars of the totalitarian system). The working 
relationships between the CYPES and the SSF to a great extent depend on loyalty to 
and support for the state policy promoted by the former, and would not tolerate any 
form of contestation by the latter. This situation, coupled with the philosophy cited 
above, automatically presented the SSF as an extension of the state agency and 
jeopardised its autonomy. 
From an economic perspective, the SSF, despite its market potential, also experiences 
the backlash of the volatile financial and banking system, in addition to the hostile 
commercial sponsorship environment, contributing to its total financial dependence on 
the state. Unlike the Aerobic Union, the SSF could not benefit from lucrative 
commercial deals, such as sponsorship or television rights money. The overall cash 
burden is eased, however, by occasional successful local sponsorship deals, which 
make the grass-roots school sport calendar happen. 
Organ isationally, as its constitution suggests, it is an umbrella governing body set up 
to represent its members' interests. With some 135 affiliated school sport clubs at 
present, accounting for only 2.5% of schools and 3.3% of pupils in the country, it is 
difficult to substantiate SSF's major claims. Although the National School Sports 
Games (NSSG) with their three-tiered structure of competition (local, regional and 
national) aimed to involve as many pupils as possible in regular activities, the scope 
of sports on offer is confined to eight traditional sports - athletics, basketball, 
handball, volleyball, football, tennis, chess and badminton. In the 1995 
Games 
aerobics, wrestling and chess were also included but the Management Board 
decided 
to drop them from the programme in future, due to the lack of interest (though 
it 
might be said to be naive to have expected full-scale response in a single year). 
Thus, 
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it appears that the SSF caters for some 2,000 athletes aged 11 to 18 (1,200 competing 
at regional and 812 at national level). Other sports such as skate boarding, roller 
blading, martial arts, mountain biking or body building which have become part of 
youth culture and recently have enjoyed great popularity have not been considered in 
the SSF-ME development plans. 
The fourth factor determining the SSF's strategies is its structural relations in 
transmission information, exchanging resources and boundary penetration. For 
running the SSF's affairs on a daily basis, the most essential are the formal and 
informal two-way channels with the CYPES and the ME. These include circulars, 
regulations, letters, reports, contracts and questionnaires, as well as personal contacts. 
It has to be noted that on a personal level, there is a truly professional and tolerant 
relationship established between the CYPES', ME's and SSF's key officials. Other 
sources for transmission involve sports clubs (SSG rules and regulations and letters - 
downward and upward), National Sport Federations (letters and meetings - 
horizontal), and the ISF (letters, reports, applications-upward and downward). The 
SSF has no or very little communications with its clubs. Virtually all messages to the 
grassroots were transmitted by the ME, which is indicative for the degree of 
penetration into a government agency but also, for the lack of such penetration in its 
own structures and resources. 
With regard to exchanging material resources, there are the same two crucial sources - 
the CYPES and the ME. As pointed out, the SSF does not have any assets and is fully 
subsidised by these two state agencies. 50% (13,000,000 Lv) of the SSF's 1998 total 
revenue and 100% ($5,350) of its budget for international competitions/meetings 
(including the $750 ISF membership fee) is provided specifically by the CYPES; 38% 
come from the ME, 10% from the Football Union for the final round of SSG, and a 
negligible 2% from other sources (basically from interest). On the expenditure side, 
92% (24,000,000 Lv) of the budget is spent for organising the School Sport Games 
finals, and 8% to pay for the administrative costs of the Federation (SSF, 1998). The 
1998 financial situation just replicates the picture established from the onset of the 
SSF in 1993. 
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The ISF does not provide any financial or in kind support for its members. Instead, in 
1994, after having complied with all requirements for participation in the World 
Schools Volleyball championships in France, including investments for preparation 
and travel arrangements, the ISF permitted the host country's decision at the last 
minute to refuse Bulgaria's SSF (and other countries) teams' participation due to the 
limited capacity of the tournament. 
Structural relations' third element, that of boundary penetration, reveals the degree of 
dependence and the ability of SSF to position itself on the national sports policy 
scene. From a structural point of view, regardless of its claims for co-operation and 
partnership with other agencies, the SSF seems to be a rather introverted organisation, 
as no representatives from any public, voluntary or private agency sit on its governing 
body. The only exception is an independent academic on the Management Board. The 
SSF, though, is a collective member of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee, the Sport 
for All Association and NCPEST. Lately, there has been a growing disagreement with 
the SfAA's policy and authoritarian leadership, and effectively, the SSF is not an 
active member any longer. As SSF could not be a factor in implementing the national 
Olympic programme, its links with the BOC are based on an ad hoc partnership in 
running one or two Sport for All events annually (e. g. The Olympic Day Run), 
subsidised by the International Olympic Committee. There is also no real co-operation 
with another important agency - the National Centre for Children - which provides a 
vast range of services and programmes, including sport and tourism, and has 
structures in all district centres. 
For the SSF, the most important relationship is with the NCPEST chaired by the 
Minister of Education. This is a consultative body aiming to drawing policy 
guidelines and standards for in-and-out-of-school physical education, sport and 
tourism, to be later transmitted in practical policies by the Ministry of Education and 
co-operating agencies. This is the highest forum where the SSF can raise strategic 
issues and seek solutions, though as the next section will demonstrate, what 
has been 
put on the agenda so far suggests that these issues would have fitted 
better a trades 
union portfolio, than that of a voluntary sport organisation's profile. 
Nevertheless, this 
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membership guarantees SSF a legitimate position in the sport policy making process 
and an opportunity to voice its concerns as well as form alliances and promote 
strategies. 
International relations are not as vital as domestic ones for the SSF compared to the 
BAU, despite a clear consciousness that the former could promote a positive image 
both at home and abroad. The Federation is a full member of the ISF, and took part in 
its 1998 General Assembly in China. In addition, one representative sits on the ISF's 
basketball technical commission, and there is a trend for increased participation of 
school teams in international competitions. Although being recognised by the IOC and 
with potential for growth, the ISF remains within a limited scope of operations and 
financial power, so it could not be yet a decisive force in dictating national school 
sport policies. 
7.10. Forming school sports policy 
This section examines the formation of school sport policy by using strategies 
promoted through the School Sport Federation's programme for 1998-2000. The aim 
of this programme is to unite the efforts of all interested parties in "creating 
conditions for harmonic physical development of the students, for enhancing their 
physical fitness, developing physical qualities, skills and habits for realisation in life" 
(SSF, 1998a: 2). The objectives include promoting school sport, setting up grass-root 
structures, effective use of sports facilities, and integration with the ISF. 
In order to achieve its programme's aims and objectives, the SSF is pursuing three 
distinct strategies. These strategies, as well as the agenda of the Management Board 
(MB), are largely determined by the Executive Director, Miss Radka Valkova, who 
exercises almost unchallenged freedom over policy orientation. As she admitted "the 
General Assembly is a pro forma body and it is all down to my and the Chairman's 
understanding and enthusiasm " (interview, 10 September 1998). Thus, her attitudes, 
professional qualities and interests become a strategic resource. For example, nothing 
in the 1998 MB six meetings' agendas pointed towards a discussion and search 
for 
long term solutions on crucial strategic issues. The 16 items (roughly 3 per meeting) 
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included for consideration were almost identical and revolved around technicalities 
about the School Sport Games. No policy document was planned for development and 
pursuit, or for evaluation or adjustment of the 1998-2000 programme. 
For the first strategy, the SSF uses its position in the NCPEST to place on the agenda 
several strategic issues concerning pupils' physical education assessments, teachers' 
and pupils' insurance, and physical education teachers' job specifications. Clearly, 
these are all of significance for successfully implementing school sport policies, but 
have very little to do with the responsibility of SSF as a voluntary body, and its 
mission to support pupils' and clubs' participation. The Ministry of Education's 
position on these matters is rather ambivalent. It heavily supports the SSG, but is 
reluctant to demand greater involvement by physical education teachers in out-of- 
school activities as no cash or other incentives are in place. The SSG does not have 
control over communications with schools, and is in the dark about how they are 
notified regarding invitations to the Games, and rules and regulations. Furthermore, 
as the school sports clubs are not licenced by the CYPES, they do not qualify for 
subsidy from the national totalizer, yet another issue the SSF will try to address. The 
lack of effective leverage for influencing policy orientation could have easily turned 
SSF's claims into populist statements, and poses a big question mark over this 
strategy, and demands its re-evaluation. 
The second strategy pursued by the SSF concerns the organisation of the School Sport 
Games and the struggle to ensure the best level of support from the CYPES. This is 
secured by a means of an annual contract with the state like those for the voluntary 
agencies, an approach considered by the former as democratic and professional. The 
1998 contract consists of a single clause binding the SSF to organise the final stage of 
the SSG and to present a financial report in return for a state subsidy amounting to 
22,000,000 Lv (DM 22,000). It is not a subject of discussion and negotiation, rather a 
case of `use it, or you lose it'. Similarly to the first strategy, the SSF does not 
have 
effective ways to intervene with the state agency, and will gladly accept any 
contribution. 
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The third strategy is also aimed at promoting SSG, but through the integrated efforts 
of two national voluntary agencies, a local authority, and commercial sponsors. The 
finals of the football tournament for 11-15 year olds became a crossing point of 
different interests. The SSF was aided greatly by the Bulgarian Football Union (BFU), 
the city council of Elin Pelin, two local businesses - the `Izida' and `Shamot' 
factories, and the `Phenomenon' publishing house. The event was attended by the 
president of the country, by politicians and by football celebrities. It turned into a 
massive local festival, and paved the way for a model of a successful partnership to be 
replicated elsewhere. In this case the alliance was formed on the principle `national 
product-local delivery', that is, the national agencies had the product (football finals) 
but lacked the delivery system, and managed to capitalise on the local demand for 
exposure and promotion of the city. The most powerful voluntary sport governing 
body, the BFU (which does not get a single penny from the state), and the heavy 
financially dependent SSF teamed up alongside a local authority and commercial 
businesses for mutual benefits. 
7.11. Conclusions 
For the six years of its existence, the School Sports Federation has established itself as 
a credible body capable of running out-of-school activities on a national scale. The 
Federation's profile, however, is not clearly voluntary because of its political and 
financial dependence on the state. This subordinate position cannot be read simply as 
a new form of corporatism, as according to its classical definition, the participating 
parties do have say in policy formulation and their identity is preserved, while still co- 
operating with the state for mutual benefits. These considerations 
have determined to 
a great extent the behaviour and strategies pursued by the SSF. 
Another contributing 
factor is the massive gap between the SSF's proclaimed mission and 
its practical 
policies. The latter are rather a mixture of general political aims 
(enhancing pupil's 
well-being), instrumental objectives (assisting the ME), trade unions' 
demands 
(improving physical educators' status), and needs serving 
(assisting school sport 
clubs). Together, these factors define the main strategies pursued 
by the SSF as short 
term ones. 
214 
Chapter 7. Case Studies: Aerobic Union and School Sports Federation 
Vital for the SSF are the intra-state relations, and specifically with two state agencies - 
the CYPES and the ME as they provided the contractual framework determining its 
activities and 100% of resources. Regular organisational relations with voluntary 
sports governing bodies (sports federations) on national level were also essential, but 
no links were established with private agencies. Loosely defined relations with local 
structures (sports clubs) did not have impact on shaping SSF's policy, in terms of 
promoting issues on the agenda, and holding the Federation accountable. Personal 
(good professional) relations between SSF and state agencies' officials proved 
important for running school sport's affairs on daily basis. Transnational relations had 
no serious effect on forming school sports policy, but served to legitimise SSF 
domestically and internationally. 
With regard to resource mobilisation, the crucial criteria appear to have been the state 
managers' ideological commitment and their interpretation of the strategic aims that 
the SSF should promote. Furthermore, the SSF lacks a well-developed social base -a 
clubs network and management structure - which could have guaranteed the 
independence and the success of its strategies. As result of the combined effect of a 
whole range of influences, the SSF is implementing strategies portraying it as an 
extension of state policy, (a CYPES department) not as a watch-dog representing the 
interests of its members. This strategy of complying with the state's visions has been 
successful nonetheless, because so far it has guaranteed secure access to state 
resources and limited privileges at no cost. 
7.12. Strategic Relations and policy making - summing up the lessons 
from the two cases 
The analysis of the strategic relations in the two cases discussed in this chapter -the 
Aerobic Union Bulgaria (AU) and School Sports Federation (SSF) - allows several 
conclusions to be drawn. Both bodies emerged as result of recent transformations 
in 
Bulgarian society in order to operate in an area of public concern dominated 
by the 
state, and successfully capitalised on the experiences of their predecessors. 
The 
process of legitimising the AU and the SSF followed two different paths - of 
continuity, in the case of SSF, and of discontinuity in the case of AU. The two 
lines of 
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development, however, led to a general shift of focus of these agencies, from a mass 
to an elite orientation, which has had an impetus on their strategies. 
Five key reasons explain the line of continuity in the domain of school sport: 
" the historically prominent presence of the Ministry of Education during all 
three periods; 
" pupils' health and fitness was always an issue of great public concern; 
" school sport had never been seen as a product for sale and profit, but rather 
as a territory with a firm state commitment; 
" school sports structures and participants, and their control are in the remit 
of the Ministry of Education; 
" the SSF is another non-profit making contractual partner to the Ministry of 
Education (previously BSFS) for delivering particular services. 
Five reasons help us to comprehend the line of discontinuity in the domain of 
aerobics: 
" the lack of centralised state support, structures and control (notably in the 
case of the BSFS's backed Aerobics Commission); 
" participation in aerobics is a matter of choice and not a compulsory element 
of school or adult education curricula; 
" aerobics is offered as a product for sale, and its provision is organised as a 
profitable service, or at least on a self-supporting base; 
" the state has no commitments to make provision even, when it benefits 
from the international success; 
" linking up private interests with a voluntary body's role in a straightforward 
manner was not possible in the two previous periods. 
The existence and effectiveness of both organisations largely depended on the policies 
and standards set by the state. The state clearly offered certain structural and 
financial 
privileges within the ideological framework of a new democratic policy, 
in return for 
gaining much-needed social support, but also at the cost of giving up organisational 
independence. Compliance with the state's prescribed rules and norms would 
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guarantee access to resources and key actors, while failure to do so would result in 
exclusion from the policy domain. 
In its attempt to regulate the sport policy scene, the Bulgarian state acts selectively by 
granting privileges to voluntary and depriving private actors. There are virtually no 
private providers of aerobics and school sport, with very limited sponsorship in the 
latter, mainly in the form of patronage on local and national levels. The structural and 
financial benefits offered by the state affect severely the grass-root structures of the 
two organisations. Due to the elitist criteria for performance and evaluation, their 
clubs receive no financial or other support, which in turn limits their organisational 
capacity and prevents them from becoming active members of the policy-making 
domain. Subsequently, this shapes the relations between central and local, that is, 
SSF, AU and sports clubs in a `top-to-bottom' manner, and presents the two national 
agencies as driven by key individuals' interests and visions, and not as transparent, 
responsive and accountable to their members. 
The AU and the SSF's structural relations included (i) transmission of information, 
(ii) resources transactions, and (iii) boundary penetration. With regard to transmission 
of information, there appeared to be three crucial channels - with CYPES, the ME (in 
the case of SSF) and with the IAF (in the case of AU), highlighting the significance of 
state and international agencies. The transaction of resources involved chiefly the 
same agencies - the CYPES, ME and IAF, and commercial sponsorship 
in the case of 
the AU. As for boundary penetration, the two governing structures displayed 
themselves as rather introverted bodies, because virtually no outsiders sat on the 
executive organ of either. The managers of these bodies, though, were well positioned 
in the domain and had access to the executive boards of other organisations and to the 
decision making process. 
In an environment shaped by an authoritative state's ideology and norms, with 
ill- 
organised voluntary bodies lacking mass local support, individual agents and 
managers emerge as the most valuable asset of these organisations. 
They play a vital 
role in directing national sport governing bodies' policy, and in 
forming strategic 
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alliances. Personal accounts and practices of the AU's and SSF's key officials, as well 
as of the vice-chairman of the CYPES state agency revealed the importance of their 
positioning on the national and international sport scene, and of their personal 
interests and visions in pursuing different strategies. 
However, it is not only the state which is selective. The two voluntary organisations 
displayed great similarities in their selectiveness as well. No serious attempts have 
been made so far to press ahead these strategies aimed at developing a solid social 
base -a national network of clubs, serving as a guarantee for being able to pursue less 
state dependent policies, in creating a clear market or a membership orientation 
through introducing of new attractive sports (SSF) or services (AU). It appeared that 
in a self-perpetuated, elitist organisation it is safer to adopt a practical orientation by 
following state established standards and benchmarks instead of displaying a degree 
of discontent by struggling to promote the blurred interests of the large fluid group of 
its members. 
Finally, both the AU and the SSF have displayed different degrees of dependence and 
relationships with their respective international governing bodies, but these only have 
confirmed the significance of global interconnectedness. The case of the AU asserted 
that strategies pursued through the IAF can guarantee vital structural and financial 
privileges equal or exceeding those offered by the national state. This cements the 
organisation's position both nationally and internationally, and lessens its dependence 
on the state. The School Sport Federation's links with the ISF are less binding, but 
nonetheless occupy a central place in its international strategy because 100% of the 
Federation's international budget is spent on taking part in ISF events. It can be 
concluded then, that the more spectator - and market-driven an 
international sport 
governing body is, the greater its influence over member countries' strategies, 
regardless of a state dominated environment and these bodies' 
lack of similar 
orientation. 
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Chapter 8. Globalisation and Sport Policy Making 
This chapter sets out to investigate the transnational linkages and responses to global 
circumstances in sport policy making of state and core sports actors. As will be 
revealed, interests, power and strategic relations in both the global and sport orders are 
not fixed, but are ever changing, particularly in a country undergoing such 
transformations as Bulgaria. The chapter will pursue the following specific objectives: 
i) Examining the changing state's position and interconnectedness in the post- 
communist transition; 
ii) Analysing the state's responses to globalisation and their implications for 
sport policy; 
iii) Investigating strategic relations in the global - national sport nexus. 
8.1. The State and global interconnectedness 
From a global perspective, it is important to analyse the democratic period of sport 
policy making for two reasons. First, as previous chapters have demonstrated, the 
state's social and economic policy was heavily dependent on other nations' interests 
and policies. The recent transformations challenged these strategic relations and set a 
new environment which, contrary to the old `socialist community', involved more 
interconnectedness and no single centre of power and supreme interests. This 
situation, which is also referred to as the `post-Cold War' global order, raised several 
concerns regarding the protection of Bulgaria's territorial and economic integrity and 
its political independence. 
The events of 1989 did not pose any immediate threat to Bulgaria's territory, but the 
disintegration of neighbouring Yugoslavia certainly provoked opportunities for re- 
opening the Macedonian issue, including negotiations for its partition between its 
neighbours. This opportunity, however, was categorically ruled out by all. Thus, 
Bulgaria was the first to recognise the four former Yugoslav republics - Macedonia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 January 1992) - even before the 
population of these countries voted for separation from Yugoslavia. Bulgaria's 
president Zhelev (1998: 159) also successfully lobbied his Turkish counterpart 
Demirel, who promised support, and in the beginning of February the same year 
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Turkey recognised Macedonia. This was an important step for strengthening state 
relations in the Balkans. 
Another internationally co-ordinated action - NATO's current (1999) military 
intervention in Yugoslavia - confronted Bulgaria with an uneasy choice. Following a 
formal demand from NATO's Secretary General, Solana, in October 1998, Bulgaria 
agreed in principle to offer its air space for the pact's planes in exchange of guarantees 
of security of its national territory and sovereignty. According to the state's political 
strategy, Bulgaria's security is viewed first as part of a stable Balkans, second as part 
of a unified Europe, and third in a global context. As will be shown, similar priorities 
are being promoted in sport policy, and relations between sports organisations of the 
Balkan countries are being used as an important means in that respect. A novelty 
urged by the global circumstance is that, for the first time in country's recent history, 
the symbolic meaning of the national territory was extended to include the idea of 
Bulgaria as a moral and material bulwark of Bulgarians around the world. This was a 
strategy aiming at consolidating Bulgarian communities in various parts of the world 
around the notion of motherhood, by encouraging their political and economic 
participation in reintegrating the country into the new post-Communist global order. 
The second state concern regarded its political independence. As Jackson & James 
(1993: 10) asserted: 
the principal value of a state system is the political freedom of its 
component parts... States do not wish to be told, lectured, hectored, 
badgered, bullied, or otherwise pushed around by other states concerning 
what they should or should not do within their own jurisdictions. 
This is what the society was led to believe was happening during the totalitarian 
period but, as the rest of this section will argue, political independence is a difficult 
project to achieve without giving up part of it. This is so particularly if a state aspires 
to be integrated in a structured community with well defined core players, such as the 
European Union. 
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The Europeanisation project proved appealing, though, with various degrees of 
consensus from all Bulgarian political parties, which campaigned for joining 
European political structures. These efforts materialised in May 1992 and October 
1993 when Bulgaria was accepted in the Council of Europe and associated in the 
European Union respectively. In 1994 it also joined NATO's project `Partnership for 
Peace' and submitted an official application for membership of the pact in February 
1997. 
The search for political independence, which represented a transition from a single to 
several transnational linkages had two important implications for state apparatuses 
and managers. Firstly, the state apparatus' ability to exercise control over state 
relations with other states involved in international conflicts was seriously 
undermined. Two prime examples illustrate the point. The United Nations Security 
Council's Resolution (661 of 3/8/1990) regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait bound 
Bulgaria to observe a total multinational embargo imposed on Iraq, which resulted in 
an indefinite loss of $1.2 billion owed to Bulgaria by this country and repayable with 
petrol. In addition, $160 million losses in 1990 alone were incurred as result of 
engineering projects, trade and transport services which did not materialise in Iraq and 
Kuwait. A similar situation but with further adverse international and domestic 
implications was repeated during the 1991-4 Yugoslav wars. The embargo affected all 
formal political, economic, and sports links. Besides the state's material losses from 
trade and transport which, for the first three days of the NATO's attacks in Kosovo 
alone (25,26 and 27 March 1999) amounted to DM 6.84 million (£2.3m, Monitor, 
30/3/99), a negative image of the region was also created, discouraging foreign 
investors and businesses ($620 million for 1998 - only half of that planned 
for the 
country, BFIA, 1999). In addition, a climate of corruption and clientelism also 
proliferated as opinion polls constantly put customs officers, judges, police and 
business people at the top of the corruption table (Soya 5,3/99). 
Second, joining the civilised Europe project was used by state managers and party 
leaders as a pretext for lessening their accountability to members and society. 
Faced 
with the demands to join European structures, they all appealed for short term 
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sacrifices on the part of society in the name of long term gains. But with an average 
government tenure of 13 months (in 1989-1999) indicating political instability, state 
management positions were used quite clearly for pursuing group or personal 
interests. 
The state's third major concern was preserving its economic integrity. The 
disintegration of the socialist economic system posed enormous burdens on the 
Bulgarian economy and its restructuring on market principles. Two sets of 
circumstances deserve attention here - the country's foreign debt and the global 
economy of ideas. Bulgaria set out on the road to Europe with a foreign debt totalling 
$10 billion, 85% of which was to commercial banks. Its debt-service ratio of 77 (all 
interest and amortisation on medium-and long-term debt as a percentage of one year's 
exports) in 1990 was the highest in Europe (Baylis, 1994: 158). With fading traditional 
trade links and falling industry output (1987-1997 annual average contraction of 
6.2%), the state suspended repayments of principal on its debt in March 1990. Unlike 
Poland, where foreign borrowings were mostly from Western governments (the Paris 
Club) which decided in 1991 to forgive 50% of them, the London Club (the private 
creditors) did not offer a similar privilege to Bulgaria. Furthermore, one of the 
prominent features of economic sovereignty - the national currency - was tied to the 
German mark and a Currency Board introduced in 1997. Subsequently, between 1992 
and 1998, foreign investment in the country was led by Germany amounting to 
$324.58 million (16.05% of total, BFIA, 1999) and followed a similar pattern in 
mutual trade worth DM2.440 million in 1998, indicating a renewed interest in the 
country. 
Since 1990 two United Nations' agencies - The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB) - became pivotal in shaping the national economy and 
social policy when Bulgaria joined these institutions for the first time. The IMF loans 
aimed to bring the budget into balance and to stabilise the currency while imposing 
austerity measures. The WB loans were tied to more specific projects and purposes 
whose conditions were subject of detailed negotiations. In both cases the loans granted 
were conditional and implied dirigiste measures such as wage freezes, simultaneously 
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tying the state to promise firm economic and social actions. The IMF loans to 
Bulgaria in 1991 were $634 million (which was spent mostly on servicing the foreign 
debt) and the World Bank country's portfolio in 1999 comprised 11 projects under 
implementation (in agriculture, industry and trade) worth $449.5 million (Reuters, 
17/3/999). The latter, however, have been delayed until the government met the 
reform targets. 
The role of the World Bank in shaping Eastern European countries' social policy, as 
Deacon and Hulse (1997: 54-8) argued, is even more crucial. In the Bulgarian case, it 
concerned pensions, family allowances, unemployment benefits and safety nets, and 
included very specific instruments of intervention such as memoranda, studies and 
recommendations, rehabilitation and structural adjustment loans and supervision. 
Essential in this respect, as the authors claimed, was also the role of the Council of 
Europe, the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) which offered advice, regulation, provision and redistribution 
through programmes such as DEMOSTHENES and PHARE (with clear implications 
for sport). Elsewhere, Deacon (1995) stressed the importance of supranationalisation 
of social policy instruments, policy and provision, and the role of advice, regulation of 
economic activity and redistribution of resources from one country to another, offered 
by these supranational agencies to national governments for achieving welfare 
objectives. 
Another critical aspect of the state's economic integrity as discussed in the section on 
globalisation (2.5.2), concerned the role of Bulgaria in a world dominated by an 
economy of ideas - communications, informational technologies and electronic 
entertainment. The demands faced here by the state and elite sport in particular are 
immense, although the official share of these sectors in the volume of foreign 
investments for the period 1992-98 was rather modest, comprising 1.87% of the total. 
Bulgaria was at the top of the list of illegal producers of electronic entertainment 
(videos, cassettes, games and CDs) in Europe, and was amongst the 25 countries with 
disloyal trade practices put on the `301 black list' by the USA government (the 1995 
Jackson-Vannick amendment to the USA Trade Law giving trade privileges). 
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According to the Business Software Alliance's office in Bulgaria (BSA - an 
organisation associating 1400 software companies in America), 97% of all computer 
products used were illegal, contributing to total global losses of $2.7 billion for the 
BSA in 1998 (Sega, 18/2/99). An prominent feature of the economy of ideas is the 
intellectual property rights which are protected by international laws. In 1992 and 
1994 respectively Bulgaria ratified international conventions and took the 
responsibility for regulating this business. A major step in this direction was the 
contract signed between the government and Microsoft, Apple, Simantech and Novel 
in December 1998 binding the state administration to legalise its software and to 
introduce a proper regime in this area. In an attempt to stimulate this process, 
Microsoft also offered a 60% rebate on the basic price of all its software products until 
31st May 1999. Bulgaria's intellectual property policy is subject to scrutiny by trade 
representatives of the USA government carried out each year in order to determine 
American economic policy about the country. 
Transnational loans, investments, trade and ideas, though not always clear-cut, had 
significant effects on state apparatuses. These effects were not unilateral, that is, either 
undermining or strengthening the state power, rather they had double-edged 
consequences, and challenged the state's authority (CE, EU and NATO interventions), 
competence (WB and IMF measures), form (the Europeanisation project) and 
legitimacy (the ability to make decisions concerning its territory), as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
8.2. Transnational linkages and state responses 
Increased transnational linkages urged the Bulgarian state to intervene in various areas 
of politics, economy and social affairs, thus diminishing or enhancing existing 
alliances and relations, or establishing new ones. Several state responses to 
transnational linkages discussed in previous section and their implications for state- 
society strategic relations will be considered here. 
Table 8.1 shows foreign direct investment in the country by sectors from 
1992-98. 
This represents for industry over half (53.6%) of total investments, followed 
by trade 
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(at 20.7%). The investments in these two sectors however, have an ambiguous nature, 
as they reflect the contradictions encountered by the transnational agencies which 
made them, for example, EU for Europe and IMF for USA. While the IMF sponsored 
investments and loans directly strengthened the role of the state as supreme overseer, 
the EU's (PHARE in particular), or the EC's (OUVERTÜRE) projects involved 
primarily small private actors and local authorities, enhancing their positions both 
locally and nationally. This was confirmed by the investment programme of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for 1998, and by the 
EU three year PHARE programme (2000-3) envisaging ECU300 million each year for 
transport, agriculture and ecology. Twenty two out of a total of 28 EBRD projects 
amounting to ECU 1.263 million were earmarked for private businesses (mainly 
finance and agriculture) (EBRD, 30/9/98), and 75% of the EU's subsidy will go to the 
Table 8.1. Foreign direct investment by sector 1992-1998 (US$ million) 
Volume % of total volume 
Industry 
Trade 
1085.3 53.65 
418.9 20.71 
Finance 205.0 10.13 
Tourism 102.4 5.06 
Transport 85.3 4.22 
Telecommunication 37.7 1,87 
Construction 20.0 0.99 
Agriculture 6.2 0.30 
Other 62.0 3.07 
Total 2022.8 100.00 
Source: BFIA: Foreign Inve stment Statistics, 1998: 2 
796 
10632 
private sector. The case of international trade presents an even more complex problem 
for the state, as trade involves economic transactions that lie outside the 
jurisdiction of 
the state, and which are in principle beyond its capacity to control. 
120 
74 
Number 
811 
8331 
160 
104 
208 
28 
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Yet, the state still retains great budgetary and financial control over local authorities 
and private businesses, as it provides nationally on average 47% of local authorities 
financing, and major companies are still state owned. As Evans (1992: 197) argued in 
this respect: 
in country after country, intensive penetration of local economies by such 
transnational actors has, with increasingly shorter lags, been followed by 
the rise of the state apparatuses that not only gained control over local 
extractive activities, but in certain cases become the dominant actors in 
the local economy. 
The effects of transnational loan capital on constructing state actions could be seen as 
limiting its developmental aspirations and having negative distributional and welfare 
consequences. As the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov (Democracy, 2/3/99) stated 
regarding the EC's strategy for constantly postponing negotiations on Bulgaria's 
membership: "no society could be inspired by aims lying 15-20 years ahead. No 
society believes in such aims. " In addition, he pointed out that, the EC is placing "a 
prolonged pointless dictate" for the closure of a nuclear power station supplying 40% 
of the country's electrical power. Otherwise, the EC is prepared to provide loans for 
Bulgarian energetic against the closure of the nuclear station, thus deliberately 
limiting state capacity to increase this sector's output. Similar is the case with the 
IMF-backed restrictive Currency Board regime which constrains the internal resources 
for investment. 
Transnational loans have other important effects on the state apparatuses and 
managers. First, as foreign loans demand state approval and guarantees, this 
inescapably places the government in an intermediary position between foreign 
lenders and domestic productive investment. Thus, local businesses needed the help of 
the state apparatuses in order to obtain these loans, which in turn, creates 
preconditions for political clientelism and corruption. A prime example was the grain 
crisis of 1997, when the socialist government of Videnov banned its export but 
allowed `by exemption' the group Orion (which was close to the Socialist Party) to 
export and then to import back crop on behalf of the government at higher prices, 
realising massive profits. 
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Second, foreign loans substantially increased the state's power vis-a-vis the local 
capitalists. This is because the state did not have to rely on private domestic actors as 
a major source of resources. Instead, it could use its control over foreign loans, both as 
an instrument for displacing actors in the process of transition to market economy, and 
for disbursing capital for implementing local private business projects. The 34 items 
of the government's three year programme (1998-2001) with the IMF illustrate the 
point. Ensuring domestic tax policy compliance with the Fund requirements alone 
imposed amendments to eight laws, each affecting the interests and the scope of local 
actors' operations (Council of Ministers, 1998, Macroeconomic and Structural 
Measures (matrix) Under the EFF-Supported Program, 1998-2001). 
Despite the global character of modem communications, ten years after the 
transformation the state preserved an unchallenged monopoly in this domain, and 
eventually, granted a single licence from February 2000 to a private TV broadcaster 
(Murdock group). Recently, the chairman of the state Committee for Post and 
Communications, Slavinski, promoted a policy that the state should be able to filter 
the information on the internet (Capital, 6/2/99). The government further reinforced its 
position in this area by signing the above mentioned contract with Microsoft and three 
other companies, committing the state administration to purchase and use only legal 
software products delivered by them. 
To sum up so far, the increased global interconnectedness and the accompanied flows 
of investments, trade, loans and communications did not caused the eclipse of the 
state, rather it stimulated and facilitated the expansion of its role in new directions. 
Although ambiguous in certain cases, these flows suggested an expanding scope of the 
state economic role, an increased organisational capacity within the state bureaucracy, 
and strengthening its strategic position vis-a-vis private domestic actors. There 
is no 
reason to believe that the effects of globalisation would follow different patterns 
in 
sport. 
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8.3. The global sport nexus and strategic relations in national sport 
policy making 
The analysis of strategic relations in this section drew mainly on evidence from 
policies and practices of three key transnational agencies - the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), Trim and Fitness International Sport for All Association (TAFISA) 
and the Council of Europe (CE) as well as from other cases involving individual 
managers and organisations. 
The impact of the IOC strategies on Bulgaria's sport can be seen in two directions - 
specifically Eastern European and global. First, there were distinct policies aiming to 
ensure a continuity of the Communist model of elite sports' contribution to Olympic 
glory. The IOC's reaction to the transformative events of 1989 was prompt and clear. 
In two successive meetings with the Eastern European countries' new leaderships in 
1990 in Lausanne (April) and Varna (November), the changes in the environment and 
their impact on elite sport and Sport for All were discussed. Although both themes 
were on the agenda of both meetings, the long-term programme for co-operation 
between these countries (1990-1996) adopted in Varna made no reference to Sport for 
All (BSFS, 1990). While the IOC's position was for a balanced development of the 
two sides of sporting practice, the real concern was about the situation of Communist 
elite sport and its further contribution to the Games. A statement from Primo Nebiolo, 
an IOC member and the IAAF president, made during the first meeting typifies the 
prevailing attitude: "there is no future without your [eastern countries, explanation 
added] champions " (IOC, 1990). And, as a gesture of generosity (together with the 
International Ski Federation and the European National Olympic Committees), he 
offered Eastern European Athletics Federations free membership of the IAAF, and 
other privileges. These are now being used by the Bulgarian Athletics Federation for 
claiming capacity to generate its own resources (around $30,000 for 1998) and to 
convince the CYPES that it is a viable body which does not rely entirely on state 
subsidies. The irony is that, this situation is well known by the CYPES, but as the 
head of Sports Division Iliev (Capital, 16/4/1999) admitted: 
we are fully aware of what is going around National Sports Federations 
but keep providing hard currency for membership fee in international 
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bodies and fees for participation in major tournaments, because if we do 
not do so, the Committee would be accused of slaughtering the Bulgarian 
sport. 
The international link, in this case apparently created an ambiguous situation which 
served both parties well in promoting their interests, and they seemed unwilling to 
abandon this double standard. 
The overall concern was echoed by Olegario Rana, the ANOC president (Association 
of the National Olympic Committees, and now an IOC member) from a more general 
perspective. He reminded the meeting that the money was not the most important 
factor when it came to Olympic sport. Of greater importance, as he pointed out was 
"the preparation of the human factor: coaches, leaders and athletes " (IOC, 1990). 
Clearly, the Communist model of sport was given conceptual endorsement, material 
support, and encouragement to continue but not from a "paternalistic position" as the 
IOC president emphasised, but rather as a form of assistance to leading sporting 
countries. 
The IOC president's view brings us to the second direction of this agency's impact - 
global. It should be examined in the context of the global marketing project 
introduced by the IOC and corporate international business, aiming to bind together 
the Olympic properties, and multinational companies' ambitions for world expansion 
and global domination in what could be termed a `brand mark'. The project was also 
seeking to include "citizen-of-the-world" customer' in an alliance where the 
ideological interpretation of the Olympic virtues is replaced by an economic reading. 
This new environment, as discussed earlier, is dominated by an economy of ideas, 
where economic growth become possible because the cost of reproducing an idea is 
essentially zero and returns increase indefinitely with the scope of the market. In this 
respect IOC vice-president Richard Pound comment's (cited in Whannel, 1992: 7) was 
very indicative for the significance of transformations and their impact on the NOCs: 
"when the only thing you have to sell are the aspirations of the youth and five rings, 
then misappropriation of intellectual property becomes a very serious matter. " 
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The policy framework of the project was the IOC TOP programme (The Olympic 
Partners -involving 11 multinational companies), particularly its third, forth and fifth 
editions (for 1992-2004, see IOC, 1999, Olympic Marketing Fact File). All National 
Olympic Committees (NOCs which resemble the notion of statehood ) were sent a 
clear message to join the project if they wanted to be part of the modem Olympic 
movement. In the case of the newly emerged NOCs of Europe (as result of the 
breakdown of USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), this approach was used by the 
IOC as a condition for recognition, a position very similar to the IOC's attitude 
towards Eastern European countries after the 2nd World War. However, the TOP 
project not only enhanced the IOC's financial and organisational powers, but 
expanded the organisational capacity of the NOCs in two ways: first, by transforming 
them from travel agencies and outfitters to professional bodies working 365 days a 
year; and second, by empowering them as the only guardians, shareholders and 
managers of the `Olympic brand' for implementing the IOC's policies on their 
national territories. 
Eastern European and Bulgarian NOCs, despite their lack of experience and financial 
power, were not prepared to accept the IOC's marketing approach unquestioningly. 
As the marketing principles were gaining superiority over other considerations, the 
Eastern European sport organisations have started to develop a relevant marketing 
consciousness about the real market value of their products. The issue "who gets 
what" was addressed unequivocally by the IOC vice-president and member for 
Hungary Pal Shmitt at the IOC 1994 Executive Board meeting in Paris (IOC, 1994). 
He suggested the adoption of new criteria for distributing the Olympic wealth 
according to the quality of the athletes and their contribution to Olympic success. The 
IOC Olympic Solidarity subsidy for all European NOCs taking part in the Seoul 1988 
Games was $6.73 million and 25% of it was allocated to the eight Eastern European 
countries, whereas they won 70% of all European and 50% of the total medals. 
In 
Barcelona 1992, and Atlanta 1996, some 29% of the total subsidy was provided, while 
42% and 25% of the medals were won respectively (see IOC, Olympic 
Solidarity 
1983-1992, and 1996 Reports). The IOC spent on its pavilion at the 
Seville 1992 
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World Expo $7.3 million while for the same display in Expo 1996 in Budapest (the 
first Expo held in Eastern European country), it designated a modest $600,000. 
Insofar as the IOC policy for distributing Olympic funds is based on rather general, 
quantitative criteria, it does not consider the qualitative aspects (the market value in 
commercial terms) - the role of the main actors (East European athletes) on the 
Olympic stage. The introduction of the United Nations' economic classification 
relating to a country's GNP per capita in 1995 can be viewed as an attempt at a more 
adequate approach to IOC budget allocation. According to this categorisation, 
Bulgaria is in the lowest Group C (under $4,000 per capita), Russia is in the middle 
Group B ($ 4,000- 12,000 per capita), and there is no ex-Communist country amongst 
the wealthiest twenty (Group A-$12,000 or above per capita). While these principles 
of the IOC (EBRD, 1994) comply with the spirit of the basic Olympic values, such as 
equality and internationalism, they are in strong disagreement with the capitalist 
philosophy behind the economic success of the Olympic Games endorsed at the same 
time. Thus, it would be justifiable for the transforming Eastern European sport, and 
Bulgaria's sport in particular, to be pledged a bigger share of Olympic wealth, which 
would represent more fairly its contribution. 
The IOC position towards transformations in Bulgaria cemented sport leaderships' 
resistance to changes, as they managed to endorse conceptually and as a machinery 
the same old system, with the state as a key player, by shaping an environment 
lacking powerful local governments and a well developed voluntary sport sector. 
Because of historically settled state-voluntary sector relationships, Bulgaria's sport 
organisations never represented a real public voice as we have seen in Chapters 4 to 7, 
so they could not put pressure on the state directly, only via international bodies, and 
specifically the IOC. At the same time the IOC pressed hard for new sports 
legislation, asserting the NOCs as independent and powerful bodies. For this purpose, 
the IOC organised a series of seminars with leading experts (NSA, 1998) and 
provided scholarships for two young Bulgarians to specialise in international law 
through study in Switzerland. It also sought ways to promote Sport for All nationally 
through direct subsidies of two events annually and charged the city of Varna with 
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hosting the 4th International Sport for All congress in 1992, along with financial aid 
of $100,000. 
The impact of TAFISA on Bulgaria's sport policy was directly linked to the IOC 
approach to Sport for All. TAFISA - the major player on the international Sport for 
All scene (recognised by UNESCO, World Health Organisation and the IOC) - was 
created in March 1991, but in fact succeeded the older Trim and Fitness movement 
organisation in Europe set up in the early 1960s. It now incorporates over 100 
member-countries, represented by voluntary or public sport governing bodies. 
Bulgaria was an active supporter of the movement before 1989 through the Sport for 
All department of BSFS, was amongst the five founding members of TAFISA, and 
benefited from the exchange of ideas in information. After that, it discontinued 
participation for two years. 
The establishment of the Bulgarian Sport for All Association (BSfAA) in 1993 (see 
Chapter 6) became possible due to a substantial amount of 1,000,000 Lev (from 
interests and a little reserve fund) left over from the IOC's contribution to the Varna 
congress in 1992, and coincided with the launch of TAFISA's first global project - the 
Challenge Day. The Challenge Day campaign sought to encourage cities, sport 
organisations, (through a marketing agency impact) - national and international 
sponsors to form partnerships and promote active participation for people from all 
walks of life in a friendly global competition held every last Wednesday of May. 
In 1993 and 1994 the BSfAA existed only on paper and was not even involved in 
o organising the first Challenge Day, which was a great success and paved the way fr 
this campaign in Bulgaria. The Association, however, took over gradually and used 
this project to legitimise itself nationally. As BSfAA did not have its own structures, 
facilities, human or material resources (only a central body with one full-time staff 
member), seven years later the Challenge Day and another TAFISA project, the 
World 
Walking Day remained the main activities in BSfAA's portfolio to 
justify its presence 
in the sport policy domain (see Table 8.2). The peculiarity of a transnational 
link in 
this case was that it proved equally appealing to local, vocational 
(the Sports 
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Association of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and national agencies, and provided 
the strategic bond. The BSfAA owes its functioning mainly to two established 
structures - one local sport club, Levski (Sofia), and the Sport Association of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (aka, The Police Sports Association). The former, due to 
its nature, cannot be a partner in major international undertakings, and otherwise is 
struggling to provide for mass participation. The latter, simply replaced the focus of 
its mission, from a more vocational service to members of the police force and their 
families, to involvement in this prestigious international project bringing financial 
privileges and instant access to key policy actors and state managers such as ministers, 
mayors, companies and media executives. Sport organisations' self-approved norms 
allow them to set their own regulations for staff financial inducements; this meant that 
BSfAA managers could have cashed in personally up to 20% of any sponsorship deal 
they secured, and benefited further from bonuses of surpluses after a campaign was 
over. In the BSfAA's first three year report (for 1994-1996 of 11/2/1997), no financial 
account was published. 
These developments, despite its lack of organisational capacity, have turned BSfAA 
into an intermediary between global and domestic Sport for All movements by 
strengthening its role as a partner of the state (through contacts with municipalities 
and central government agencies) and private businesses (through sponsorship). This 
position will be further reinforced by a recently signed contract between TAFISA and 
the Australian based company MaxxPlay (Document, 11/12/98) promoting greater 
public access to sport and active recreation through specially adapted programmes, 
services and products. The nature of this global Sport for All programme under the 
name `MaxxAxxess' follows closely the format of the IOC TOP project and is based 
on the same principle of using intellectual property rights (the TAFISA logo), and 
licenced products, programmes and materials (over 40 on offer) by TAFISA member 
countries. If the BSfAA opts to sign up, it would obtain the exclusive rights to 
promote throughout Bulgaria and benefit from MaxxAxxess programmes, services, 
games and products (between 20%-30% of the revenue) which have 
been endorsed by 
TAFISA. This would place a greater demand for professionalism and 
business-like 
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methods of daily working, and would meant developing a new approach to relations 
with the state apparatuses and commercial sector regarding Sport for All. 
Table 8.2 illustrates the development of the two global campaigns - the International 
Challenge Day (ICD) and the World Walking Day (WWD) and the involvement of 
state apparatus. 
Table 8.2 Participating municipalities and political patronage of the ICD and the 
WWD 
Year ICD 
1993 1 
1994 8 
1995 10 
1996 50 
1997 37 
WWD 
1998 38 
1999 27 
Source: author and BS fAA statistics (1997: 4-6) 
10 Chairman of the Parliament 
46 Chairman of the Parliament 
n/a Chairman of the Parliament 
n/a 
n/a 
Mayors of Cities 
Mayors of Cities 
Another transnational linkage with clear implications for sport policy making and 
strategic relations in sport was with the Council of Europe and European Union. 
Contacts with these two structures after 1991 were in the remit of the state Committee 
for Youth Physical Education and Sport (CYPES) and were implemented chiefly 
within the framework of SPRINT and PHARE programmes. The SPRINT (Sports 
Reform, Innovation and Training) programme was designed specifically to assist 
Eastern European countries to comply with European cultural conventions and ensure 
that sport becomes accepted as an important part of government activity and receives 
appropriate funding. The PHARE has broader social aims, which can include sports 
projects. 
The level and effects of intervention of these European institutions 
in various 
countries mirrored the overall political context and differed 
from clearly 
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interventionist in the case of the Czech Republic to advisory in Bulgaria. Apart from 
regular mobile (problem specific) and regional (general topic) seminars, the CYPES 
also demanded a parliamentary hearing seminar (category B- "activities of 
significance to the development of sport policy in a political context" of the SPRINT 
programme) where the Sports Law (1996) proposal was consulted and certain 
comments were taken into account before it was entered into the hall of parliament. 
The CYPES also used a protocol letter from George Walker - the Secretary of the 
CE's Committee for Sports Development (CDDS) - as a strong argument in favour of 
the credibility of the conception for the system of Physical Education and Sport 
(CYPES, 1996, discussed in chapter 6). 
Two other CE policy documents - the Conventions on Spectator Violence and 
Misbehaviour at Sports Events (and in particular at Football Matches) (1985), and on 
Anti-Doping (1989) had strategic impacts on the national sport policy domain. The 
former was endorsed by parliament and brought into force in 1 December 1996, while 
the latter came into effect for a much shorter period - in 24 April 1992. However, both 
demanded state co-operation and respective legal, administrative and financial 
measures. In addition, these conventions empowered state apparatuses in areas where 
they previously had little or no involvement. The CYPES was entrusted with the 
power of controlling the standards of safety at sports grounds, and sports 
organisations' strategies concerning continuing education of athletes and crowds and 
obedience to the norms of fair play. In the area of doping control transnational 
linkages resulted in a Council of Ministers' decree (142 of 13/7/1995), creating a new 
governmental structure -a National Commission for Doping 
Control (NCDC) under 
the supervision of the CYPES. An additional impact concerned a further enhancement 
of the role of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee (BOC) as a core player in setting 
elite sport policy. 
The CE and the EU represented pan-European bodies with a clear mission to assist 
transformations in Eastern European countries, but their policies and degree of 
support were far from uniformly supported. As S. Ranev, head of the 
CYPES' 
International Relations Department commented (interview, 31/8/1998): 
236 
Chapter 8. Globalisation and Sport Policy Making 
we have established very good relations with the Council of Europe and 
enjoy their professional co-operation and assistance. But it is completely 
different picture all together with the European Union. They would try to 
avoid direct links and keep `sending' us to the Greeks for advice and 
support for all matters concerned. 
This was perceived as a lack of real concern and professionalism on the part of the EU 
because the successes of Greek sport over the previous two decades was achieved to 
some extent due to significant outflows of Bulgarian expertise, know-how, athletes 
and staff, not to mention the hundreds of Greek students who graduated every year 
from the National Sports Academy in Sofia. 
Although European co-operation is deemed important, it could not cater for all the 
diverse needs of sport. Gradually, the CYPES and voluntary sport organisations 
started to re-discover regional linkages in the Balkans, not at least because of 
geographical accessibility and lower cost. There is at present co-operation in 27 sports 
with over 100 events yearly (CYPES, 1998). The CYPES is trying to capitalise on the 
proximity and similarity in climate conditions and signed up a protocol with the 
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) in Athens 2004 to provide 
acclimatisation training camps and expertise for national teams from all over the 
world. 
However, the disintegration of the national sport movement after the transformations 
did have a negative impact on transnational linkages, and particularly on the role of 
the state as an initiator of political relations in sport. Until 1989 the BSFS and national 
sport federations were members of 51 International Sport Associations with 
89 
Bulgarian representatives occupying various positions and performing 110 
functions. 
These numbers have been reduced to some 17 representatives and 
involved the loss of 
critical seats in many international sport governing bodies (BSFS, 
1998). Two main 
reasons were responsible for this state of affairs. First, the new 
democratic state 
apparatuses (the presidency and the government) took a position of 
disinterest in 
employing sport as a tool in international diplomacy. As 
S. Ranev elaborated 
(interview, 31/8/1998): 
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contrary to the socialist period when most of the sports contacts, 
particularly with the third world countries developed as result of intergovernmental agreements, today it is virtually impossible to include 
sport in the agenda of international presidential or governmental 
meetings. All our efforts in this respect so far have failed. Inevitably 
Bulgarian sport is losing its international positions. 
Second, it was the undemocratic and `staying in office at all cost' attitude of sports 
organisations' managers that caused damage to the image and strategic positions of 
particular sports. Volleyball - the second most popular sport in the country - is a case 
in point. In 1998, after six years as president of the national Volleyball Federation, 
Zhajakov, one of the three most influential key figures in the sport policy domain 
described in chapter six, had to face serious accusations about mismanagement and 
misappropriation of funds and transfers fees. In an extraordinary session of the 
Federation he was unanimously voted out of office by all 126 clubs' representatives. 
He, however, refused to obey this collective decision on the grounds that the meeting 
was illegal, and a second national volleyball federation emerged. This resulted in a 
whole chain of negative events ranging from the FIVB suspending Bulgarian 
volleyball from international competitions to the loss of Nike's sponsorship contract. 
A domestic argument had now to be solved by an international organisation - the 
FIVB -which called for a reconciliation meeting of the two federations to settle the 
issue as a precondition to Bulgarian volleyball being admitted back to the 
international arena. R. Acosta, president of the FIVB, even went further and 
demanded that Zhajakov should preside over the meeting if its results were to be 
considered legitimate. Faced by the prospect of a lengthy court hearing, a deal 
arbitrated by Slavkov, chairman of the BOC and an IOC member, appeared to have 
been arranged: Zhajakov would withdraw his obstruction to the national federation in 
exchange for keeping his position on the FIVB's umpire commission (he could only 
be there as a representative of a national federation). This deal was entertained 
personally by the president of FIVB, Acosta, as he aspired very strongly to become an 
IOC member, and Slavkov could help him in this (Personal communications with 
sport officials). 
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8.4. Conclusions 
The preceding discussion on transnational linkages allowed to draw four conclusions 
concerning their impact on the role of the state, voluntary sport governing bodies and 
managers. Table 8.3 summarises the instruments used by four key international 
agencies for shaping national sport policy. 
Table 8.3 International instruments for shaping Bulgarian sport policy 
Agency Method Effects on Sport Domain 
Council of Europe (CE), Recommendations, Funds, Legislations, Decrees, 
European Union (EU) Programmes, Courses, International co-operation, 
Advice Structural changes 
International Olympic Contracts, Funds, Advice, Structural changes, 
Committee (IOC) Programmes Funding, Regulation 
TAFISA Advice, Contracts, Structural changes, 
Programmes Professional management 
First, the ever increasing global interconnectedness did not lead to the eclipse of the 
state, although it did challenge its authority, form, competence and legitimation. 
While placing limitations on the state's competence on the one hand, foreign 
investments, loans and projects enhanced the role of state apparatuses and managers 
on the other, by expanding their economic, political and executive powers. This was 
confirmed by the expansion of the CYPES's role in areas not previously occupied by 
the state, resulting from the CE intervention. The state apparatuses now act more as 
intermediators between global and local interests, and it is often unclear where the 
facilitating and adaptation role of the state starts and finishes, and where its 
empowering and catalytic functions emerge. Apart from the case of the Olympic 
Games Organising Committee for Athens 2004, there was no evidence to support the 
idea of improved catalytic capacity of the state (i. e. the CYPES) to establish regional 
or international alliances and maximising the benefits for the national sports 
movement. 
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Second, transnational linkages enhanced the voluntary governing bodies' 
independence from the state (especially BOC and BSfAA) and served as a vehicle for 
legitimating their role in the sport policy domain. The local success of these global 
projects in which BOC and BSfAA participated, however, will depend to a great 
extent on their ability to establish strategic relations with state apparatuses in other to 
promote the necessary legislative, administrative and financial measures. Given the 
contingent character of state-voluntary sector relations, this will be a challenging task, 
a view supported by D. Haralampiev, co-ordinator of the Foundation Bulgarian Sport, 
who commented that: 
at present all projects implemented by the Foundation have been paid for 
by foreign programmes combating social exclusion of young people, and 
thus we had to move away from the original focus of our mission aiming 
at supporting sporting talents (interview, 5/8/1998). 
Third, transnational linkages clearly empowered local actors, but they also posed a 
great threat for the newly constituted voluntary sport sector. Becoming a partner in a 
global project turns a national sports governing body and its managers into an `off 
shore' zone. This means that they are not accountable any longer to members or state 
institutions, and that they can easily justify their domestic policy with the pressure 
from the international actor, as they could explain failure to conform with global 
requirements on the adversity of local circumstances. Besides, all conflict of interests 
were to be settled in courts beyond the state territory and control - in Switzerland 
(IOC), and Australia (MaxxPlay). 
Fourth, sport managers' personal placement and their strategic relations in the sport 
policy domain remained a key asset in deciding the outcomes of transnational 
linkages. 
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Chapter 9. Strategic Relations in Sports Policy Making - Conclusions 
This project set out to investigate the transformations in Bulgarian sport policy in the 
20th century, and more specifically the role of the state and various societal forces in 
shaping and controlling the sports domain in the three periods - Capitalism (1878- 
1944), Communism (1945-1989) and Democracy (1990-1999) as outlined in Chapters 
4 to 7. The research was theoretically informed by the premises of the Strategic 
Relations approach and of Critical theory. One of the most obvious lessons brought 
out by this study was that building a new stateness as a crucial element of the state 
project at different historical conjunctures represented a structural-creative process 
with critical implications for the conceptualisation, structuring, production and 
consumption of sport, and for the strategic relations in the domain. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to relate the findings of empirical research to 
the key propositions posed by these two theoretical frameworks identified in Chapters 
2 and 3, and to answer the research questions. In achieving that it will seek to draw 
conclusions with regards to: 
i) The state as a social relation 
ii) Conceptualising state social relations in sport policy making 
iii) Operationalising strategic relations in sport policy making 
iv) Lessons from applying Critical theory to sport policy analysis. 
9.1. The state as a set of social relations 
A comprehensive appreciation of the construction of sports policy in the Bulgarian 
context can be established if it is placed in a wider framework of the state as a social 
relation. This in turn allows the identification, conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of strategic relations in sport policy making. Moreover, none of 
these have received so far empirical testing, even in Jessop's works, and as he himself 
(1990: 267) admitted, they remain "at the level of assertions and guidelines". Jessop's 
(1990) notion of the state as a social relation asserted that it can be analysed as the 
site, the generator and the product of strategies. He argued (1990: 260) that the state 
system is first, the site of strategy because: 
it can be analysed as a system of strategic selectivity, i. e. as a system 
whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of 
political strategy than others... I believe this notion of strategic selectivity 
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is more fruitful than that of structural selectivity because it brings out 
more clearly the relational character of this selectivity. 
Secondly, Jessop saw the state as the generator of strategies because it offered the 
strategic terrain where the state system's formal unity (e. g. as a sovereign state) and 
substantive unity (e. g. as the social basis of support and a hegemonic project) can be 
established. An important implication of this unity concerned the actions of the state 
as a united political force, where, as he commented: 
... the role of state managers is crucial in understanding haw a relative 
unity is imposed on the various (in) activities of the state and how these 
activities acquire a relative autonomy from the conflicting pressures 
emanating from civil society (1990: 261). 
Thirdly, Jessop understood the structure and modus operandi of the state system in 
terms of their production in and through past political strategies and struggles. He 
claimed that "in this sense the current strategic selectivity of the state is in part the 
emergent effect of the interaction between its past patterns of strategic selectivity and 
the strategies adopted for its transformations " (1990: 261). 
As the empirical evidence for the construction of the Bulgarian state in the three major 
transformations suggested, the constitutional settlement of the capitalist and 
communist forms of the state favoured an authoritative power symbolised by a central 
figure - the head of the state (the Prince/Tsar or the Chairman of the 
Communist Party 
and the State Council). This authoritarian tendency was simultaneously underpinned 
and reinforced by the process of capital accumulation. Because of its geographic 
location, its level of industrial development and its place in the global geo-political 
mapping of the world, the state positions and access to resources were seen and used 
by political, economic and sport managers as a source of privileges, and not as a 
means through which to gain wider benefits for society and the sports domain 
in 
particular. 
Chapters 5 (Capitalist), 6 (Communist) and 7 (Democratic periods), demonstrated that 
the form of the state and its basic structural mechanisms were not constituted out of 
the existing institutional elements, rather these elements were imposed 
from outside 
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forces. The Russian (1878-1944), German (1933-1944) and European (1990-1999) 
interventions support the point. An important implication of this process was the 
preconditioning of the state as the site, the generator and the product of strategies. 
This was particularly well illustrated during the Communist period (1945-1989), when 
individual interests and strategies were subordinated to the general interest of the 
Communist Party's elite, which, though still illusory, were highly effective because of 
society's total submission. The key difference between agents, interests and strategies 
in capitalist and communist environments is that while the capitalism still influenced 
outcomes of struggles, the Communism inscribed all political and non-political agents 
in the state system. Subsequently, this predetermined their ability to advocate 
transformations by promoting strategies which did not conform to the general interest, 
yet as defined by the state. 
In a study of the Greek sport policy (between 1980 and 1993) Nassis (1994: 211) 
argued that "the relation between the strategies of those agents and the sport policy 
system is said to be dialectic... and simultaneously may result in the reproduction or 
transformation of the structure of sport. " The totalitarian state system (although seen 
as a tendency and not as an absolute) to a large extent made possible only the 
reproduction of the structure of sport. Individual sport managers and structures did not 
have say in the strategic orientation of sports policy, and obeyed the guidelines set by 
the party-state and echoed by the umbrella governing body, the BSFS. Although less 
explicit, the reproduction of the state-sport system relation as opposed to its 
transformation seems to have dominated much of the capitalist and communist 
periods as well. The evidence gathered in this respect confirmed the need to 
differentiate between state-society closure or separation because of the limitations 
posed by the closure on the agents' ability to promote transformative strategies and to 
form alliances based on interests other than general. This challenged Jessop's claim, 
that as long as state-society boundaries remained uncertain, state-society closure or 
separation did not matter. He could not have envisaged this, but nonetheless was 
intrigued by the revolutionary movements of 1989 in Eastern Europe 
for providing 
some interesting and invaluable lessons about our understanding of 
Strategic 
Relations (1990: 271). 
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Another implication resulting from the outside imposition of a particular form and 
particular structures on the state concerned the conflict between outside interests 
which subsides domestic agents' real interests, and reinforced the state's authoritarian 
position. Several examples illustrated the dual nature of these interests, that is, why 
specific strategies identified as agents real interests have not been pursued. For 
example, the leading slogan of the Communist project was `Everything in the name of 
the person', but the concept of people's needs was never discussed in a sport policy 
document of that period. In the same vein, as the case studies demonstrated (Chapter 
7) state apparatuses and sport organisations virtually did nothing to empower their 
members as the democratisation project dictated it should. State regimes usually were 
related to a social base only retrospectively, that is, in order to rationalise past actions. 
The latest example was the decision of the Bulgarian government and Parliament (in 
April and May 1999 respectively) to offer the state airspace to be used for NATO 
military operations in Kosovo in the hope of speeding Bulgaria's acceptance to NATO 
and the European Community, whereas over 75% of the population strongly opposed 
any involvement in the Yugoslavian crisis. 
The authoritarian tradition in the state system and its effects on sports policy complied 
with Jessop's proposition about the state as `the product of strategies', in the sense 
that the continuity of this tradition in each of the three periods was in part 
presupposed by the patterns of strategic selectivity employed for its transformation. 
The three great transformations each began with a total negation of previous 
settlements and achievements, thus introducing a `new' strategic selectivity, but one 
based on similar principles. 
Finally, the analysis of the state as a social relation complemented empirically the 
notion of the state as a mediator of strategies. The overt and covert foreign 
interventions in the state constitution as well as state interventions in sport policy 
made by mediating global strategies (Russia's double military intervention in 1878 
and 1944 was part of a world global remapping) support this conclusion. Just the 
successive projects for building a capitalist, communist and democratic state were all 
political constructs and lacked in various degrees the necessary formal and substantive 
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unity, none of them managed to mobilise wide public or organisational support 
without some form of coercion. 
9.2 Conceptualising state-social relations in sport policy making 
This section looks to conceptualise four key relations pertinent to the study research 
questions in the three periods (as set out on pp. 66-7 of Chapter 3) concerned between: 
" the state project and the sport project; 
" forms of state intervention in sport and various socio-political 
environments; 
" the construction of power in sports policy and state-society 
interactions; 
" transnational and local forces in helping to shape sport policy 
9.2.1 State projects and sport projects 
The state projects - Capitalism (1878-1944), Communism (1944-1989), and 
Europeanisation (1989-1999) pursued during the three periods were hegemonic by 
nature, and sought to endow specific identities and interests, and to mobilize wide 
social support by offering structural and other privileges to various classes and groups. 
As the capitalist period (1878-1944) evidenced, modem sport emerged in Bulgaria 
more as a necessity for military training of the population in defence of the new state's 
independence, and, not as in Western societies, a typical leisure pursuit of affluent 
classes. The state project set two clear priorities - the unification of both Bulgaria's 
lands and people. This general strategy needed structures for its implementation, and 
because the Berlin Treaty (1878) prevented the state having a regular army and any 
form of military training, sports societies (shooting and gymnastics) appeared to be 
the only legal ways to mobilise the population around the national cause. 
Subsequently, these were encouraged and supported by the state. 
After the first World War, the state project for regaining a hegemonic position in the 
Balkans (including former Bulgarian territories) in alliance with one of the great 
powers, Germany, dictated the nature of the sport project. It was constructed around 
the notion of `sportive manhood', and ideologically and structurally 
followed the 
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state's project guidelines for preparing a military capable and obedient to the Tsar and 
the state youth, and clearly copied the example of fascist Germany and Italy. It could 
be argued then, that throughout the communist period, the sport project was set and 
shaped by utilitarian reasons and served them diligently, and because of its intrinsic 
values did not have the chance to develop as an independent domain of activity 
appealing to wider social groups. 
The building of a Communist society was the state project during the communist 
period (1945-1989). Accordingly, state-society relations were grounded on its 
ideological and organisational tenets. The sport project promoted essentially mass 
participation, elitism and communist virtues. It was also tied closely to and mirrored 
the aspirations of the state, and its contribution ranged from support in establishing the 
power of local Communist Party committees to gaining international prestige for the 
state regime. With no exception, all sports policy strategic documents were based on 
and proclaimed that the sports organisations' paramount aim was to fulfil the tasks set 
by the Party-state. In return, the sport establishments received support and privileges, 
although still in a very selective manner. 
The project for building a democratic state (Europeanisation) promoted in the 
democratic period (1990-1999), in spite of its pluralistic nature and rhetoric, brought 
no convincing evidence for a change in state-sport relationships. The sport project for 
democratisation, more opportunities and choice followed the state's visions, and 
remained highly strategically selective. In essence, it perpetuated the relationships 
established in the previous period and excluded effectively from the policy decision 
making process the large number of sports organisations' members and the newly 
emerging private sector agents. 
The core of the state-sport projects' relations in the three periods constituted an 
authoritative form and state structures imposed by foreign forces which were coupled 
with an uncertain process of capital accumulation and short lived political regimes 
in 
the first and third periods. As grass root formations and their members were 
traditionally excluded from policy formulation, and their interests were never really 
247 
Chapter 9. Strategic Relations in Sports Policy Making - Conclusions 
taken into account, this turned the state apparatuses into the main source of support, 
and of resources and privileges for sport. Sports organisations' uncritical acceptance 
of this relation throughout the whole history of Bulgarian sport made them tacit 
supporters of the notion of the general interest as seen and promoted by the state, and 
nurtured a culture of clientelism. This clientelism was just as strong but less 
oppositional than that of Greece, as demonstrated by Henry and Nassis (1999). 
9.2.2 Forms of state intervention in sport and various socio-political 
environments 
The relation between the state's forms of intervention in sport and different 
environments was clearly manifested in this study. The form of state intervention was 
presupposed by the nature of the state project, and had clear implications for pursuing 
strategies in the sport policy domain in the three periods. They included how issues 
were recognised, how domains were structured, the general and sport-specific laws 
passed, how policy aims were formulated, how structural elements were set and how 
key appointments were made, how resources were allocated, controlled and outcomes 
or success/failure assessed (Table 9.1; for key interventions see also introductory 
boxes to Chapters 4,5 and 6). They varied in degree of concretness and harshness, but 
virtually all of them were imperative and did not invite an interactive participation and 
discussions on behalf of non-governmental and private agents concerned. A similar 
process was in place in other Eastern European countries as argued by Keohane and 
Hoffman, 1993, and Janos, 1994). Forms of state intervention in the three periods 
displayed great consistency in terms of policy aims formulation, assessment and 
control, and their impact on all domain actors. Indicative for this type of relations was 
the trend for centralisation of sports domain, displayed at the outset of each period, 
despite various state and sport administrations proclaimed concern 
for democratic set 
up and participation in policy making. 
9.2.3 The construction of power in sports policy and state-society 
interactions 
The state-society relations described throughout this research 
determined the nature of 
power in the sports policy domain. The binding of sports policy to the state project 
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highlighted the importance of three factors for constructing the social base of the 
state's power in sport. 
First, it was well justified ideologically, with concerns ranging 
from defence of the 
country to improving individual fitness and well being so as to appeal to wider social 
groups outside sport (the `hegemonic project' in Jessopian terms). 
Second, state power 
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was based on a strategic configuration of the non-governmental sport sectors in ways 
such that they would always be supportive of the state regime. No state project ever 
allowed the voluntary sport organisations to unify in a body representing the 
collective voice of their members that could have become a powerful political actor. 
This was partly permitted to happen with the forming of the BSFS in the totalitarian 
period, but only in a fashion strictly controlled by the Party-state, ensuring 
representative support without real mass backing. Third, it was the source of 
consensus and the means of channelling demands upwards and flows of resources 
downwards needed to establish and to maintain the state's power in sport. The former 
was chiefly achieved through recruiting politically loyal sport managers, while the 
latter was ensured by political clientelism, and depended very much on the placement 
of individual actors in the sport domain, that is on structural but not on interpersonal 
relations. This is underpinned by compelling evidence from the three periods. The 
construction of state power in sport shed light on to why the Bulgarian sport policy 
community has always been disintegrated and dominated by key state or individual 
actors, and excluded the interests of large groups. Figure 9.1 shows the composition of 
the sport policy community in the three periods. The state power in sport displayed 
very little penetrative (the ability of state and voluntary agencies for direct 
intervention with the population) and extractive (the ability to extract resources from 
society for constructing a viable voluntary sector), and only limited negotiated (the 
ability for collaboration between state political apparatuses and sport agencies) 
capacity. 
9.2.4 Transnational and local forces in shaping sports policy 
The study provided ample evidence for conceptualising the relation between 
transnational and local forces in shaping sports policy. Although the English and 
Swiss concepts of sport diffused in most European countries and then the rest of the 
world, they did not succeed during the Capitalist period in Bulgaria 
because they 
lacked state backing. Instead, the Russian and German sports doctrine, which enjoyed 
political patronage, penetrated and shaped the visions of Bulgaria's state and sport 
managers. Until the second World War the international sports movement was 
ill- 
organised and its influence on national sport policies was rather symbolic. 
In this 
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period Bulgaria became a member of only five international sport federations, and 
marked a modest participation in four of ten Olympic Games mainly in military 
oriented sports such as shooting, riding and fencing which reflected the utilitarian 
character of sport policy. 
With the growing commodification and legitimation of international sports 
competitions, a second powerful element was added to the political rationale 
underpinning the transnational-local relation in the totalitarian and post-totalitarian 
periods. Transnational sports linkages dictated not only the rules and forms of sports 
but offered various tangible and intangible benefits. Sport was assigned a clear 
ideological mission by the Communist regime but brought relative autonomy and 
substantial financial incentives to some sport associations in the Democratic period 
(for athletics, and the BSfAA). There was one noticeable exception in the case of the 
agreement between the CYPES and the Organising Committee for the Olympic 
Games Athens 2004 for using acclimatisation training camps in Bulgaria, evidence of 
using transnational linkages to increase the catalytic capacity of the state. Figure 9.2 
summarises the conceptualisation of state-social relations in sport policy in the three 
periods. 
9.3 Operationalising strategic relations in sports policy making 
Having identified and conceptualised these four key state social-relations in sport, it is 
now possible to offer a greater degree of concreteness by spelling out how the two 
main types of strategic relations - intra-state and transnational - identified 
by this 
research worked. These will be divided into three categories (Figure 9.3) in 
accordance with Jessop, and with the author's claim that, in both state apparatuses and 
sport policy there were core and peripheral agents trying to promote their own 
projects, and to change or to sustain their places in the domain. 
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Figure 9.1 Sport policy community during the Capitalist (1878-1944), Communist 
(1944-1989) and Democratic (1989-1999) periods 
Capitalist 
Unak 
Communist 
BNSF 
cc 
Ministry of Education Ministry of Defence Ministry of Internal Affair 
BSFS 
Democratic 
Ministry of Education ýL- 
i 
BS 
120 NSFs 
1,600 Sports Clubs 
CNSF 
BOC 
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Figure 9.2 State-social relations in sports policy (1878-1999) 
State Project 
Capitalism (1878-1944) 
Communism (1944-1989) 
Democracy (1989-1999) 
State Forms of Intervention 
Issue recognition; domain structuring; 
general & specific legislation; policy 
aims; setting structural elements; 
appointments; resource allocation; 
control & assessment 
Construction of Social Power State - 
Sport Project 
Sportive manhood (1878-1944) 
Participation & elitism (1944-1989) 
Opportunity & choice (1989-1999) 
Periods 
Capitalist (1878-1944) 
Communist (1944-1989) 
Democratic (1989-1999) 
, -action 
Ideological Justification Imperative (1878-1944) 
Voluntary sector configuration Totalitarian (1944-1989) 
Consensus and mode of demands Imperative (1989-1999) 
Transnational Forces 
Russian & German political doctrines 
CE & EU political & economic 
IOC economy of ideas 
Local 
Sport conceptualisation 
Managers recruitment 
Resource allocation 
The first category concerns strategic relations between the sports domain and non- 
domain agents: 
i) between state political apparatuses and non-governmental sports 
organisations, i. e., political parties, political youth organisations, 
parliament and sports governing bodies 
ii) between non-governmental and sports organisations, i. e., social 
movements, voluntary groups and sports governing bodies 
253 
Chapter 9. Strategic Relations in Sports Policy Making - Conclusions 
Figure 9.3 Strategic Relations in sport policy making (1878-1999) 
Domain and Non-domain agents 
State political apparatuses 
(Parties, Parliament, Ministries) 
Non-governmental organisations 
(Social movements, Voluntary Groups) 
lý _ 
Non-governmental sports organisations 
(National Sports Associations & Sport 
Clubs) 
Sports organisations 
(National and Local Sports Associations) 'I 
Sports governing bodies Transnational agents 
(BOC, CYPES, NSFs) (IOC, CE, EU, IFs) 
Domain Core and Peripheral Agents 
National Sports Organisations 
(CYPES, NSFs) 
State sports apparatus 
Domain Core and Non-domain agents 
Domain core individual actors 
(NSFs key officials) 
Domain core individual actors 
(NSFs key officials, e. g. BOC) 
Local Sports Organisations 
(Sport clubs, members) 
Non-governmental sports organisations 
(NSFs, BOC) 
Non-domain individual actors 
(Party functionaries, IFs managers) 
Domain core individual actors 
(NSFs key officials, e. g. SfAA) 
iii) between sports governing bodies and transnational agents, 
i. e., sports 
organisations and the IOC, CE, EU and International Federations. 
The second category includes relations between the domain 
's core and peripheral 
agents : 
iv) between national and local sports organisations, i. e., national sports 
governing bodies and grass root clubs, sports and members; 
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v) between state apparatuses and non-governmental sports organisations, 
i. e., governmental sports agencies and voluntary sports organisations. 
The third category involves relations between the domain's core and non-domain 
agents: 
vi) between domain core and non-domain individual actors, i. e., key 
officials of sports organisations and domestic political and transnational 
actors 
vii) between domain core individual actors, i. e., key sports officials. 
The rest of this section operationalises each of these relations in turn. 
i) Relations between state political apparatuses and non-governmental sports 
organisations 
Relations between various political parties, their youth organisations, or the 
parliamentary groups and voluntary sports organisations followed similar patterns of 
development in the three periods. They were used for achieving social unity as part of 
the state-sport project, or for narrow political ends. A clear trend for encouraging and 
establishing loyal sports governing organisations by political parties in power was 
identified. The Confederation of National Sports Federations, the National Sports 
Federation or Branik in the capitalist period were all proponents or facilitators of the 
dominant pro-Nazi political ideology (particularly after 1920) in a way which lead to a 
profound politicisation of the sports domain. This was manifested in the introduction 
of a body politics underpinned by the notion of sportive manhood, and based on 
military drills and their use in asserting the unity of the nation. 
Following the same political rationale during the totalitarian period, all capitalist 
sports structures were dismantled by the Communist party and replaced by the Party- 
state controlled creature, the BSFS (by a decision of its Central Committee, 1957). 
Sports organisations' strategies stemmed from the party doctrine and clearly aspired to 
achieve political goals. A similar scenario occurred in the Democratic environment: 
since the Communist Party managed to remain in power after the 1989 
transformations, it did not have to replace BSFS as a supreme governing body. This 
only happened when the opposition UDF took over in 1992 and established the 
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CYPES. The BSFS was declared a `totalitarian' structure and had to be demolished, 
which was eventually achieved in 1998 by `democratic' means, because the 
democratisation project presupposed pluralism, and would not want to be associated 
with the brutal interventions of the previous regime. 
The relation between state political apparatuses and sport organisations had a 
significant impact on key strategies pursued in the sports domain including defining 
sports projects, setting policies, determining membership in the domain, issues 
recognition, setting up structures, resource allocation, forming loyal leaderships and 
setting standards for performance and effectiveness. 
ii) Relations between non-governmental and sports organisations 
Although evidence substantiating relations between social movements, voluntary or 
interest groups and sports governing bodies was found, nonetheless it remained 
limited to Unak and workers'-bourgeois' sports clubs in getting access to resources 
and structures (in the Capitalist period); to vocational affiliation - co-operation in 
promoting mass sport between the Trade Unions or the Communist youth organisation 
and the BSFS (during the Communist period), and to deprived groups - joint projects 
between Foundation Sport and sports federations for abandoned or children and those 
with disabilities (in the Democratic period), and were relatively little elaborated. No 
data concerning organised interests of gender groups and women in particular were 
discovered which could have brought in an interesting aspect of relations. 
iii) Relations between sports governing bodies and transnational agents 
This type of relation proved to be of significance because it brought various tangible 
and intangible privileges for governmental and non-governmental sports governing 
bodies. First, links between domestic sports organisations and transnational agencies 
served to legitimate structures and actions in the domain. These were confirmed by 
the cases of the Sport for All Association's (SfAA) assertion on the national scene 
(initially by an indirect, but lately curtailed financial IOC contribution) and TAFISA's 
global Challenge Day participation project; by CYPES's activities (legislative and 
organisational) in previously untouched areas, and the Council of Europe's resolutions 
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on doping and security measures during sporting events and the national sport law 
hearings; or strengthening the Aerobic Union's national position (in winning medals 
and getting state subsidy) and the IAF's policy for promoting aerobics internationally. 
Second, the national-transnational nexus was used by voluntary sports organisations 
for putting pressure on state apparatuses to solve issues. The most illuminating case 
was of the Bulgarian National Bank's abuse of the five Olympic rings for commercial 
gains without paying royalties to the BOC, which was empowered by the IOC as the 
sole national proprietor of this intellectual property (discussed in chapter 2). In 
another example, a transnational actor - FIFA - was called in by the Bulgarian 
Football Union to persuade the CYPES that the latter was a legitimate body, and to 
abandon the governmental campaign against it. 
Third, there is the usage of this relation for mutual benefits between domestic and 
international actors. The IOC needed the support and contribution of Communist elite 
sport for sustaining Olympic glory globally, and offered in return material resources 
and other concessions. The CYPES plan to offer the Organising Committee of the 
Games in Athens 2004 the use of acclimatisation training camps in Bulgaria extended 
sports organisations' opportunities for structural and financial privileges. 
iv) Relations between national and local sports organisations 
The constitution of the sports policy domain was a structural-creative process 
involving various state and social actors. The position of core and peripheral actors 
was presupposed by a mixture of criteria, both utilitarian (usefulness - military, 
defence, obedience), structural (Olympic-non-Olympic sports) and performance-based 
(medals, formal registration). No evidence was found suggesting a change 
from a 
peripheral to a core status within any particular period. However, transformations 
in 
the state's form and regime did bring about such changes as in the case of the 
Aerobic 
Union - from a marginal commission with a 
limited remit to a core member of the 
domain, or as in the case of the CYPES, from non-existence to the role of a central 
player in the post-totalitarian period. The opposite process - degrading 
from core to 
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peripheral status - was found to be true in the cases of Unak and BSFS during the 
Capitalist and Democratic periods respectively. 
Relations between national and local sports organisations reflected the boundaries and 
interaction between the state and civil society in each period. As discussed, the 
process of legitimation in the national sports scene - that is, of grass root clubs coming 
together to form national governing bodies, was rather premature, taking on average 
only seventeen years compared to the gradual consolidation that occurred in Western 
Europe. Although most central organisations have always tried to develop wider 
networks of clubs, they never really incorporated grass root structures in their strategic 
decision making bodies. Throughout the totalitarian period no representative of 365 
DFSs (local multi sport societies responsible for winning success into international 
arena) ever sat on the BSFS Executive Board. Similarly, local sports clubs did not 
have a say in the capitalist period, and they were denied by the state apparatus 
(CYPES) any individual or structural representation in decision-making in the 
democratic phase. CYPES provided financial support only to 40 of over 100 
organised sports in the domain. 
The exclusion of a large number of local actors from decision-making process was 
possible partly because of the criteria previously described, but also because the 
majority of local sports organisations never had a clear membership profile. 
Membership as well as the fee was usually collective (e. g. for a school, or factory), 
that is, no recognition of individual members' interests was given. A striking finding 
was that the notion of people's needs was never used as a rationale for justifying 
strategy in any sports policy document, and no sports governing body ever set out 
specifically to satisfy its members' needs. In contrast, the interests of the sport system 
(this was the dominant phraseology) as defined by a small elite were put forward and 
pursued. 
For seven years (1992-1999) the CYPES failed to produce any report informing 
society, policy-makers, or even experts of the outcomes of its policy. A culture of 
transparency and accountability of national sports organisations to their members 
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including a code of behaviour, regular reports and audits never developed. Annual 
reports were virtually exceptions and were viewed with disdain by the majority of 
national organisations, while such documents simply do not exist at a grass root level. 
Similar practices not only hindered research, but deprived the leaderships of latecomer 
organisations from having realistic ideas about past strategies and devising substantive 
outcomes, thus dooming the policy process to constant improvisations. These 
observations give substance to Marsh's (1995) fifth hypothesis, that policy networks 
in sport restrict democracy. 
The relations between national and local sports organisations, however, were not all 
residual. The case of the AU (chapter 7) signalled the emergence of practices tying up 
a private sport club (Jova Sport) with a national sports governing body (AU), in a 
mutually beneficial relationship, driven by key actors' personal interests. There is also 
evidence from other sports, such as martial arts (which was not documented in this 
project) for similar relations. 
v) Relations between state apparatuses and non-governmental sports 
organisations 
Three notable examples from each period evidenced this relationship. The relationship 
reflected the degree of state intervention in sport according to the state project and 
how it was reflected in identifying and placing core and peripheral actors in the policy 
domain. 
The promotion of body politics in the capitalist period put a governmental agency - 
Ministry of Education (ME) - at the very heart of the sports domain. It was entrusted 
with enormous power, and effectively exercised unrestricted control over all voluntary 
sports organisations, including a veto on their decisions, on key appointments, and it 
could suspend organisations. In 1941 most of the ME's role was transferred to the 
universal state youth organisation Branik. 
In the communist period similar relations, though partly disguised, re-emerged. 
It 
survived in two different governmental forms and served different missions. First was 
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in the form of the Supreme Council for Physical Culture and Sport (SCPCS, 1949- 
1957) with the purpose of establishing state control over sport and constructing the 
policy domain. Second, it existed for five years (1971-76) in the form of a Committee 
for Youth and Sport (CYS) with wide responsibilities. However, because of society's 
total subordination to the Party-state, it became apparent that the CYS was duplicating 
the functions of the BSFS, and it was dissolved. Despite being a voluntary 
organisation by constitution BSFS was in fact an extension of the Communist Party 
and the government it controlled, so strategy formulation, supervision and leadership 
appointments in sport were first of all a political matter. 
The relation between state apparatuses and voluntary sport sector in the post- 
Communist period was one of continuity rather than of change as might have been 
expected. Shortly after the CYPES was set up in 1992, it took over all key aspects of 
sport policy - conceptualising, structuring, financing and representation. More over 
the CYPES empowered itself with the role of supreme regulator in the domain. It 
established new rules for becoming a domain member through a formal legal 
registration, a procedure which was also misused selectively for repression of 
individuals and organisations. The application of this mechanism reached its absurdity 
in 1999 when the CYPES managed to obtain a court decision, and declared the 
Bulgarian Football Union illegitimate (for a spurious omission in its charter, while the 
real battle was to eliminate its president Slavkov from the domain), including all its 
grass root structures and leagues. 
Another key state apparatus with responsibility for Physical Education and sport - the 
capitalist Ministry of Education - had lesser influence over and 
degree of involvement 
in sport policy. Before 1944 voluntary sport organisations links' were clearly 
autocratic, followed by a period of more interactive relations during totalitarianism, 
and a strategy of co-operating with school sport, but still from a paternalistic position. 
Finally, the evidence from the three periods suggested clear residual patterns of 
conceptual, structural and financial dependency of the voluntary sector on state 
apparatuses. It has to be noted that the leading role taken by the state 
in the sports 
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domain was strongly advocated by non-governmental organisations as they never 
made any serious attempt to change this balance, but rather tried to comply with the 
guidelines imposed on them. As a result of this, non-governmental sport organisations 
assumed many conflicting responsibilities ranging from expelling from their ranks 
those who did not subscribe to the dominant ideology (in the capitalist and communist 
periods) to assisting a political party, for instance, in forcefully changing the names of 
the Bulgarian Muslim population (BSFS under-totalitarianism; the staff and structures 
of the Union took part in this process), or in winning elections (the BSFS in the 
democratic period). In turn, these relations discredited non-governmental 
organisations as politically dependent and clientelistic, and widened the gap between 
them and their own members. 
vi) Relations between the domain core and individual non-domain actors: 
This category of relation was established on an individual level, and involved sports 
organisations' key officials and domestic political patrons on the one hand, and sports 
officials and transnational actors on the other. The former was evidenced in each of 
the three periods and was presaged by the nature of the state's intervention in sport. 
Key positions in the sport policy domain were always considered as political 
appointments, and a clearly declared political loyalty was essential for becoming a top 
manager not only in government but also in non-governmental agencies. The pursuit 
of major strategic projects was possible only with heavy political backing. This was 
illustrated in the case of Sofia's 1992 and 1994 bids for the Winter Olympic Games. 
The links between domain managers and transnational actors was more subtle, but 
still influential for their placement, and was displayed in the democratic period. The 
IOC membership of the BOC chairman Slavkov proved critical for his survival in the 
domain. When he was arrested and for three years (1991-94) was not allowed to leave 
the country, the president of the IOC, Juan Samaranch and Director General Carrard 
three times visited the Bulgarian president and other governmental officials to seek a 
solution. Another highly influential international colleague of Slavkov - Blatter, the 
president of FIFA, was called in to save the BFU and his position as chairman. In a 
similar vain, when the president of the volleyball federation Zhajakov was made 
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redundant, he relied on his relations with the president of the International Federation, 
da Costa, to preserve his place in the policy community. 
vii) Relations between the domain 's individual core actors 
Evidence for this relation was provided in the analysis of the democratic sports policy. 
It was revealed that a handful of sports officials were sharing the key positions in the 
domain and exercising great control in channelling strategies and placements. 
Particularly indicative was that three of them (Slavkov, Hadjiev and Zhajakov) 
together occupied the leadership positions of BOC (President, Board member and 
Secretary General), BSFS (Chairman, vice-Chairman and a Board member) and 
CNSF (President and vice-presidents). However, despite the power they mutually 
shared, no evidence was found to suggest a collaborative strategy existed involving 
the institutions they represented to address such fundamental issues for the voluntary 
sector as the heavy dependency on the state. Conversely, they all advocated a great 
state intervention in sports policy formulation. These findings in our view support 
Marsh' (1995) third and fifth hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3, that: i) policy 
networks were based on structural rather than interpersonal relations, and ii) policy 
networks are a restriction of democracy because they are characterised by the 
exclusion of most interests. 
9.4. Lessons from applying critical theory to sports policy analysis 
As discussed in chapter 3 (Methodology), the application of critical theory aimed, 
amongst other things, to overcome possible weaknesses of the Strategic Relations 
approach in analysing sport policy. In order to achieve this, the rest of this section 
relates the empirical evidence found in the study to the main assumptions of critical 
theory. 
The preceding section asserted the dominance of imperative strategies and relations 
in 
sport policy making in Bulgaria in the 121 years examined in this study. 
A key 
element of these imperative strategies was the existence of a central authority 
(a state 
apparatus) initiating the transformation process by laying down new systemic rules 
and forcing participants in the domain to respect them. These were related to state 
. 
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hegemonic projects in which social, political, economic and cultural conditions 
impacted on sport policy. An alternative to this strategy could have been an interactive 
strategy whereby the same central authority stimulated a process whereby the rules of 
the sports domain were constituted while allowing participants to put forward their 
views, needs and interests. This is a situation wholly foreign to the country's 
experience. This peculiarity of Bulgaria's case helps the reader to comprehend the 
empirical lessons from applying critical theory. 
Having established the persisting features of the sports domain (imperative strategies 
and a central authority), we refer briefly to the empirical evidence in relation to the 
three key assumptions of critical theory, selectivity, emancipation and power. 
According to critical theory, the presence of a central state (or state controlled) 
authority, responsible for devising policies and standards in the sports domain, implies 
that versions of sports policy (the attainment and use of knowledge for achieving 
particular ends) were socially constructed, and that we have to critically assess our 
knowledge about them. As demonstrated by this thesis, the outcomes of sports 
policies in each of the three periods corresponded very little with their proclaimed 
aims, and depended on an authority's visions, capacity and relation to the state 
project. From a strategic perspective, the process of knowledge construction (forming 
sports policy) followed a particular pattern of. 
i) negation by a central authority of previous dominant ideas about sport, 
related practices and achievements. The Europeanisation project (1990) rejected the 
totalitarian concept of sport, in the same way as the Communist project (1945) 
neglected the bourgeois sport policy; 
ii) producing new knowledge (ideas and policies) in a non-transparent and 
accountable manner, which was not based on an objective analysis of socio-economic 
processes, thus did not recognise different groups and interests. Virtually no national 
sport policy in the three periods ever made a serious reference to particular political, 
social, economic, demographic, or global processes to justify practical actions; 
iii) assertion of the new knowledge (setting standards 
for performance and 
control) in an incontrovertible way, and accompanying measures to ensure compliance 
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with it, and allowing no contestation. Sport policies were not promoted as a 
framework, rather as ultimate ends to be aspired by all players in the domain; 
iv) avoiding any sport policy analyses from which might follow systematic 
conclusions and recommendations, which might permit let alone encourage access to 
knowledge available to policy-makers (as in Western Europe and North America). No 
public or voluntary sport administration, or academic expert produced a coherent 
piece of work addressing key issues of sport policy making. 
The research findings from the three periods confirmed that the visions of the state as 
formulated by its key managers (party or state leaders) were presented as the interests 
to be pursued by all actors in the sports domain. The lack of communication (or 
distorted interaction as in the case of the AU, Chapter 7) between individual members 
of sports clubs and the sports governing bodies and their member clubs nurtured 
further the notion of the supreme interest and domination, and prevented the formation 
of sports communities of interest. Clubs largely remained fictitious entities with no 
real identity and members, and virtually all strategic sport policy documents reflected 
the `needs of the system' and not that of the major actors involved. Instead what 
Goodin (1998: 545-6) termed communities of regard and subsumption emerged. The 
former served as sources of standards and benchmarks, that is, when an actor entered 
the sports domain he/she knowingly submitted himself to the judgement of the state as 
its supreme regulator. This was well illustrated by numerous measures, regulations 
and interventions for controlling the sports domain imposed by all state 
administrations (see introductory boxes in Chapters 3 to 5 for key state interventions). 
The latter (seen as an extension of the community of regard involved the loyal 
leaderships of voluntary sports organisations) were also described by Goodin as a 
`total institution' demanding loyalty both in conceptual and structural senses. 
The processes of knowledge construction (forming sport policy) and of forming sports 
communities of interest signal the social, political, economic and cultural selectivity 
of sport policy. Drawing from the analyses in Chapters 4 to 8, the key ways in which 
this selectivity was produced can be summarised in the following way: 
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(i) the social selectivity consisted of instilling state supremacy over civil 
society; 
(ii) the political selectivity consisted of coercively imposing a dominant 
ideology in the capitalist and communist periods, and in the post-totalitarian period, of 
a covert ideological mechanism which subjected managers and organisations 
perceived to be totalitarian, to repressions and limited support; 
(iii) the economic selectivity established centralised forms of resource 
allocation; and 
(iv) the cultural selectivity promoted particular models of sport 
consumption/production, for example, collective forms during the communist period. 
The critical theory sees emancipation as a process of alleviating the suffering of 
oppressed people and interests by empowering them. Jessop termed this process 
`interpellation', which referred to the ideological mechanism through which subjects 
were endowed with identities and social positions. Empowerment required, in the 
words of Kieffer (cited in Chalip, 1996: 313) a transformation from victim to agent. 
The three major transformations clearly brought to the fore of the sports policy 
domain groups and individuals who were not present before, but clearly were not 
victims either. This was done in a manner which had very little to do with the 
influence of organised group interests, although the transformations in sport were 
made in the name of empowering more people to have access to sport and to its 
process of decision-making. For example, the cases of the chairman of CYPES 
Barchovski, and Zhajakov as chairman of the Volleyball Federation, or various 
associations which were not present in the previous period, and were created by small 
groups without grass-root support. Empowerment in the three periods was firstly an 
ideological construct and its practical realisation was seen in terms of discriminating 
against any competing views, and secondly the know-how of complying to systemic 
rules laid down by a central authority. These required institutional structures, but 
given the process of knowledge production (imperative strategies) employed by state 
sport administrations, they have in fact sustained the very inequalities which the 
process of empowerment was trying to redress. Ray (1993: 122) identified this as a 
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socio-cultural process of organisational attachment to the organisational culture of the 
former system. 
In the Bulgarian case, the empowerment was given rather than recognised and grasped 
by those who aspired to it. As Gruber & Trickett (1987, cited in Chalip 1997: 4) 
argued: "if knowledge is merely conferred f om persons claiming to be expert to those 
classified as nonexpert, it can be more disempowering than empowering. " The 
communitarian model of a sports policy community dominated by the state as 
developed during the capitalist, communist and democratic periods demanded that 
agents lost their independence when they came together to discuss issues, to the point 
where they had no independent stance from which to disagree. This was ensured by 
coercive measures either overtly (in the laws of the 1878-1989), or covertly (in post- 
communist governmental contracts with voluntary sports organisations, as explained 
in Chapter 7). 
Athletes, grass roots sports clubs and private providers as well as many minor sports 
were neither identified as potentially active agents, nor given a place at the policy- 
decision table. But disempowering becomes possible even in an "expert 
environment", as in the case of NOCs and the IOC global TOP marketing programme. 
Indeed, based on the use of intellectual property rights, the programme gave power 
(opening up the possibility to act) to NOCs to benefit from the sale of Olympic 
symbols within a national territory. A positive result of this was that the BOC was 
able to stop the abuse of Olympic coins by the National Bank. However, the terms of 
`exclusivity' embedded in the programme prevented the BOC (and all NOCs) from 
benefiting from sponsorship from other companies which offered services or products 
in the same product/service category as the exclusive rights holder - member of TOP. 
For example, although the American insurance company John Hancock 
(a TOP 
partner) does not operate in Bulgaria, no other insurance company is allowed to enter 
into agreement with the BOC. In other words, empowerment in sports policy could 
be 
seen more as statisation of sport rather than improving the process of policy making 
by creating a culture of transparency, responsibility, consultation and accountability, 
which would enable more agents to freely take part. 
266 
chapter 9. Strategic Relations in Sports Policy Making - Conclusions 
In critical theory to date emancipation has referred to benefiting individuals or groups. 
But the analysis revealed that it should be interpreted from the point of view of all key 
members of the domain. In other words, emancipation should be viewed as opening 
up possibilities not only to individual agents (participants or managers), but to agents 
and agencies on the three other levels: between clubs and national governing bodies; 
between clubs/governing bodies and the state; and between the state and international 
agencies. These four levels of emancipation seem to be interdependent as individual 
autonomy can be seen as a precondition for the greater freedom of clubs and 
associations, in the same way as state emancipation (cultural, political or economic) is 
likely to increase possibilities for individual autonomy. 
9.5 Strategic Relations' applications outside capitalism 
Studying Bulgaria's sport policy in the 20th century from the Strategic Relations and 
critical perspectives proved a challenging and rewarding venture. They provided a 
useful framework for comprehending and interpreting events, the actions of agents 
and strategies in sports policy domain, and demonstrated that sports policy is not an 
abstract concept, but a strategic relation. So far as it can be ascertained this was the 
first study to apply the Strategic Relations approach in a non-capitalist state. Together 
with a similar study on Greek sport policy (Nassis, 1994), the two accounts provided 
some empirical evidence to substantiate Jessop's theoretical claims. This study also 
offered different interpretations of some of Strategic Relations' premises, particularly 
those concerning the role of the state and the notion of interests in sport policy 
making, in that of the state as mediator, and interests dual nature. 
Covering a century-long period was a daunting and exhausting task because ensuring 
consistency in details and comparability between three periods proved not always 
easy. Conceptualising and operationalising Strategic Relations allowed for three 
overriding tendencies pertinent to Bulgaria's sport policy to be highlighted. The 
first 
was continuity - in terms of state forms of 
intervention and state-voluntary sport 
sector relations and domain constitution. The conceptualisation and construction of 
modem sport in Bulgaria emerged more as a response to threats of the 
disintegration 
of the national territory and nationhood, than as a typical popular 
leisure pursuit. This 
267 
Chapter 9. Strategic Relations in Sports Policy Making - Conclusions 
had a huge impact on shaping interests and sports policy community identity. 
Although the 20th century saw the advance of three starkly different projects - 
Capitalist (1878-1994), Communist (1944-1989) and Europeanisation (1989-1999), 
each imposing new socio-political arrangements, the underlying ethos of sports policy 
remained the same. The continuity in sport policy was presupposed to a great extent 
by territorial and constitutional aspects of the state which were subject to complex 
geo-political developments. 
The second trend in sports policy could be termed statisation, and reflected a process 
of neutralising and channelling popular initiatives in favour of continued domination 
of the political leadership. It involved gradual growth and oppressive presence of state 
apparatuses in the sport policy domain as initiator, mediator, facilitator, allocator and 
controller of strategies. Different justifications were used for legitimising the 
statisation of the sports domain, from the need for defence and military training to 
people's well-being and allegedly greater free choice. The call for more government 
was equally popular in the political and sports domains, and was promoted by the 
state and voluntary sports organisations managers in all three periods. As sports 
organisations never managed to establish a clear membership orientation, they could 
not rely on mass support. Therefore, the material and other privileges offered by the 
state were seen as more valuable and worthy of pursuing. It is possible to suggest that, 
together with the first trend of continuity, there is in place a process of active 
reproduction of social structures in sport promoted both by state and voluntary 
organisations managers aiming at sustaining their positions and privileges. 
A similar 
process in Canadian sport, though, from a class struggle perspective was 
identified by 
Gruneau in his revision of Class, Sports and Social Development 
(1999: 14-6). 
Statisation of sport is also a dominant moment of the social construction of sports 
policy because this process had always occurred within the 
framework of building a 
new stateness. Thus, the sports domain developed along side 
the constitution of 
relatively weak states, which were not interested in promoting other powerful 
actors 
like voluntary or private groups. Even in the post 
1989 period the voluntary and 
commercial sports sectors have not developed to the stage where 
they have become 
worthy and necessary partners in a shared governance of sport, as 
is common in 
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Western Europe (Meier, 1988), North America (Chalip and Johnson, 1996), Australia 
(Mc Kay, 1986) and Japan (Nakamura, 1996). 
The final trend - incongruity - depicted the lack of correlation between state sports 
projects and their outcomes. The outcome of no state sport project in the three periods 
corresponded to what was originally envisaged. As a rule, sports projects were 
ideologically constructed and had very little ground in reality. Virtually no strategic 
sports policy document was based on a comprehensive analysis of society, and 
consequently they failed to address the interests and needs of those who were subject 
to these policies. 
Strategic relations in the sport policy domain were formed around what was perceived 
as a priority by the state hegemonic project. An essential condition for promoting 
particular strategies was the placement of individual agents. Traditionally, such a large 
group as membership of sports organisations, athletes and private actors were not well 
organised, and so found themselves excluded from the policy making process. 
Sports policy's major transformations followed the changes in state projects and 
constitutional arrangements which in the three periods were imposed substantially as a 
result of outside forces. Because of that, they inevitably involved interests different 
from those of the state and local communities. This often triggered conceptual and 
behavioural responses learned in the previous environment because agents and 
organisations found it difficult to cope with demands of transformations. Thus, the 
empowerment of agents who were to carry out the new policies was given from above 
and not accrued, and served to reinforce the statisation of sport. 
9.6. Future research opportunities 
Finally, it is believed that similar studies will unveil new avenues for further research, 
enlightenment and empowerment of scholars, policy makers and organisations which 
will alter Bulgaria's sport policy in the 21st century. In this respects, 
it seems that 
there are several promising ideas which this project brought to light and might 
be 
pursued. 
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First, as it became clear, various agents establish relations in the process of pursuing 
either their personal or the interests of the organisations they represent. As they do 
that, they also create new relations which were not necessarily envisaged before. Such 
relations that deserve further considerations emerged between the opportunities for 
participation, which all state and voluntary sports administrations tried to enhance, 
and the opportunities for control in sport gained both by participants and spectators as 
knowledgeable agents. 
Second, establishing Strategic Relations is a structural and a phenomenological 
process, that is, one which involves actors' perceptions and social settings on which 
they act. It would be important then to investigate the relations between sports policy 
aims and the structures accompanying them. 
Third, another set of Strategic Relations which this research did not address concern 
the relations between political actors and core sports domain members such as the 
groups of ethnic minorities and women, which are otherwise well politically 
organised, but lack representation in the sports policy domain. 
Fourth, the democratisation project calls for attention to Strategic Relations which will 
develop between local authorities and grass-roots sports clubs and participants. In the 
light of a century-long authoritarian state dictate in sport, it is more likely demands for 
participation to be met by municipalities (still a governmental agency), but under the 
pressure of better defined local interests. In addition, local authorities might voice 
more decisively these demands to the central government and become involved 
closely in sport policy-making process. 
Fifth, it is essential for a sport policy process and managers to identify the 
dominant, 
residual and emerging Strategic Relations as a factor in shaping policymakers' 
placement and visions. In his analysis of the Bulgarian post-Communist political 
system Karasimeonov (1998: 338) identified four types of cleavages - residual 
(those 
inherited from the pre-Communist society and manifesting themselves 
in post- 
Communist society), transitional (those which determine political 
divisions during 
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initial changes of the regime), actual (new cleavages marked by specific 
contradictions of post-Communist society) and potential (those major issues which 
might transform into actual cleavages). These are, however, also informing for the 
relations that may have to be established in order to outline the cleavages. 
Sixth, when applied to an analysis of Strategic Relations in sport policy making, the 
duality of critical theory's main concerns about emancipation and power have to 
recognised. For example, what may be seen from a local perspective by agents 
involved as a dependency situation, may well be defined as empowerment from a 
global perspective. The workings of this duality is illustrated by the IOC global 
marketing programme TOP, promoted as a means of empowering the NOCs. In 
reality, there are indications suggesting that despite structural and financial benefits, 
the programme imposes simultaneously constrains on its beneficiaries, which may 
outweigh the gains. 
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Appendix -A Sample Interview Transcript 
Interview with Mr. Christo Meranzov 
(Conducted on 1st September 1998, Sofia) 
Positions held by Christo Meranzov in the sports policy domain: 
1958 - 1962 - Head of Sports Department, Youth Communist League 
1963 - 1980 - Vice-Chairman, Bulgarian Sports Union (BSFS) 
1980 - 1989 - Deputy head of Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee 
Organisational Department; Chairman National Weightlifting 
Federation 
1990 - 1996 - Bulgarian Sports Union (BSFS) consultant 
1996 -- Executive Director, Bulgarian Power lifting Federation 
How did you get involve in sport policy making? 
Firstly I was the appointed by the Party (Bulgarian Communist Party-BCP) in 1958 as 
a head of the sports department of the Youth Communist League (YCL). Sport was 
perceived by the Party as a powerful means for mobilizing the youth in building the 
socialist society. After the 1958 BCP's decision to establish a mass voluntary sports 
organisation - BSFS - many of us from the YCL's sports department were transferred 
to leadership positions in the BSFS. There were no trained staff, and we were 
entrusted with the power to set up the new sport organisation in line with the Party's 
visions. For 17 years after 1963 I served as BSFS vice-chairman responsible mainly 
for the national Olympic teams, and the system of elite training. At the beginning, we 
did not have great experience and benefited a lot from our Soviet friends. BSFS 
invited Soviet experts to advise on setting the foundations of sport training and 
various organisational issues, including staff training. 
What was the role of the state in devising national sports policy? 
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The state (and the Party of course) promoted the idea that state affairs had to be 
decided with the participation of voluntary bodies. This was a process whereby the 
state delegates functions to various voluntary organisations, provides resources and 
holds them responsible for implementing policies. The BSFS was assigned the 
responsibility of implementing state policy in the field of sport. These functions were 
fixed in the 1949 Sport Law, which allowed the Council of Ministers to supervise and 
intervene in sport policy making, particularly when something was going wrong. It 
was an objective necessity - it was impossible for sport to do without the state. It was 
clear, of course that the BCP had a supreme leading role in society. 
Can you describe the actual process of strategic policy formulation at the time? 
As you are well aware, society's general courses of action had been decided by the 
Party, and communicated from its congresses. The Party's postulates always 
contained directions for sport, and it was a BSFS responsibility to put them into 
particular strategies and practical policies for implementation. We, believed however, 
that sports policy making should involve public discussions, and insisted on the 
participation of various partners, such as the YCL, the Trade Unions, the Ministry of 
Education, and others. There had been several declarations in this respect (in 1958 and 
1962), but the first attempt at similar discussions was organised in 1965, during an 
extended Plenary session of the BSFS which aimed to evaluate the national Olympic 
teams' participation in the Tokyo 1964 Olympics, and to devise a strategy for the 
Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. The strategic outcome of these discussions was 
the establishment of a well defined policy for elite sport, which was endorsed by the 
3rd congress (1967) of the BSFS. It was in fact, a whole system for talent 
identification, nourishment and performance, which was gradually put in place, with 
the objective of implementing state policy for achieving better results in the 
international sport competition. The concept behind the system was to implement the 
state policy with voluntary efforts. 
There were, of course, arguments in favour of greater centralisation and 
professionalisation of the system, which gradually took precedence. 
But the idea of 
having professional athletes was inconceivable. 
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Why then were certain sports given greater privileges than others? 
It was mainly because we lacked material and human resources. There was simply not 
enough in the coffers to spend, and it was not possible to rely on natural selection 
(that is, on young people coming through Sport for All programmes, explanation 
added) of athletes. So we had to put a system, which was actively seeking to identify 
and nurture sporting talents. That is why a wide network of sports boarding schools 
was suggested as one solution. 
How was the whole system financed? 
There were several financial leverages. We had always claimed that we were 
performing particular functions on behalf of the state. Therefore, sport was entitled to 
resources allocated by the same state. In addition, we had developed purposeful 
programmes for Olympic preparation which were financed by the Government. A 
third source of support was the setting up in 1965-67 of departmental Olympic teams 
(what is meant here is the teams of the Army, Police, and Army construction forces, 
which were directly financed by the respective ministries, explanation added). We did 
not hesitate to ask for more money for elite sport should there be a need, and usually it 
was given to us. The truth is, however, that the BSFS never knew what exactly its 
budget was. We always spent more than planned. 
Can you give some examples of the role of Party officials in deciding the outcome 
of particular strategies? 
You may be aware that amongst the members of Politburo, there were several 
fanatical sport fans. It was well known that the Defence minister, Dobri Djurov, and 
Todor Zhivkov's `right hand' Milko Balev were CSKA supporters, while Boris 
Veltchev, who was in charge of the ideology and culture was a Levski fan. In 
addition, because of his background, one of the oldest Politburo members, Pentcho 
Kubadinski, a close friend of Zhivkov from the resistance, was a keen supporter of 
equestrian sport and wrestling. 
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In 1985 a very dangerous situation emerged. The spark that ignited the fire was an 
ugly incident between the old rivals CSKA and Levski during the final match of the 
football cup. Members of the Politburo and other senior party officials who were not 
happy with the concept of departmental sport were prompt in wanting to settle the 
matter by issuing a party decision to dismantle these clubs. Such a solution would had 
been disastrous for the whole system of elite sport, and we tried desperately to contact 
officials in an attempt to persuade them not to proceed with the decision. The next day 
I went to see one of the Central Committee's Secretaries, Georgy Atanasov, who was 
a close mate from the years in the Youth organisation. He was very concerned and 
puzzled, and explained that there was nothing he could do, and advised that this was 
just not the right time for arguing. He agreed, however, to argue for a more ambiguous 
wording of the Party decision, which would allow, once the dust was settled, to 
restore in a disguised form what used to be departmental sport. 
The BSFS was not even consulted. A harsh decision was made public on the next day 
and we had to obey and to reshape a significant part of the sports system. 
I can also tell you another personal encounter with Baj (a nick name 
for uncle) 
Pentcho. At the time he was chairman of the Wrestling Federation. He loved very 
much the mass wrestling festivals held in villages, followed 
by mass cavortings. 
Wrestling was doing very well but we clearly needed more resources to ensure 
its 
place as a major contributor to Olympic Success. The best solution 
in our view was to 
have a Council of Ministers's decree. We also knew that, 
had we tried to promote this 
decision through official channels, it would not stand a chance. So I send the proposal 
for a decree to the Prime Minister but he categorically 
denied to consider it. Then I 
went to see Baj Pentcho who explained that there was another way 
to get this proposal 
through. He promised to persuade the head of the Politburo, 
T. Zhivkov, to sign the 
proposal first, and then it could be processed with no obstructions 
in the Council of 
Ministers. And this is exactly what happened. The government issued 
its first decree 
relating to a single sport, and the resources needed 
for wrestling were secured. So 
lobbying and having influential patrons was essential 
for the success of sport policy. 
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Were there any contingent issues between the various branches of state 
administration and the sport governing body? 
Various contests and rivalries were a permanent feature of sports policy-making. As I 
said earlier, at the beginning sport did not have its own leadership cadres, and many of 
us who worked in the Youth organisation were transferred to leadership positions in 
the newly formed Bulgarian Sports Union (BSFS, 1958). Because sport was 
predominantly a youth activity, and due to many youth leaders placement in the sports 
union, a sense of closeness and co-operation was created between these two spheres. 
Thus, when in 1967-8 the Party first tried to establish a state structure responsible for 
youth and sport, this was seen as a real treat by the Youth organisation. The YCL 
refused to accept the supremacy of the state Committee for Youth and Sport (CMS), 
and asked the Party's central committee to appoint one of the secretaries of the Youth 
organisation to be in charge of sport. Moreover, the YCL also demanded that one of 
the BCP's Central Committee's Secretaries should be made responsible for sport and 
the CMS. 
The strategic idea behind the introduction of the CMS was a statisation of the Youth 
organisation and sport, a squabble which lasted until 1976. Bulgarian sports 
achievements at the Mexico 1968 and Munich 1972 Olympic Games clearly raised the 
ambitions of Party and state officials for greater control over sport, and in 1971 a 
second attempt for direct state governance of youth and sport was made, with the 
setting up of another CMS. This created enormous bureaucracy, overlap of functions 
and posts between voluntary and public agencies. Eventually, the Party July's plenary 
session (1976) brought this situation to an end, when the CMS was dissolved and the 
YCL and the BSFS were left as the only players in their fields, without 
duplicating 
state structures. 
There were, of course, tensions between different sports competing for greater shares 
of the cake, which were fueled by local ambitions of many party and sports officials, 
who was also part of the game. There were numerous attempts for promoting projects 
favoring particular locations, say for setting up of a sport boarding school or a 
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swimming pool which ran counter to the general strategy for talent identification and 
elite sport development. 
The East-West ideological tension was clearly mirrored in sport, and the striving 
to outperform the ideological opponent urged the use of drugs. What was the 
role of BSFS in supplying drugs to athletes? At the time you were president of 
the weightlifting federation, and as we know, four Bulgarian weight-lifters had 
been stripped of of their Olympic gold medals for drug taking. 
There had been many speculations about this issue. I have said several times in reports 
and interviews that the BSFS was never involved in importing and supplying of drugs 
to athletes. Indeed, we did have a well organised medical service for monitoring 
athletes which involved administering drugs for treatment, but supplying and 
encouraging drug taking was never part of our policy. It is also true that some coaches 
were prepared to push their athletes to extremes in order to win, and that involved 
taking performance enhancing substances. 
People must recognise that there were other issues at stake, and that a positive drug 
sample is never simply a case of misfortune or foolishness on the part of athletes and 
administrators. I don't understand the people who want to discredit Bulgarian sport. 
How do you see the role of the BSFS after the transformations? 
A lot has been said about transformations, and the way sport should develop in the 
future. I think that it would be political short-sightness not to use the rich experience 
of the sports union due to its ideologically subordinate position in the previous 
regime. Unfortunately, due to its ambivalent position with regard to transformations, 
and its inability to take a clear stance, BSFS is very open to criticism. We developed 
in 1994 a clear conception for its role in the new environment, but this was never put 
into practice. It is important that the state differentiates between the functions to 
be 
performed by the state committee for sport (CYPES) and the voluntary organisation 
(BSFS). It is a shame that the BSFS is manifesting itself as an opposition to the ruling 
class and not as a voluntary body committed to providing sports services. 
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There has been and there will always be a need for voluntary sport organisations, and 
BSFS should play an important role here. I believe that the state will recognise this 
necessity and sooner or later will put things right by giving the voluntary sector 
greater freedom and will start to consider it as its partner, and not as a totalitarian 
creation. 
299 
